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INTRODUCTION 
Tango is the traditional dance of Argentina: emotional and dynamic, it perfectly represents the features 
of a country which is a paradox between astonishing beauties and excellencies and disappointing 
performances. Volver is one of Carlos Gardel’s most famous and emotional tangos: its melancholic 
notes suit the image of a country trapped within this paradox. “Somos number one, como también lo peor, con 
la misma facilidad”: we are the best, as well as the worst, with the same readiness. These words, from the 
song “La argentinidad al palo” by the Argentine band Bersuit Vergarabat, well convey the idea of a 
country that does not know mediocrity, but can just perform either too well or too badly.  
These features of the Argentine people involve not only the society but also the economy of the South 
American country. This is why this thesis aims at describing a country that has not taken advantage of 
its huge economic potential, and has often dissipated it implementing economic policies that prevented 
Argentina from becoming one of the most rich and developed countries in the world. This has 
happened several times over the course of the last decades (especially after World War II), and also in 
the last decade, after the harsh economic crisis suffered in 2002 following Argentina’s default on its 
public debt. Since then Argentina has been ruled by the party “Frente para la Victoria” (Front for 
Victory), a peronist movement led by Néstor Kirchner (died in 2010) first and then by his widow 
Cristina. During this period the country has experienced an unprecedented economic growth and a 
remarkable social development, a process which allowed millions of citizens come out of poverty. 
However, despite these remarkable economic and social achievements, I argue that inappropriate 
economic policies implemented during this period did not help Argentina to grow further and were 
detrimental for the country’s role as a relevant regional and global (as a member of the G20) member. 
Protectionism, an unfriendly attitude to foreign investors, ineffective industrial policies are leading 
Argentina to a position of self-isolation within the international economic community, with 
consequences that could be very negative for the country’s future in the medium-long term. 
The main research question of this thesis is aimed at exploring the relations between the internal 
dimensions of Argentine economic and political development and the external dimensions, in order to 
assess the country’s potential in terms of regional (MERCOSUR – South American level) and global 
competitiveness. It is divided in three parts that adopt a variety of approaches (exploring economic 
institutions and policies, econometric analysis, international political economy and international 
relations) that have a clear common thread. Their purpose is to highlight how decisions and economic 
policies have affected the country’s domestic growth, its external competitiveness, its role on the global 
economic stage, and the reputation it has within multilateral economic fora such as the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of 20 (G20) and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR). 
The first part of this research, entitled “Argentina: patterns of economic growth”, provides a 
comprehensive analysis of Argentina’s economic development model that has been implemented over 
the course of the last decade. In clear contrast with the neo-liberal policies of the 1990s, the Kirchner 
governments adopted policies characterized by a strong intervention of the State in the management of 
the economy and by protection of national industries. I will try to highlight the flaws of this model, 
which have prevented Argentina from moving towards the status of a fully developed country. I will 
argue that the export-led growth model, although it did not lead to a ‘re-primarization’ of the economy, 
relied too much on the agricultural exports in order to increase the government revenues and on a weak 
exchange rate as the main tool of industrial policy. Argentina would need different policies to achieve 
growth that might last even in the long run, which has to be pursued through structural reforms rather 
than only by periodical currency devaluations. The last chapter of this part will provide a comparison 
between three different development theoretical frameworks: structuralism, a theory elaborated by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) based on public intervention 
fostering the development of a national industry through the adoption of protectionist and inward-
looking policies; neo-liberalism, characterized by privatizations and public disengagement from the 
management of the economy, which is entirely left to the rational actions of markets; new structural 
economics, a relatively recent paradigm that tries to be halfway between the first two theories, and tries 
to corrects the excesses of neo-liberalism acknowledging the importance of the public action in order 
to address market failures.    
The second part of the thesis is entitled “Argentina in the context of South American integration” and 
offers an empirical study of the trading flows in the region and in Argentina. Through the 
implementation of the Gravity equation, an econometric model particularly useful to explain the 
determinants of trading flows, I will try to assess how regional trade  in Latin America is  influenced by  
variables such as the membership to regional organizations for economic integration, like the Andean 
Community of Nations (CAN) and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and other 
macroeconomic determinants such as the bilateral real exchange rate. The following section will focus 
on a similar econometric analysis of Argentina’s trade patterns with some key partners (Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay, as members of the MERCOSUR, and the European Union, China and the United States).   
The third part of this work is dedicated to provide “A view from the outside: Argentina in the global 
context”. I will analyze Argentina’s behavior and role in three important international organizations: the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of 20 (G20) and MERCOSUR. The aim is to assess, 
also from an historical perspective, whether the country’s relationship with these organizations has 
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been conducive to development within the global economic system or, on the contrary, Argentina has 
acted as an ‘outlier’ in international economic relations. This might drive the country towards a position 
of isolation which might constrain its potential as a main actor both in South America and in the 
current context of a changing multilateral system.  
An appendix, containing three interviews, concludes this work. The interviews are the result of a short 
period of research conducted in Buenos Aires in August 2012. . The first and second interviews are 
mainly focused on Argentina’s domestic economic performance and development with respect to its 
international competitiveness. Martín Schorr, researcher at the Latin American Faculty of Social 
Sciences (FLACSO), and José Maria Fanelli, Professor of Economics at the University of Buenos Aires, 
will provide two alternative views of the economic and industrial policies adopted by the Argentina’s 
government during the last decade. The third interview was given by Verónica Moreno, a former 
advisor at the Foreign Relations of the Presidency of Argentina and offers a broad perspective of 
Argentina’s role and position within the global system 
A preliminary digression about the methodology is necessary. The thesis is heterogeneous in terms of 
the different research methods and approaches implemented: the potential drawbacks in terms of lack 
of consistency among the different parts are avoided by the fact that all the three parts contribute to 
provide a complete and detailed analysis of Argentina’s economic performance from different angles 
and perspectives. The first part is intended to be a useful and necessary introduction that offers an 
analysis of the model of development followed in Argentina during the last decade. It then compares 
different theories of economic development in order to highlight strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach and to convey the message that economic policies should be designed ex-post, after a careful 
consideration of a country’s situation in terms of resource endowments. The second part is empirical 
and offers a quantitative analysis of Argentina’s trading flows in the context of South American 
integration. The Gravity model of international trade, through the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation technique, was proved to be the most efficient econometric methodology to 
research on these issues. The main objective of this part is to assess the impact of economic 
organizations and of key macroeconomic variables (i.e. the bilateral real exchange rate and its 
variability) in promoting or depressing regional trade. This will be particularly useful with respect to the 
troubled economic relationship between Argentina and Brazil. Finally, the third part adopts a 
methodology typical of the International Political Economy (IPE) analysis. The three case studies on 
the IMF, G20 and MERCOSUR will be included into a theoretical framework of negotiating behavior 
adopted by emerging powers, and analyzed from the perspective of neo-liberal institutionalism which, 
in my view, is the approach that suits the current context of international economic relations best. 
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To conclude, the three parts are linked by a common thread which is aimed at assessing in which 
direction Argentina’s “tango” is moving, from the domestic to the regional and global level. The 
country’s economic experience has been characterized by swings between growth and recession, 
indebtedness and fiscal soundness, production diversification and technological upgrade and re-
primarization ,further pushes for integration with the rest of South American countries and the world 
and progressive isolation. Where is Argentina going, and where should it go? This thesis will try to offer 
an answer to these questions.   
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1.1 South America and Argentina: an overview of the social and economic rising of the 
region in the last few years 
 
1.1.1 Introduction and structure of the chapter 
South America’s economic history was historically characterized by underdevelopment, spread poverty 
and difficulty in catching up with developed countries. Argentina has partly been an exception, since it 
was one of the world’s richest country until World War II, before being trapped in a deadlock of slow 
development and periodical recessions. However, over the course of the past decade the region has 
faced an unprecedented period of economic growth, social progress and political stability, favored both 
by internal and external circumstances and factors. 
This chapter will analyze this dynamics, showing achievements, major strengths and future challenges 
for the region. It will set the scene before focusing more in detail on Argentina’s case.  
1.1.2  A picture of the evolution of economic and social development in LA throughout the 20th 
century 
South America has been one of the regions with the highest potential in terms of economic growth, but 
it has also been one of the main disappointing cases in recent economic history. A region provided with 
a unique endowment of natural resources, its path of development had been characterized until a 
decade ago by slow economic growth, inequality and political instability. There are at least two long-
term basic, structural explanations for this process: 
- The political and social structures established by the Spanish colonizers, who based their power 
on an unequal distribution of land (the most common property institution was the land-tenure 
system, called “latifundio”). These structures led to inequality in the distribution of power even in 
contemporary times, with a high degree of  concentration in industry and finance (Bulmer 
Thomas 2003), and to the establishment of political and economic élites that characterized the 
social structure of Latin American countries until very recent years;  
- The distribution of the endowments of natural resources is not homogenous among the South 
American countries. It is possible to address this phenomenon as the “commodity lottery” 
(Bulmer Thomas 2003), in the sense that the agricultural products that need some processing 
before being exported provided stimulus for the development of an industrial sector in the 
countries well endowed  with those resources. On the other hand, commodities with no 
forward linkages, in the sense that they do not require much processing, did not help the 
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formation of manufacturing industries, leaving certain economic systems at lower levels of the 
value chain. An example for the first case is meat in Argentina, while for the second case a clear 
example is guano in Peru.  
These two explanations have to be considered as a whole, since political and economic stability and 
equality and richness in natural resources are both necessary, but not sufficient conditions to guarantee a 
stable development path in the South American region. Therefore, a country well-endowed with 
commodities could fall in the trap of the so-called “resource curse” 1if this condition, potentially 
favorable, is not accompanied by a sound political and economic environment, and viceversa. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) showed that economic growth depends very much on how a 
society is organized in terms of institutions, since growth emerges when political institutions allocate 
power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, when they create effective 
constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders.   
A simple variable to look at is the GDP per capita, which during the 20th century increased from a value 
of 223 current US$ per capita in 1913 to a value of 804 current US$ per capita in 2000 (World Bank). It 
is possible to obtain interesting information about the slow economic growth occurred in the region by 
looking at a comparison between Latin America and the Caribbean2 (LAC) and the other most 
important regions in the world, in order to grasp an idea about the paths of economic and social 
development undertaken throughout the last decades. I chose South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
China as a representation of the developing countries, European Union, United States and Japan as a 
representation of the developed ones. 
The first set of data refers to the level of GDP per capita, considered from 1960 to 2010. Figure 1 
shows how strikingly different was the performance of LAC countries with respect to the more 
developed regions, even if the difference in the GDP per capita was not so impressive at the beginning 
of the period covered. On the other hand, it is also remarkable that LAC is the region that obtained the 
                                                          
1
 The “resource curse” is a paradox which links rich endowments of natural resources with poor levels of economic 
development, mainly due to a mismanagement of these resources and corruption by the ruling élites. South American 
countries suffered from this phenomenon, but today it might be the right moment to revert the direction (Radon 
2013). However, recent empirical studies showed that a clear correlation between natural resource abundance and 
either a ‘blessing’ or a ‘curse’ in terms of economic development, but that the pre-condition for a good exploitation of 
those resources is the enforcement of a sound institutional and fiscal system (Canuto and Cavallari 2012).  
2
 Even if the chapter is about South America for the elaboration of the data presented in this section I had to consider 
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) as a whole, according to the type and availability of data. Nevertheless, it is 
important to underline that South America differs from LAC, in the sense that the former region only the countries 
from the channel of Panama southward. 
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best performance over time among the developing countries, achieving an average level of 8698 current 
US$ per capita. 
Figure 1.1.1 - GDP per capita, LAC versus developed and developing regions  
(current US$, 1960-2010) 
 
Source: World Bank Databank 
According to the growth in GDP per capita, I considered the same period of 50 years by computing 
the average value for each decade. In this case, the results show that LAC suffered from a heavy fall in 
the growth of GDP per capita during the ‘80s, obtaining a negative average. The trend of this variable 
follows that one of  GDP growth: the dramatic slowdown during 1980 and 1990 is due to the 
economic crises (originated by debt and high inflation) that hit the region in that period. 
Table1.1.1 - Average growth of GDP per capita, LAC versus developed and developing regions 
(%, 1960-2010) 
REGION 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
2.6 
 
3.1 -0.7 1.5 2.0 
South Asia 3.7 0.6 3.0 3.1 5.4 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
2.3 0.9 -0.9 -0.3 2.2 
 
European 
Union 
4.0 
 
2.6 2.1 2.0 1.0 
United 
States 
2.8 2.2 2.2 2.1 0.6 
China 2.4 4.3 7.71 9.2 9.8 
Japan 8.5 3.3 3.3 0.9 0.7 
 
Source:  elaboration of the author on World Bank Databank data 
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It is also interesting to give a  look at a set of social variables, and to consider  the improvements in the 
health conditions of people as a proxy to assess the social development occurred in these countries. I 
present the data regarding the evolution of life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rates, 
considered for the same period (1960-2010) and regions. 
Table 1.1.2 -  Life expectancy at birth, LAC versus developed and developing regions  
(1960-2010) 
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Latin 
America 
&Caribbean 
56.1 60.1 64.4 68.2 71.6 74.1 
South Asia 43.2 48.6 55.3 58.5 61.8 65.2 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
40.5 44.4 48 49.5 49.8 54.2 
European 
Union 
69.4 71 72.9 74.8 77.1 79.6 
United 
States 
69.7 70.8 73.6 75.2 76.6 78.2 
China 43.4 62.9 66.9 69.4 71.2 73.2 
Japan 67.6 71.9 76 78.8 81 82 
 
Source: World Bank Databank 
 
Figure 1.1.2 - Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1000 inhabitants under 5 years), 1960-2010,  
LAC versus developed and developing regions 
 
Source: World Bank Databank 
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The data show that there was a continuous improvement in life expectancy at birth and a steady 
decrease in infant mortality rate in each region, but LAC, together with China, recorded the best 
performance catching up with the most developed regions. 
To summarize, it is possible to say that LAC countries improved a lot in terms of social and health 
conditions, ranking in the first position among the developing regions. The performance in the field of 
economic development was less impressive: GDP per capita has not increased so much as expected 
because of a general slow growth during  the second half of the 20th century and because of a decade of 
recession in the ‘80s (the so-called ‘lost decade’ of Latin America). 
Nevertheless, the first decade of the 21st century saw a break in the cycle of stagnation where the region 
was trapped and a strong economic recovery, which consisted not only in the increase of the general 
wealth of the region (in some countries GDP grew at really impressive rates, recording in some years 
double-digit growth percentages), but also in a more equal and comprehensive income distribution.  
Next paragraph will shed light on the reasons why these performances were disappointing at first and 
impressive in the last years. 
 
1.1.3 South America since the ‘50s: a series of ups and downs 
As shown in the previous paragraph, South American countries experienced a quite disappointing 
economic performance since the second half of the 20th century. The path of development was not 
regular but it is described by periods of ‘boom’ and others of stagnation or recession. It is important to 
take into account that both internal and external factors are responsible for this volatile macroeconomic 
performance: 
- Among the internal factors, the models of economic development experimented throughout 
different decades played an important role in determining the success, or the failure, in boosting 
growth; 
- Among the external ones, macroeconomic events such as the oil shock in 1974 or the debt 
crisis of East-Asian countries in 1997-1998, but also the external influence of international 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in determining the economic 
policies undertaken by the national governments. 
In the period following  World War II, South America experienced one of its fastest-growing periods, 
starting a transition towards the modernization of its economic structure. The acceleration was the 
result of the increase in the rate of capital accumulation and of factor productivity growth (Syrquin 
1986). The prevailing model of growth at that time was based on the Import Substitution 
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Industrialization (ISI), which was aimed at supporting the creation of a modern national industrial 
sector through state intervention and protectionism in trade policy: therefore, it can be defined as an 
“inward-looking” approach (Bulmer Thomas 2003). This  approach was promoted by Raúl Presbisch, 
first Secretary of the CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America), an organization created by 
the United Nations in order to foster economic growth in this region. The ISI was implemented to 
follow the indications of the infant industry strategy in all the nations where the first stages of 
industrialization had already been completed (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay). 
Nevertheless, if this strategy obtained success in East Asian countries, which started from an analogous 
level of development, in South America it was less effective. Two fundamental limits in the South 
American context prevented the ISI from being successful. The first one was  the insufficient 
investment rate, determined by the difficulty of the domestic private sector in having access to the 
capital necessary to support large-scale investment in new industries. The second one  was the small 
amount of  manufactured exports. First of all, domestic markets were still too little to stimulate a fast 
growth in the productive capacity of the national industrial sectors. Secondly, the  Effective Rate of 
Protection (ERP), which resulted as a combination of the nominal tariff on competing imports and also 
other forms of protection, was too high. Therefore, high costs (determined by the protection rate and 
by the oligopolistic structure of the internal markets) and inefficiencies (determined by ‘bottlenecks’ at 
the entrance of market) prevented the industrial products from penetrating the world market, 
differently from East Asian countries (Bulmer Thomas 2003).  As Syrquin (1986) has also shown at the  
empirical level, the main difference in the transformation of the economic structure between South 
America and other semi-industrialized countries was represented by the continued relatively low 
participation in international trade. 
The failure of this strategy led to a ‘u-turn’ of the choices in economic and foreign trade policies in 
some countries of the region (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay). The ISI was replaced in the ‘70s by the 
“export substitution strategy” which consisted essentially in trade liberalization. On one hand, exports 
were promoted through systematic currency devaluations aimed at depreciating the Real Exchange Rate 
(RER); on the other hand, imports were  also encouraged by lowering tariffs and the other distortionary  
commercial policies that were used to protect national companies against foreign products (Bulmer 
Thomas 2003). These radical changes were promoted by the military dictatorships which took power 
during that period (Pinochet in Chile, Videla in Argentina and Bordaberry in Uruguay) and were 
considered as ‘shock therapies’ that would have helped the countries to gain a sustained level of 
economic growth.  However, this strategy did not prove to be effective because it did not reflect an 
increase of productivity in the manufacturing industries of South American countries. Differently from 
East Asian countries, Latin American economies started producing items that did not match with 
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global demand for high value added products and got stuck in the so-called “middle income export 
trap”, consisting in a rise of the shares of global exports for certain products whose valued added was 
quite low. In other words, the region increased its global market share overall, but its improvement in 
the export competitiveness did not include many high-tech products, differently from the East Asian 
tigers (Palma 2011). This policy, that went on also in the 1990s after the implementation of the neo-
liberal policies fostered by the Washington Consensus, was characterized by a chronic deficiency of 
effective demand for its non-tradable sector, as a consequence of undervalued labor and overvalued 
exchange rates (Palma 2011).   
The second ‘pillar’ of this new set of policies was determined by the need of solving the lack of capital 
to finance investments. The opportunity was offered by two conditions that materialized during those 
years: 
- The growth of the “Eurocurrency market”,3 which generated a huge pool of international 
liquidity controlled by international banks; 
- The spread of branches and representative offices of international banks in South America 
(Bulmer Thomas 2003). 
Loans offered to Governments by banks were considered much more convenient than loans offered by  
International Financial Institutions (IFI) like the IMF, because they had very few strings attached in 
terms of conditionality. That is why most of South American states shifted to this ‘debt-led growth’ 
strategy, by borrowing from banks at a growing pace. This made the level of public debt grow 
dramatically in a few years: 
Table 1.1.3 - Banks’ share of public external debt, LAC countries (%, 1960-1982) 
Year Share of public external debt 
1960 16.4% 
1970 19.5% 
1975 42.9% 
1979 56% 
1980 56.6% 
1981 57.6% 
1982 57.6% 
Source: CEPAL – IDB 
                                                          
3
 The “Eurocurrency market” describes any currency holding outside the issuing country. It allowed for more 
convenient borrowings, thus leading to an improvement in the international flow of capital for trade between 
countries and companies.  
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The situation became unsustainable after the two oil crises, because the nominal rates of interest on the 
debt raised over the rate of growth of nominal exports. The debt-export ratio deteriorated rapidly by 
1980, reaching the level of 200% in most South-American states. The implosion of this strategy led not 
only to severe economic recessions, but also to the fall of some authoritarian regimes, such as in 
Argentina (1983), where the severe defeat in the war of the Falkland/Malvinas islands suffered from 
the United Kingdom put the military dictatorship to an end. 
It took quite a long time for South American countries to recover from the debt crises: during the 
1980s GDP per capita grew by only 0.9% per year (Ocampo 2007) and the attempts made in economic 
policy in order to achieve macroeconomic stability failed. The main structural imbalance was 
represented by the combination of high financial exposure (indebtedness) and the relatively low trade 
dependence, differently from East Asian countries which were able to carry out the necessary 
adjustments thanks to a large external trade sector (Bulmer Thomas 2003). In order to improve the 
trade balance, a strategy based on import suppression and systematic currency devaluations was 
implemented. It worked in the short run, but as inflation started to skyrocket (in some countries it 
reached a three-digit level by the end of the ‘80s) and real incomes kept on falling, it became clear that 
stagflation4 could not be sustained for long. Therefore, the lost decade of Latin America ended with the 
awareness that, again, the economic policies implemented had not been effective in promoting 
sustained growth and development. 
The 1990s were marked by another change of the economic policy paradigm characterized by a 
neoliberal approach. Under the supervision of the IMF, South American countries embraced the 
principles expressed in the so-called “Washington Consensus”.  Coined in 1989 by John Williamson, an 
economist from the Institute for International Economics, the term referred to a set of ten policy 
measures to be implemented in Latin American countries troubled by the debt crisis and the 
macroeconomic imbalances of the 1980s in order to obtain macroeconomic stability. These principles 
mainly advocated for privatizations and the opening of the economy to external trade and FDIs 
(Williamson 2004). High inflation (that in some cases and for certain periods turned into 
hyperinflation5) was finally put under control, in some cases thanks to the adoption of fixed exchange 
                                                          
4
 The term “stagflation” is referred to a macroeconomic situation where stagnation in the economic growth is 
accompanied by a rise in prices. South American countries experienced episodes of very high inflation (sometimes 
hyperinflation) in many cases, leading to a worsening of their macroeconomic balance.   
5
 The most commonly accepted definition of hyperinflation is from Phillip Cagan (1956), who wrote The Monetary 
Dynamics of Hyperinflation. He defined hyperinflation as starting in the month when the monthly inflation rate is 
above 50% and concluding in the month when the rate goes again below 50% and stays below this threshold for at 
least a year.  
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rate systems (as the convertibility regime in Argentina, see chapter 1.2), but the region’s vulnerability to 
external shocks was still high, as dramatically shown by another tequila crisis, a new debt crisis 
propagated from Mexico to the rest of the region that reversed for a period (1994-95) the capital flows 
into the region and led to a new temporary recession (Bulmer Thomas 2003). The openness of South 
American economies was part of the inclusion of the region in the new wave of globalization, although 
this process was not so successful during these years. As explained in the above, another detrimental 
effect of these new policies was the disappointing performance in terms of global trade, due to a 
widespread decrease of labor productivity. Moreover, the liberalization of capital controls allowed the 
region to establish their own bond markets and to borrow from the rest of the world. However, 
financial openness was not managed very well in countries like Argentina and Brazil, with the former 
obliged to default on its external debt at the end of 2001. This episode was the final example of a long-
term economic pattern characterized by the constant failure to achieve stable and lasting economic 
growth.6 
Then the 2000s came. An unprecedented decade of growth and stability marked a new era for the 
economy of South America. Figure 1.1.3 and Table 1.1.5 show the performances of five countries7, 
with Argentina being the fastest growing at an annual average rate of 5.5% between 2002 and 2012.  
 
Figure 1.1.3 – Annual GDP growth (%, 1992-2018)* 
 
Source: IMF * 2013-2018: forecasts 
 
 
                                                          
6
 The definition of ‘stable economic growth’ should involve limited macroeconomic fluctuations in prices, employment 
and production. Limited and regular fluctuations around a country’s business cycle can increase the level of 
predictability and contribute to the creation of an appropriate environment for lasting economic growth.  
7
 I chose to represent data of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela since they are the biggest South 
American countries in terms of GDP.  
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Table 1.1.4 – Average annual GDP growth (%, 2002-2012) 
Country 
% 
Growth 
Argentina 5.55 
Brazil 3.53 
Chile 4.46 
Colombia 4.53 
Venezuela 3.72 
Source: personal elaboration on IMF data 
But it is not all about GDP growth. Tangible improvements have been observed also with respect to 
other macroeconomic variables, all indicating a shift towards stability. Inflation normalized around 
single-digit values (with the exception of Argentina and Venezuela, Figure 1.14), while no new debt 
crises seem at the horizon, as per the relatively low values of the public debt-to-GDP ratios observed 
during the last decade (the example of Chile is quite striking at this respect, with a level of 11.2% in 
2012 – Figure 1.1.5).  
Figure 1.1.4 – Inflation rate (%, 1992-2018)* 
 
 
Source: IMF * 2013-2018: forecasts 
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Figure 1.1.5 – Public debt-to-GDP ratio (%, 1991-2014) 
 
Source: IMF * 2013-2014: forecasts 
The main reasons that help explain this season of growth and stability are two. The first one is external 
and is represented by the high prices of agricultural and mining commodities on international markets. 
The rise of exports, both in terms of volume (thanks to the increasing demand from big emerging 
markets, mainly China) and values also increased the fiscal revenues of South American states, 
providing them with sources of capital and preventing them from implementing once again debt-led 
growth strategies. The second one is internal and derives from the sustained domestic demand, thanks 
to the improved conditions of millions of people who finally came out of poverty conditions. The 
presence of a strong domestic demand is one of the main reasons why South America was much less 
affected by the global financial crisis of 2008-09 and the recovery was almost immediate and strong. 
 
1.1.4 What’s next? 
Perspectives for the next years still look positive for South America’s economy. According to the 
forecasts released by the IMF (Figure 1.1.3), GDP growth will remain positive, although not so high as 
in the previous decade, which looks normal as developing countries catch up with developed ones 
(Barro 1996). Real output growth moderated to 3% in 2012 after 4.5% in 2011 in the Latin American 
region overall and it seems it will stabilize around this level. The potential for sustained growth is still 
intact, since domestic demand is growing and many countries are still taking advantage of favorable 
conditions on the global markets for their exports of commodities. 
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However, some risks are likely to occur in the medium term. First of all, despite a generally favorable 
external environment, the region’s growth rates are slowing down. It seems that production possibilities 
are being exhausted in a region where improvements in physical and technological infrastructures have 
not kept up with strong output performance. This resulted into “supply bottlenecks” that reduced 
growth in Latin American countries because of restrictions in some of the inputs of the production 
process that do not allow output to continue growing at previous rates, thus preventing the production 
possibility frontier from expanding further (Talvi and Munyo 2013). Moreover, a key risk  for the 
region is a reversal of the tailwinds of easy financing conditions determined by high commodity prices. 
The slowdown of China’s growth, which is a main buyer of South American agricultural and mining 
goods, might trigger a fall of their prices. Moreover, at the domestic level, current account surpluses 
have weakened in recent years and asset prices are on the rise. Therefore, a deterioration of the 
financial sector balance sheets might look likely to happen (IMF 2013a).   
In conclusion, more reforms, most of them of a structural nature, are needed for South America to 
keep growing. Labor costs should be reduced in some countries (mainly in Brazil) and measures to 
enhance the human capital are needed (improvements of the education system, both in terms of quality 
of teaching and equal access), while product market reforms and infrastructural projects should be 
implemented in order to release the bottlenecks that prevent domestic economic systems from being 
fully competitive at the global level.   
1.1.5 Conclusions: challenges ahead 
This chapter focused on the long-term economic performance of South America. After World War II, 
the region struggled to find its way to undertake a pattern of stable and sustained growth, despite its 
huge potential thanks to a unique endowment of natural resources. Too conservative social structures, 
as a legacy of the Spanish colonial period, as well as a mismanagement of these resources (the so-called 
“resource curse”) prevented South America from achieving a satisfactory performance in terms of 
growth, which remained volatile and very uneven among the different groups of the population.  
Very different economic paradigms were adopted: the ISI strategy was suddenly replaced between the 
1970s and the 1980s by an opening to free trade and external indebtedness, which led to 
macroeconomic crises and sluggish growth due to a lack of international competitiveness of South 
American manufacturing. The neo-liberal policies adopted in the 1990s were not effective in providing 
the region with stable and evenly spread growth, given its still high financial vulnerability to the rest of 
the world, as shown by the Argentine debt crisis of 2001. 
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The 2000s were finally a decade of sustained growth, thanks to high prices of commodities and the 
growing demand from major developing countries. It is now the moment for South America not to 
waste the big achievements obtained, not only in economic but also in social terms, and to grow up the 
ladder from a middle income region to a high income one. In order to be able to do so, the region has 
to remove its supply bottlenecks that prevent it from expanding its production frontier and taking full 
advantage of the favorable external conditions. 
Argentina is the country that probably best summarizes the contradictions of the uneven and unstable 
development path in the region. In the following chapters I will focus on its economy, identify 
problems, compare strategies and suggest economic policy indications to overcome them.  
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1.2  An analysis of Argentina’s economic policies (2003-2013) 
1.2.1 Introduction 
Argentina is South America’s second biggest economy. A member of the G20, the country is 
considered a key player in the region and it has been able to strongly recover from the severe economic 
crisis of 2001-2002. The export-led growth of the last decade brought about an unprecedented period 
of economic boom, because of its stability and success in reducing poverty and income inequalities. 
However, several problems seem to pose at risk the sustainability of the development model 
implemented by the Kirchner governments (Néstor from 2003 to 2007 and his wife Cristina Fernández 
since then). An excessive intervention of the State in the management of the economy, together with 
the typical features of a closed economic system, could limit the growth potential of Argentina, which is 
endowed of high quality resources both in terms of natural and human capital. 
This chapter will analyze the economic policies implemented by the Argentine Governments in recent 
years and uncover the problems that can undermine the country’s economic growth in the medium-
long term. Before giving a brief summary of the economic policies adopted in the past decades, in 
order to highlight a story of an extremely high potential wasted because of wrong and inconsistent 
choices, I will focus on the industrial, investment, trade and financial policies enforced by the Kirchner 
governments. My hypothesis is that the increasing return to economic ‘nationalism’ will be detrimental 
to the long-term economic performance of the country, given the current situation of the global 
economy where integration with other countries is very important. In the next chapter I will then 
provide some policy indications that might help Argentina undertake a more stable path. 
1.2.2. Setting the scene: Argentina’s economic history since the 1950s 
Describing the economic history of Argentina is not the main purpose of this thesis. However, it is 
useful to recall the main elements that characterized the period following World War II, in order to 
better understand the current situation. Argentina’s economy is the story of a huge potential that has 
been partially wasted. In fact, although from a peripheral position not only in geographic terms but also 
in proportion to its economic power and influence, Argentina became one of the richest countries in 
the world by the middle of last century. If we look at its GDP per capita, it had been ranking well 
above Italy (used here as a term of comparison because of the similar demographic structure between 
the two countries) until and for some years after the end of World War II (Figure 1.2.1).  
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Figure 1.2.1 – Argentina vs. other countries, GDP per capita (million 1990 international 
Geary-Khamis dollars, 1900-1945) 
 
Source: Maddison tables 
A major agricultural exporter and also a manufacturing power with a considerable potential, Argentina 
could have easily become a developed country and followed the pattern of the United States and 
Western European countries. Nevertheless, the governments that ruled the country during the last 
decades were not able to undertake a coherent paradigm of economic development, but adopted 
strategies which proved to be unsuccessful and not consistent to each other. This is why the pattern of 
growth followed by Argentina was defined as an example of the “stop and go model”: economic cycles 
in Argentina during the period considered in this analysis were generally short and based on strong, 
devaluations and recoveries via expansive demand-driven policies (Della Paolera and Taylor 2003).  
After Juan Domingo Perón took power in 1945, a new model based on political populism and 
economic nationalism was implemented. This model, defined “Peronism” not by chance, will be not 
doomed to disappear together with the President who first adopted it, but it will become, as I will 
explain  in the next paragraph, the main reference for the present Government of Cristina Kirchner. A 
process of income redistribution from the agricultural, exporting sector to the urban industrial working 
class was put in place, together with a progressive expansion of the role of the State in managing the 
economy and in providing welfare assistance to the working classes. The increasing public deficit-to-
GDP ratio, that reached the level of 13.4% in 1948, was being compensated by printing money, which 
brought about a rising inflation, always above the two digits (Silvestri 2004).  
In 1958 the end of Peronism was marked by the radical (after the name of the Unión Cívica Radical, 
UCR, the main opponent party to the Partido Justicialista, PJ) government of Arturo Frondizi, who won 
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the general elections. His government decided to implement a “developmentalist” model in order to 
foster economic growth. Such framework considered the deterioration of terms of trade in agriculture 
and mining products as the main source of underdevelopment in countries that were primarily engaged 
in the export of commodities. Therefore, developmentalism advocated domestic industrialization and 
the expansion of energy and transportation infrastructure. This approach followed the ‘recipes’ 
suggested by the Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC), a regional agency 
of the United Nations, based on the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy fostered by 
Raúl Prebisch, the first Secretary of the organization. Nevertheless, this model proved to be very 
inefficient since domestic industry was unable to be competitive vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Trouble 
occurred with this strategy and the urgent need for foreign capital flowing into the country convinced 
Frondizi of the necessity to ask for a loan from the IMF: receiving money from a multilateral 
institution, of which Argentina was a member itself, was in fact considered a more acceptable option 
rather than allowing foreign capital through the channel of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), because 
the latter would have been considered as a form of intrusiveness and external control on the domestic 
economy (Kedar 2013). 
Nevertheless, the need to find sources of financing drove Argentina to start increasing its external level 
of indebtedness: foreign capital was considered more convenient because the domestic interest rate was 
systematically higher than in the rest of the world (Basualdo 2006). The increasing external vulnerability 
of Argentina became manifest in 1982 when the debt crisis originated in Mexico propagated to the rest 
of the region and hit Argentina with a freeze of banking loans and a sudden lack of capital. In the 
meantime, the country had changed once again its model of development, because the military 
dictatorship that had been ruling brutally Argentina since 1976 abandoned the focus on 
industrialization and state interventionism in order to liberalize the economy with trade and financial 
openness (capital movements were allowed). However, the strategies aimed at containing inflation and 
consisting in a rigid control of the exchange rate were detrimental to the external competitiveness of 
Argentine goods. Therefore, exports were negatively affected (Silvestri 2004).  
After Argentina was defeated by the United Kingdom in the war at the Falklands/Malvinas islands in 
1982, the military dictatorship had no further cards to play and it was forced to resign, giving way again 
to democracy. Unfortunately, the newly elected radical government of Raúl Alfonsín was not able to 
bring Argentina back to the path of growth and stability. The 1980s, known as the “lost decade” of 
Latin America, were characterized by several cases of hyperinflation and a series of macroeconomic 
stabilization programs that proved to be ineffective. The “Plan Austral” and “Plan Primavera”, just to 
mention the biggest initiatives launched by Alfonsín in economic policy, aimed at contrasting inflation 
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and the long-lasting fiscal deficits, were not able to reach their target in the long run and had to be 
abandoned (Silvestri 2004). 
Argentina’s most important problem was structural and determined by its constant public fiscal deficits 
that the country started running since the Peronist period. This problem, accompanied with high 
inflation, had detrimental effects on Argentina’s economy since it produced the so-called “Oliveira-
Tanzi” effect. Named after the two economists who defined it, this effect shows the existence of a 
negative correlation between periods of high inflation and tax revenues: as prices rise too much, fiscal 
revenues decrease, even more if payments are delayed and there are lags in tax collection that make the 
value of taxes offset by the rising inflation (Bulmer Thomas 2003, Tanzi 2007). The heterodox policies 
applied by Alfonsín were based on the belief that the stabilization of prices would have been followed 
by an increase of tax collection, so that the fiscal deficit would be lower.  
The only effective tool against inflation was a drastic intervention on the nominal exchange rate of the 
country: in 1991 Domingo Cavallo, the minister of the Economy of the new government led by Carlos 
Saul Menem, decided to peg the Argentine peso to the US dollar through a fixed convertibility of one 
peso to one dollar. This currency board regime helped lower the inflation from 2314% in 1990 to 0.2% 
in 1996 (IMF 2013). Together with price stabilization, the Menem government embraced the principles 
contained in the so-called “Washington Consensus” (see chapter 1.1.1) starting a process of 
liberalization and privatization and reducing the role of the State in the management of the economy. 
Argentina started growing again (at an average rate of 8.2% in real terms between 1991 and 1994, IMF 
2013) and it was defined as a new emerging market, starting to attract foreign capital for new 
investments. However, also this new set of economic policies had its flaws and it was doomed to fail, as 
witnessed by the crisis of 1995, as a consequence of the new debt crisis originated in Mexico, which 
signaled the persistence of the country’s external vulnerability.  
The default on 107 billion US dollars external debt, in December 2011, was the unhappy ending of a 
growth model that could not be sustainable in the long run. The fixed exchange rate prevented 
Argentine government from using monetary policy as a tool to refinance its traditional high public 
deficit. This is why the country experienced a growing external debt that could not be paid back at an 
indefinite time horizon, as a Ponzi scheme.8 More in detail, Argentina used to suffer simultaneously 
from three sources of vulnerability: 
                                                          
8
 The Ponzi scheme (after the name of Charles Ponzi, a fraudulent investor) usually entices new investors by offering 
higher returns than other investments, in the form of short-term returns that are either abnormally high or unusually 
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- the hard peg adopted against the theoretical arguments of an optimal currency area,9 in a 
context of wage and price inflexibility. Argentina suffered from a decline of its terms of trade 
after Brazil and the European Union depreciated their currencies in 1999 and from a rapid 
deterioration of its net foreign asset position. These negative effects were amplified by the fact 
that Argentina’s exchange rate was pegged to the US dollar, but the United States was not a 
major trade partner, representing just 15% of its total trade; 
- the fragile fiscal position resulting from an expansionary stance in the boom: the increase of 
public deficit and debt, made worse by pro-cyclical expansionary policies in years of growth;  
- underlying vulnerabilities in the banking system: despite a façade of soundness (by 1998 
Argentina ranked second in terms of quality of its banking regulatory environment, according to 
the World Bank), the domestic system presented three sources of vulnerabilities: the failure in 
recognizing the special risk of loans to debtors in the non tradable sector, in a context of an 
overvalued Real Exchange Rate; the failure to isolate the solvency of the banking system from 
the solvency of the government (direct exposure of banks to Government risk rose above 20% 
of total assets by 2000); thanks to its liquidity requirements, the Argentine banking system 
withstood a prolonged and severe process of deposit withdrawal during 2001 (Perry and Servén 
2003). 
Moreover, the existence of “twin deficits” , the fiscal one forcing the country to increase its external 
indebtedness, the current account one producing capital outflows originated by the fixed exchange rate 
(Silvestri 2004), surrounded Argentina in a deadly cage that made the default option unavoidable.  
What would the alternatives to these problems have been? The authorities might either have attempted 
an earlier ‘pesification’ of the economy before devaluing, with the risk of a major deposit flight, or a full 
dollarization, but harming the external competitiveness of domestically produced goods (Perry and 
Servén 2003). However, it is by all means true that fiscal strengthening, stricter prudential regulations, a 
higher degree of flexibility in the labor market aimed at reducing unemployment, and an increased trade 
openness were necessary. The next paragraph will analyze the economic policies implemented in the 
last decade and will try to assess whether the Kirchner governments followed these policy indications. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
consistent. Perpetuation of the high returns requires an ever-increasing flow of money from new investors to keep the 
scheme going, so there will be a time when the scheme cannot be perpetuated anymore.  
9
 The Optimal Currency Area theory (OCA) suggests that an irrevocable peg is more likely to be beneficial for the client 
country if it trades a lot with the anchor, and if client and anchor are not exposed to significant asymmetric shocks 
which would demand monetary policy responses of different sign in the two countries (Perry and Servén 2003).  
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1.2.3 Argentina and Kirchnerismo: an analysis ten years after 
A “low quality” democracy 
The new Presidential elections held in May 2003 showed an unexpected result. Carlos Menem, again 
candidate for the third time, had obtained the relative majority of the votes at the first round, but 
decided to withdraw from the second round, giving the way to the candidate who had got only 22.2 % 
of the popular preferences, Néstor Kirchner. Governor of the Santa Cruz province, Kirchner belonged 
to the left wing of the Partido Justicialista (the so-called Frente para la Victoria, Front for Victory, which 
was closer to the original Peronism) while, as I explained  in the previous paragraph, Menem’s 
economic policies were far more liberal.  
The new government was able to rapidly restore growth in the country, reducing the rates of 
unemployment and poverty at an historical low. Kirchner took advantage of an extremely favorable 
global conjuncture: high prices of agricultural commodities, together with a higher competitiveness of 
Argentina after the sharp devaluation of the peso vis-à-vis the dollar10 that allowed for a reduction of 
the real exchange rate, helped the economy to boom and to restore its fiscal position. The Kirchner 
Presidency was also marked by the unilateral decision to renegotiate the value of the country’s external 
debt with the issuance of new bonds with a much lower nominal value. 
Néstor Kirchner decided not to run for a second Presidency term, but stepped down in favor of his 
wife, Cristina Fernández, who was elected in October 2007. The second term of the ‘Kirchnerist’ 
government  was marked by increasing political and social tensions, as the economic growth started to 
slow down as a consequence of the global financial crisis. At the domestic level, the government had to 
face a period of turmoil because of the harsh confrontation with the agricultural exporters, who were 
charged a tax on their exports. Spring 2008 was characterized by high social and political polarization 
until the tax was removed. The resolute attitude of the Presidenta was clearly evident in episodes such as 
the decision to remove the former Central Bank governor, Martín Redrado, who was replaced in 2009 
by Mercedes Marcó del Pont, an unorthodox economist close to the Government who accepted to use 
foreign currency reserves to finance an increase of public expenditure; or the discussed Ley de Medios 
(Law of Telecommunications), which harmed the most important media group in the country, Clarín; 
or, more recently, the conflict with the Constitutional Court to pass a law that would have put judges 
under the control of political parties.  
                                                          
10
 The new nominal exchange rate was set at a floating level of 1 US dollar against 3 ARS.  
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On the other hand, foreign policy was characterized by the so-called “K-Style” (where “K” stands 
obviously for “Kirchner”): opposition to the neo-liberal policies promoted by the US, alignment with 
the other Latin American countries ruled by leftist governments and nationalist and populist rhetoric 
are the main features of this orientation (Correa da Silva 2012). In particular, Argentina strengthened its 
relationship with Venezuela, ruled since 1999 by the socialist government of Hugo Chávez: until 2010, 
it was the country Argentina had signed the highest number of bilateral treaties with (94, more than 
three times as with Brazil and Chile, 31 each, De Luca and Malamud 2010).  
It is quite clear that Argentina is (and has been) a country full of contradictions. It is a society without 
ethnic or social conflicts, with a relatively advanced and diversified production structure and very good 
performances in terms of human development and quality of life (De Luca and Malamud 2010, López 
Belsué 2013)11 but, on the other hand, it is affected by problems in terms of lack of transparency and 
corruption. The Corruption Perception Index elaborated by Transparency International sees Argentina 
at 102nd place in 2012, while according to the Index of Institutional Quality put together by the 
International Policy Network the country ranks 122nd in 2012. Argentina obtains similar disappointing 
results in other rankings, such as the Index of Economic Freedom released by the Heritage Foundation 
(160th in 2012, while only in 2007 it ranked 95th), and the Doing Business 2012 by the World Bank 
(113th in 2012 from the 65th position in 2007).  
To sum up, from this general picture it seems that ten years of Kirchnerism helped improve living 
conditions of people, but an ‘authoritarian’ style of government, as well as a series of questionable 
policies, reduced the external credibility of the country in terms of institutional quality and ease of 
doing business. Democracy in Argentina is not at risk, but its functioning has many flaws (De Luca and 
Malamud 2010).  
Ten years of growth: a macroeconomic overview 
The crisis of 2001-2002 was shocking: in only one year GDP contracted by 10.9% and income per 
capita fell 22% below its level of 1998. The sharp devaluation of the peso vis-à-vis the US dollar (70% 
in a few months) strongly reduced the savings of households that held peso-denominated assets, both 
in real and absolute terms. Imported goods became more expensive because of the devaluation, while 
internal inflation (25.9% in 2002, IMF) increased the price of domestic goods. The combined effect 
                                                          
11
 Argentina ranks 45th according to the Human Development Index elaborated by the United Nations and 17
th
 
according to the quality of life index elaborated by International Living.  
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was that by June 2002 57.7% of the population was living in poverty conditions, while 23.8% was even 
in a condition of extreme poverty (World Bank 2002).  
Argentina’s economic and social situation was tragic. Néstor Kirchner, who took over Eduardo 
Duhalde, nominated President ad interim after the institutional chaos of December 2001 (during that 
month three different Presidents alternated), implemented a set of unorthodox economic policies that 
represented a clear rupture with the neo-liberal paradigm embraced during the 1990s. Fiscal expansion, 
together with enhanced competitiveness due to devaluation of the exchange rate and a large haircut on 
the defaulted debt, provided the macroeconomic basis for the recovery. 
In particular, the most impressive years of boom were from 2003 to 2007, with an average GDP 
growth of 8.8% (IMF 2013 – see Figure 1.2.2). Economic growth was mainly driven by three factors: 
- A favorable external environment and outlook, with a global rise in the price of agricultural 
commodities (Argentina became one of the main exporters of soy beans) and in the external 
demand, especially from China; 
- A highly competitive exchange rate, which remained so also in real terms since inflation in these 
first years was not too high; 
- The implementation of nationalization of foreign-owned businesses and the pursuit of import 
substitution and export tax policies (Zaza 2011). 
GDP increased both in absolute and per capita terms. Growth was more evenly spread than in the past, 
thanks also to the programs of conditional cash transfers promoted by the government in order to help 
the poorest households. GDP per  capita is now higher than the average of emerging markets and 
developing countries and is expected to grow also in the next few years (Figure 1.2.3). 
Figure 1.2.2 – Argentina, Real GDP growth (%, 2003-2018*) 
 
Source: IMF *2013-2018: forecasts 
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Figure 1.2.3 – Argentina, Real GDP per capita (US$, 2003-2018*) 
 
Source: IMF *2013-2018: forecasts 
Inflation was not too high in the first years of the decade, and it did not offset the GDP growth in real 
terms. However, during the last 5 years prices started rising much more than expected, and officially 
declared by the statistics released by the National Institute of Statistics (INDEC). This is why the IMF 
stopped accepting the official data provided by the Argentine government. More reliable inflation 
estimates show that the real increase in prices has been well above the 8-10% declared on average, 
reaching up to almost 30% per year (Figure 1.2.4 and 1.2.5).12  
Figure 1.2.4 – Argentina, Consumer Price Index (%, 2003-2014*) 
 
Source: IMF *2013-2014: forecasts 
                                                          
12
 For a detailed explanation of the controversial debate on inflation in Argentina see chapter 3.1 
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Figure 1.2.5 – Argentina, monthly CPI, INDEC vs. Price Stats  
(% values, January 2008 – March 2013) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on INDEC, Price Stats data 
The situation of households has significantly improved. Unemployment has constantly decreased and is 
now below 10%, while private consumption has grown (Figures 1.2.6 and 1.2.7). On the other hand, 
also public consumption has constantly been on the rise, which might be worrisome for the central 
government public account (Figure 1.2.7). If we give a look at the current account balance, in fact, we 
see that the surplus accumulated until 2006 as a result of the boom in exports and of the increase in tax 
revenues has deteriorated and has now turned to a deficit (Figure 1.2.8). This is a quite significant result 
that should worry Argentine authorities since the surplus in the external sector has been one of the 
main assets of the country’s economic recovery.   
Figure 1.2.6 –Argentina, Unemployment rate (%, 2003-2012) 
 
Source: INDEC 
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Figure 1.2.7 – Argentina, Public and private consumption (% annual increase, 2004-2012) 
 
Source: ECLAC 
 
Figure 1.2.8 – Argentina,  Current account balance as a % of GDP (2005-2014) 
 
Source: IMF 
Forecasts for the near future still look positive. In 2013 GDP is expected to grow by 3.5% (ECLAC 
2013): a good result, but much lower compared to the growth rates of the previous decade. In fact, the 
main determinant of the ‘sluggish’ growth expected in 2013 is the substantial increase of public 
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expenditure, risen by 26.6% on a yearly basis. This means that the public deficit-to-GDP ratio will rise 
up to 2.6%, compared to 1.7% in 2012 (ECLAC 2013) 
There are several challenges that Argentina will have to face in the short run. The first priority should 
be to pursue macroeconomic stability. As the “stop and go” model shows, Argentina’s growth pattern 
has been affected by a high degree of volatility.13 As Fanelli and Abrieu (2011) show, Argentina’s 
growth historically presents a high level of volatility between 1960 and 2009, with an average level of 
the standard deviation of almost 6%: a much higher result than both the OECD countries (2.3%) and 
the rest of Latin America (4.2%). Empirical evidence shows the existence of a negative relationship 
between volatility and growth, with a negative influence of the former on the latter through three 
different channels: inflation and relative prices, financial stability (in terms of a good functioning of the 
banking system) and the fiscal position (with permanent effects of anti-cyclical fiscal policies) (Fanelli 
2007). Does this apply also to Argentina? I computed volatility, measured by the standard deviation of 
economic growth with a three-year moving average, between 1983 and 2012. The results (Figure 1.2.9) 
seem to confirm the negative relationship between the two variables. During the 1980s volatility (red 
line) kept at high levels, while growth remained sluggish or even negative (these were the years of 
hyperinflation and the failure of the unorthodox policies implemented by the Alfonsín government, see 
previous paragraph). Despite the good performance of the first half of the 1990s, volatility was still 
high and increased during the last years of the decade, before and during the heavy recession of years 
2000-2002. What we observe in the 2000s is different: volatility falls sharply while economic growth is 
strong and sustained. However, volatility rises again after the 2008/09 global financial crisis, but stays 
below the 5% ‘critical’ threshold. On one hand, this is good news for Argentina: for the first time in 30 
years (at least for the period covered in my analysis) lower levels of volatility seem to have allowed the 
country to grow in a more stable way. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Volatility is considered as the standard deviation of GDP growth. It is considered as a proxy for the fluctuations of 
GDP.  
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Figure 1.2.9 – Argentina, Economic growth and volatility (1983-2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on INDEC data 
Macroeconomic stability is the most important challenge that Argentina has to face in order to 
overcome the other ones. As shown, despite its successful performance and the still positive economic 
trend, growth risks to become sluggish and sustained mainly by fiscal stimulus. If we merge this factor 
with a deterioration of the current account balance, it is pretty obvious that such economic policies 
cannot be sustainable in the long run. Growth has to be supported by structural reforms aimed at 
enhancing the stock of capital, both in terms of technology and human skills (Mercado, Cicowiez and 
Coremberg 2011): positive effects of these measures are visible only in the medium-long run, but they 
are essential to enhance the country’s competitiveness. This and other issues will be the object of the 
remainder of this chapter.     
1.2.4 Argentina’s economic structure: high potential and low competitiveness  
Lack of competitiveness and ‘software’: an overview 
As shown in the first part of this chapter, Argentina’s recovery has been based on a very simple set of 
economic policy tools: a devaluation which led to a more competitive exchange rate and a boost of the 
exports of agricultural commodities, drawing upon the exploitation of natural resources the country is 
relatively well endowed of. In order to be able to take full advantage of this situation, Argentina should 
establish and develop an economic and institutional system favorable to its inclusion in global markets.  
An important indicator to evaluate a country’s competitiveness is its labor productivity. Productivity 
can be roughly approximated as the ratio between a volume measure of output (GDP or gross value 
added) and a measure of input use (the total number of hours worked or total employment):  
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Let us look at Argentina’s performance over the course of the last three decades. Figure 1.2.10 shows 
the evolution of productivity in comparison with the other main South American countries included in 
my sample: it seems that Argentina is the best, with an hourly labor productivity of 20.86 US$. 
However, as Fanelli (2012) explains, it is important to underline that during the last ten years the 
increase of per capita GDP was higher than labor productivity, which means that the overall growth is 
explained more by the increase of the labor force rather than the output produced by every single 
worker.  
 Figure 1.2.10 – Argentina vs. South America, GDP per hour worked, Argentina vs. South 
America (US 2012 PPP $, 1983-2012) 
 
Source: The Conference Board, Total Economy Database 
If we go further and look at Argentina’s performance in comparison to some of the most developed 
economies in the world, we see that productivity is still much lower, despite a growth that, in relative 
terms, has been stronger than what was observed in the US, Germany and Japan during the last ten 
years (Figure 1.2.11). This means that, despite a process of catch-up with developed countries, 
Argentina is still far to close the gap with them in terms of productivity.  
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Figure 1.2.11 – Argentina vs. developed economies, GDP per hour worked,  
(US 2012 PPP$, 1983-2012) 
 
Source: The Conference Board, Total Economy Database 
There are other indicators that help look at a country’s competitiveness also on a qualitative basis. The 
Global Competitiveness Index elaborated every year by the World Economic Forum (WEF) ranks 
Argentina in the 94th position out of 144 countries covered in its analysis (WEF 2013). This is not a 
good result, especially if compared to the other South American countries considered in my analysis: 
Chile stands 33rd, Brazil 48th, Colombia 69th and only Venezuela performs worse ranking 126th (WEF 
2013). Argentina’s overall standing is quite worrisome since the country lost ten positions in only a year, 
this being mainly due to a very negative assessment on its institutional environment (138th position 
according to this single indicator), and the inefficient functioning of its labor (140th) and financial 
markets (131st). The five most problematic factors for doing business, as perceived by a sample of 
interviews, are inflation, policy instability, corruption, foreign currency regulations and access to 
financing. The WEF report concludes its assessment on Argentina advocating structural reforms that 
might help its labor market become more flexible, in order to boost productivity, and its financial 
system deeper. Table 1.2.1 shows the overall performance of Argentina according to the WEF analysis.  
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Table 1.2.1 – Argentina, Global Competitiveness Index Assessment (2013) 
Indicator Rank (out of 144) 
Overall Index  94 
Basic requirements 96 
Institutions 138 
Infrastructure 86 
Macroeconomic environment 94 
Health and primary education 59 
Efficiency enhancers 86 
Higher education and training 53 
Goods market efficiency 140 
Labor market efficiency 140 
Financial market development 131 
Technological readiness 67 
Market size 23 
Innovation and sophistication factors 88 
Business sophistication 89 
Innovation 91 
Source: World Economic Forum. The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 
Such a context does not seem the most appropriate to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). 
Indeed, the scarcity of foreign capital is a problem for Argentina’s economy, which looks much less 
dynamic than most of the other South American countries considered. The comparison with Chile is 
particularly brutal: in only a decade the latter has accumulated a stock of FDI which is almost twice as 
Argentina’s stock (206.594 million US$ versus 110.704 US$), and it has achieved a share of foreign 
investment on GDP of almost 12%, while Argentina’s share is less than 3%. By the same token, 
Argentina’s position as a foreign investor is not very satisfactory, despite the presence in the country of 
some important Trans National Companies (TNCs):14 again, if we compare Argentina to Chile, the 
former’s share of international investments is less than 1% of GDP, while the latter’s amounts up to 
over 8% (see Figures 1.2.12 and 1.2.13). Among the main reasons of the overall disappointing 
performance of Argentina as an FDI recipient, the recent wave of nationalizations deployed by the 
government of Cristina Kirchner, especially in the field of the extractive industry (as witnessed by the 
expropriation of the 51% of shares of YPF, the most important oil&gas company operating in the 
country, from the Spanish company Repsol), helps explain the lack of new foreign capital flowing into 
the country. As the United Nations Committee for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) says, 
                                                          
14
 Among the most important companies we mention Techint in the field of engineering and construction, and Arcor in 
the food industry.  
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Argentina would need a shift to industrial policies aiming at developing domestic industries and 
improving technological capabilities. In order to do so, the country would also need a supply of capital 
available for investment, that cannot be provided only internally.  
Figure 1.2.12 – Argentina vs. other countries, FDI inflows as a share of GDP (%, 2007-2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on UNCTAD data 
Figure 1.2.13 – Argentina vs. other countries, FDI outflows as a share of GDP (%, 2007-2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on UNCTAD data 
To sum up, Argentina’s economic system suffers from “software” deficiencies , where by software I 
mean the elements that contribute to form the institutional framework of the economy (Fanelli 2012).  
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It means that the legislative, financial and bureaucratic systems are not efficient and their flaws seriously 
damage the growth potential of the country. For instance, Argentina is affected by a lack of investment 
because the high inflation, the highly volatile macroeconomic environment, and the impossibility to rely 
on the official statistics and forecasts about price stability discourage capital holders from investing in 
long-term projects, therefore also damaging the domestic credit market. Moreover, the wave of 
nationalizations that took place in recent years increased the uncertainty about the respect of private 
property rights from the government. Finally, the lack of investment in higher education did not help 
human capital to develop further and to enhance productivity (Fanelli 2012). These are some of the 
reasons why Argentina, despite its huge potential, is still stuck in the situation of a middle-income 
country that is unable to take the necessary steps to become a fully developed economy.        
Agriculture vs. manufacturing: an appropriate mix to be globally competitive? 
An important requirement for an economy to reach an advanced stage of development is that it 
presents a quite deep level of diversification among its sectors and also of technologic innovation. Final 
products should also contain a high component of value added. With respect to these considerations, 
where does Argentina stand? A significant part of the country’s recent economic growth has been 
explained by the exploitation of agricultural resources, so that some analysts talked about a ‘re-
primarization’ of the economy. In order to assess whether this is true, I will analyze data regarding the 
evolution of Argentina’s production structure. According to the data provided by the National Institute 
of Statistics (INDEC), we can have a look at the weight of the primary sector for the domestic 
economy. In terms of contribution to the GDP, agriculture’s share among the sectors that produce 
goods is 12% and has slightly decreased over the course of the last 20 years. On the other hand, the 
share of manufacturing has remained pretty much the same, slightly over 50% (Figure 1.2.14). In 
absolute terms, agriculture does not seem to be such an important sector for the economy overall even 
if we look at the number of people employed: 5.4% of the labor force in 2011 worked in the primary 
sector, against 16% in the manufacturing and over 50% in the services sector (Figure 1.2.15).  
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Figure 1.2.14 – Argentina, Agriculture and manufacturing, share over goods produced (%, 1995-
2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on INDEC data 
 
Figure 1.2.15 – Argentina, Composition of the labor force across sectors (%, 2011) 
 
Source: INDEC 
However, the agricultural sector plays a substantial role if we reason in terms of the value chain. The 
most important manufacturing sector is that one of processed food and beverages, which accounted 
for 33.2% of the industrial production and 43.4% of industrial exports in 2007 (Azpiazu and Schorr 
2011). Moreover, exports of non-processed agricultural commodities account for 27% of total exports; 
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if we sum this to the share of agricultural manufactured exports, the total share goes up to about 60% 
(Figure 1.2.17). Therefore, even if it is not possible to say that Argentina’s economy was affected by a 
‘re-primarization’, it is also clear that the primary sector takes on a vital importance for Argentina. 
However, the economic system and labor market is unbalanced, since very few workers are employed 
in this sector. Next paragraph will try to explain what this means for the country’s economy as a whole 
analyzing the role of industrial policies.  
Figure 1.2.17 – Argentina, Composition of exports (million US$, 1994-2012) 
 
Source: INDEC 
The role of industrial policies 
There are several definition of “industrial policy”. A broader one defines it as the set of policies 
designed to support industry, including fiscal and monetary incentives for investment, direct public 
investment, incentives for investment in R&D, while a narrow one encompasses all those government 
activities aimed at supporting the development of certain industries in a national economy to maintain 
international competitiveness (Peres and Primi 2009). Within this continuum, it is clear that the concept 
of industrial policy assumes an active role of the State in supporting industrial production. As 
previously shown, in order to reach further stages of economic development a country has to evolve 
from a situation of ‘primarization’, where the exploitation of raw commodities is the most important 
source of income, and to achieve specialization through industrialization and the growth of a skill-
intensive services sector.  
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The industrialization process in Argentina was initially led by the State that tried to develop a domestic 
industrial sector after the end of World War II by the implementation of developmentalist strategies 
based on the ISI and on inward-looking policies. However, it is quite evident that all the second half of 
the 20th century was characterized by a lack of coherence in national industrial policies. The forced 
industrialization that took place at the beginning of the period considered did not help Argentina gain 
global competitiveness: the kind of protectionism implemented in the country was not aimed at 
selecting the industrial sectors with the highest potential and at increasing investment and technological 
innovation, not complying to the principles of the so-called “infant-industry” theory.15 Moreover, the 
national industrial bourgeoisie was always unable to provide the amount of capital necessary for an 
endogenous development, so that Argentine industry soon became dependent on foreign capital 
(Azpiazu and Schorr 2011).   
Since the middle of the 1970s a de-industrialization process took place. The military dictatorship 
suddenly broke up with the inward-looking strategy opening up the domestic economy and 
implementing a new model of capital accumulation based on financial speculation. Argentina’s 
industrial fabric became controlled by a restricted oligopoly of domestic and foreign groups, a tendency 
that could not be stopped even during the years of the Alfonsín Government. Capital available was 
diverted from productive investment in high value added, technology intensive sectors like machinery 
and equipment, to financial speculations (Azpiazu and Schorr 2011, Basualdo 2006). This strategy was 
then simply continued and deepened during the convertibility era of the Menem Governments in the 
1990s: privatizations, de-industrialization, the establishment of a fixed, not competitive exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world, further contributed to deteriorate the already fragile industrial fabric, 
leading to a rise of unemployment to unprecedented levels and of the people living in conditions of 
poverty (Azpiazu and Schorr 2011).  
Have things changed under the Kirchner period? It is undeniable that after the 2001-2002 crisis the 
industrial sector gained new importance, with a 67% expansion from 2002 to 2007 (INDEC 2012) that 
has to be considered in the economic recovery of the country overall. In absolute terms, the most 
important manufacturing sector still remains that one of processed agricultural goods, but in relative 
                                                          
15
 Infant-industry theorists argue that industries in developing sectors of the economy need to be protected to keep 
international competitors from damaging or destroying the domestic infant industry. In response to these arguments, 
governments may enact import duties, tariffs, quotas and exchange rate controls to prevent international competitors 
from matching or beating the prices of an infant industry, thereby giving the infant industry time to develop and 
stabilize. The strategy was successful in East Asian countries, where temporary protectionist trade policies were 
accompanied by investment in R&D, but it basically failed in South America.  
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terms the sectors that grew the most were machinery and equipment, mineral processing and textiles 
(Table 1.2.2).  
Table 1.2.2 – Industrial GDP by main sectors (million ARS$ and %, 2002-2007) 
 2002 2005 2007 % Growth 2002-
2007  
Food & 
Beverage 9683.8 12.090,70 13.665,40 41,1 
Textiles 2.471,00 4.275,60 4.915,00 98,9 
Paper 2.663,60 3.890,80 4.671,00 75,4 
Chemicals 8.504,30 10.593,40 11.653,00 37 
Minerals 871,5 1.570,90 1.902,90 118,3 
Basic metal 
industries 1.493,20 2.045,20 2.357,00 57,8 
Machinery and 
equipment 4.736,60 9.113,60 11.876,60 150,7 
Other 
manufacturing 2.068,00 2.975,70 3.438,60 66,3 
TOTAL 
INDUSTRY 32.492,00 46.555,90 54.479,50 67,7 
Source: INDEC 
Therefore, the processing of agricultural goods still remains the most important manufacturing sector, 
but it is now increasingly accompanied by other sectors that allow for a diversification of the domestic 
production. Moreover, an increase both of internal and external demand (industrial exports increased 
by 127% between 2002 and 2007), the latter thanks to reduced salaries and prices after the devaluation 
of 2002, helped Argentina’s manufacturing recover.  
Is this outcome due to a real and durable improvement of competitiveness and of a renewed general 
interest for the industrial sector? To answer this question, it is primarily important to define what we 
exactly mean by “competitiveness”. In fact, this concept is  not based just on price and cost issues, but 
it is more comprehensive and ‘systemic’ involving different dimensions: the micro level, referred to the 
innovation and efficiency of firms; the ‘meso’ level, referred to a country’s infrastructural and 
educational endowment; the macro level, referred to the government’s macroeconomic and fiscal 
policies; and a sort of ‘target’ level that points at the level of social cohesion and at the values a society 
uses to direct its development (Altenburg et al. 1998).  
According to Couto (2010), the Kirchner Government decided to change priority in the orientation of 
its industrial policy, shifting from orthodox policies focused on macroeconomic stability (as witnessed 
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by the choice of pegging the currency to the US dollar) to unorthodox policies focused on boosting 
competitiveness. Apart from the fact that the target of stability was not met in the 1990s (see previous 
section), Azpiazu and Schorr (2011) are quite sharp in their assessment on what the Kirchner 
Government did to increase the level of competitiveness of national industry. They say that a deep and 
structured strategy was lacking and that the main axis of the new industrial policy was simply based on 
the strong devaluation of 2002 and on the pursuit of an “undervalued exchange rate” able to boost 
exports of Argentine products. In other words, keeping a competitive exchange rate, together with a 
favorable global conjuncture regarding the demand for commodities, created the favorable conditions 
for a ‘natural’ development of Argentina’s industry, especially in the sectors linked to the primary sector 
(as shown by the high percentage of industrial exports related to agriculture). As shown by Cimoli, 
Fleitas and Porcile (2011), there is a positive relationship between a depreciated real exchange rate and a 
higher technological intensity of the exported goods, and such an exchange rate is an incentive for the 
production of tradable goods. However, it is necessary that measures aiming at keeping the RER low 
are accompanied by measures promoting technological upgrading. Other measures implemented during 
the last years were mainly aimed at promoting investments in larger firms through several rounds of 
fiscal incentives offered to firms, such as more favorable conditions for the payment of the Value 
Added Tax or tax reductions for investments in capital goods and infrastructure (Law n. 25294, 2004 
and Law n. 26360 of 2008). These mechanisms allow for bigger incentives to firms operating in export-
oriented sectors and, in this respect, they work in a similar way to export subsidies. Encouraging 
exports is indeed one of the top priorities set by the Ministry of Industry in its “Strategic Industrial Plan 
2020”, an agenda designed to increase and empower the national industrial sector. The main axes of 
this strategy are: 
- Sustain internal demand through public investment in infrastructure, education and income 
redistribution; 
- Defense of the domestic market and import substitution; 
- Competitive exchange rate; 
- Increase exports until 167 billion US$ by 2020; 
- Tools aimed at stimulating productive investments (Ministry of Industry 2013). 
Therefore, this strategy seems to be based on protectionism and state interventionism, with further 
increase in public spending aimed at fostering private demand rather than creating the conditions for a 
competitive national industry in terms of skills and technology. The effectiveness of these policies 
cannot be defined as completely satisfactory so far: the devaluation was the main leverage to exports, 
but the net position of Argentina vis-à-vis its most important trade partners – Brazil, the United States 
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and the European Union – is getting worse and worse (apart from Brazil, against which Argentina has 
recently risen new protectionist measures) (Figure 1.2.18). This means that the exchange rate 
manipulation is not an effective tool in the long run: as Figure 1.2.19 shows, the real exchange rate 
between Argentina with the US and the EU has more or less stabilized. If we combine to this the 
growing trade deficit, the possible options at hand for Argentina in order to increase its 
competitiveness would be two. The second best, but easiest option, would be to manipulate again the 
exchange rate, devaluating the peso with the risk to trigger a further increase of inflation. This would be 
successful in the short run: industrial exports would rise, imports would become more expensive and 
therefore would decrease, and in general terms the Plan 2020 would have proven to be effective. On 
the other hand, the first best, but most difficult to implement strategy, would be to adopt structural 
reforms aimed at improving the functioning of the labor market, attracting new investments in 
technology and higher education, easing business conditions and access to market. Concerns about the 
ability of the Government to deliver such reforms will rise as the new Presidential elections, scheduled 
in 2015, approach.  
Figure 1.2.18 – Argentina, Net trade position with Brazil, US, EU (million US$, 1993-2013) 
 
Source: Ministry of Industry of Argentina 
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Figure 1.2.19 – Argentina, Real exchange rate with Brazil, US, EU (million US$, 1993-2013) 
 
Source: Ministry of Industry of Argentina 
A new wave of nationalizations 
The renewed interventionism of the State in the management of the economy during the last decade 
was witnessed not only by protectionism and by industrial policies aimed at reducing imports in order 
to favor domestic companies. A new wave of nationalizations, in fact, followed the liberalizations and 
privatizations that took place in the 1990s during the Menem Governments.  
The increasing role of the State in recent years can be mainly explained by the need of the Government 
to finance its expensive programs of social spending. The first important episode to recall is the 
nationalization of the private pension funds in late 2008. The private pension system was set up in 1994 
and the scheme allowed workers to choose between staying with the state system or switching. By 2003 
84% of workers with a pension scheme had chosen the new private funds. They have 9.5m accounts 
for total  assets of 30 billion US$ (The Economist 2008). This pot of money represented the largest 
group of private investors in Argentina's depleted capital markets after the financial default of 2001. 
Their demise would make it far harder for local firms to raise money. The re-nationalization of pension 
funds looked then like a way to fill the sudden lack of cash coming from the 44% fall of the world price 
of soy beans, that cut tax revenues by 2.7 billion US$ that year.  
The time to take control over foreign currency reserves then came. In this case one cannot technically 
define it as a ‘nationalization’, but the Constitution of Argentina clearly rules out the possibility that the 
Government can manage the country’s foreign currency reserves, a norm aimed at respecting the 
Central Bank’s independence. In December 2009 President Kirchner issued a decree transferring 6.6 
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billion US$ of the reserves to a fund to service the public debt (The Economist 2010). As a ‘pariah’ in 
international financial markets, Argentina could not (and still  cannot) borrow freely in international 
capital markets after the debt crisis. Following the Central Bank governor’s refusal to transfer the 
money, the President Cristina Kirchner replaced him with Mercedes Marcó del Pont, an unorthodox 
economist close to her positions. It could be considered more than a simple coincidence the fact that 
since January 2010 Argentina’s foreign currency reserves decreased by 23%, after a constant increase 
due to the considerable revenues coming from exports (Figure 1.2.20).  
Figure 1.2.20 – Argentina, Foreign currency reserves (million US$, 2003-2013) 
 
Source: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 
The third and most recent episode took place in 2012 and is represented by the expropriation and 
nationalization of would expropriate and 51% of YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales), the former 
state oil company, which had been sold to Repsol, a Spanish firm, in 1999. Of the confiscated portion, 
51% went to the national government and 49% to Argentina's oil-producing provinces. President 
Kirchner explained the measure with the fact that Repsol was not investing enough in new 
explorations. The Spanish company replied to this accusation saying that in Argentina energy prices and 
tariffs are controlled and kept too low for an investment to be profitable (The Economist 2012).This 
act seemed to the global investors’ community as the ‘nail in the coffin’, since it is the final result of a 
series of actions taken by the Government determined by ideological faith rather than by any rational 
economic explanation (Erixon and Brandt 2013a). Argentina’s soil seems to be very rich of shale gas, 
but fresh capital is needed to invest in new explorations. There are serious concerns about the fact that 
the Government alone can provide the financial resources needed. Therefore, it has to look for new 
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private investors. This is why in July 2013 YPF signed an agreement with the American oil company 
Chevron for approximately 1.24 billion US$ to enable the first phase of new drillings in the Loma La 
Lata Norte and Loma Campaña areas, where big amounts of resources are expected to be found. This 
issue can be also explained as an episode of ‘crony capitalism’,16 since most of the 3.5 billion US$ of the 
dividends paid by Repsol had gone to pay the loans that Petersen, an Argentine company, took out to 
buy a share of the company with the support of the former President Néstor Kirchner. However, it 
seems there are some positive signals at the horizon: investment in the company has risen from 2 
billion US$ in 2012 to 5 billion US$ this year and, in addition, YPF issued 150 million US$ bonds in 
New York stock exchange market in September 2013, despite Argentina’s ongoing battle with 
international creditors (Financial Times 2013). Nevertheless, YPF needs to continue to attract foreign 
capital if it wants to deploy the high potential in terms of natural resources of Argentina’s soil.  
1.2.5 Conclusion: impressive growth, insufficient competitiveness 
This chapter provided an outlook on the economic performance of Argentina over the last decades, 
with a particular focus on the last ten years, as a result of the economic policies implemented over time. 
Macroeconomic problems (especially growth volatility and, in less recent years, long-lasting fiscal 
deficits and indebtedness) as well as lack of coherence in the development strategies adopted, harmed 
the growth potential of Argentina preventing it from achieving the status of a fully developed economy. 
After the debt crisis of 2001-2002, that pushed millions of Argentine citizens below the poverty line, 
the new peronist governments led by Néstor and Cristina Kirchner were protagonist of an 
unprecedented period of economic boom. High and lasting growth was sustained by a strong increase 
of exports made possible by a sharp devaluation of the domestic currency, the Argentine peso, which 
restored competitiveness of domestic goods.  
Exports mainly consisted of agricultural primary or processed products. This means that, despite a new 
phase of industrialization and economic diversification after three decades during which the national 
industry was progressively dismantled, industrial policies were not aimed at achieving a real global 
competitiveness of Argentine industrial products. A high exchange rate, subsidies to exports and 
protectionist measures against foreign goods (especially Brazilian) have been the main arrows in the 
bow of Kirchnerist industrial policy. 
                                                          
16
 Crony capitalism can be defined as a description of capitalist society based on the close relationships between 
businessmen and the State. Instead of success being determined by a free market and the rule of law, the success of a 
business is dependent on the favoritism that is shown to it by the ruling government in the form of tax breaks, 
government grants and other incentives 
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However, those tools cannot be enough to provide Argentina’s economic system with a real global 
competitiveness in the long run. As shown by the assessment of the World Economic Forum, 
Argentina is one of the worst countries in the world where to do business. Policies aimed at improving 
the ‘software’ of the economic system (in terms of transparency of institutions, effectiveness of 
bureaucracy, fight against corruption), as well as structural reforms to improve the labor market and the 
skills of workers in terms of higher education.  
In the next chapter I will compare alternative patterns of economic development and give some policy 
indications that the country could follow to strengthen and better exploit its potential.    
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1.3 Argentina in front of the challenge of economic development 
1.3.1  Structure of the chapter 
In the previous chapter I analyzed the economic situation of Argentina. The historical perspective 
adopted at the beginning of the chapter showed that the macroeconomic volatility and the 
inconsistence between the heterogeneous models of economic development implemented over the 
course of the last decades produced a detrimental effect to stability and growth. During the last decade, 
the Kirchner governments were finally able to establish a new phase, characterized by sustained growth 
and a process of income redistribution that favored the poorest part of the population.  
However, the ‘neo-developmentalist’ model embraced by Néstor and Cristina Kirchner has its flaws, as 
shown in chapter 1.2. The shift to a new industrialization and to a boom of exports thanks to an 
undervalued exchange rate did not coincide to a real increase of competitiveness in the long run. This 
chapter will analyze  different economic development paradigms, starting from those followed in the 
past, either belonging to the ‘structuralist’ approach embraced by the economists of ECLAC 
(Economic Commission of Latin America and Caribbean) or to the ‘neo-liberal’ paradigm of the 1990s, 
and continuing with a more recent  approach, labeled ‘new structural economics’, proposed and 
developed by Justin Yifu Lin, former Chief Economist at the World Bank. The approach appeals to 
common sense  as a reasonable compromise between the ‘old’ structuralism and the ‘old’ neo-
liberalism. I will then suggest some general policy indications drawing upon my analysis.  
The last part of the chapter  will also offer a focus on the potential of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) as economic actors with an interesting potential for the growth of Argentine industry and 
economic development overall through their inclusion in global value chains.  
1.3.2 Economic development: a brief review 
Is it possible to design an efficient and successful approach to economic development? Too often the 
number of theoretical frameworks that have been designed and put into practice proved to be 
inadequate simply because, in most cases, they lacked the necessary degree of flexibility to adapt to the 
features of each specific situation. Economic development as a discipline was born right at the end of 
World War II intended as the mechanics of organizing a country’s resources and institutions to produce 
and distribute more goods and services, and to sustain regular social progress and rising prosperity (Lin 
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2011). The first theoretical frameworks were developed around the concept of ‘market failures’17 
highlighted by the rise of Keynesian economics in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Differently 
from the laissez-faire theory based on the statement that the market can work properly by itself and does 
not need any external corrective mechanism, here the role of the State is important as a powerful 
supplementary means to accelerate the pace of economic development through an industrialization 
push. This was, basically, the Schumpeterian, Evolutionist and Structuralist (SES) approach that in 
Latin America became particularly popular thanks to the thesis developed by Raúl Prebisch, economist 
and first Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), a 
regional agency of the United Nations. Prebisch believed that the decline in terms of trade against the 
export of primary commodities from ‘peripheral’ countries (developing, Latin American nations) to 
‘core’ countries (developed, Western countries) resulted in a transfer of income from resource-intensive 
to capital-intensive countries, therefore depriving the former of the financial resources necessary to 
develop their own industrial sector and to climb up the ladder of economic development (Prebisch 
1950). This is why an industrialization process, driven by the State through policies aimed at protecting 
the domestic, infant industry, was the only means by which Latin America might have been able to fully 
obtain the advantages of technical progress (Prebisch 1950). Therefore, the element of technological 
upgrading lies at the basis of the development process in this theory, and this is why according to the 
SES public intervention is necessary in order to introduce asymmetries and to generate the incentives 
that make possible to explore technological opportunities (Peres and Primi 2009). However the Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI), although implemented in most of Latin American countries, failed 
because the governments of that period tried to defy the comparative advantages of their economies, 
simply given by their endowment structures, by establishing a national industry that was not going to be 
competitive externally because they gave priority to capital-intensive heavy industries when capital in 
their economies was scarce (Lin 2011). While Prebisch advocated for regional integration, which would 
have increased the opportunities to exploit economies of scale underlying capital goods industrial 
sectors, and for the formation of capital available for investment, none of these two conditions 
materialized. Therefore, these economies ended up with having overvalued exchange rates, too 
expensive goods and fragmented, inefficient markets, as they produced too small-scale goods (Bulmer-
Thomas 2003). This is the main reason why this theory failed in Latin America while it was successful 
in other countries like South Korea: in this case, the approach adopted was aimed at prioritizing 
                                                          
17
 Market failures encompass situations where, in any given market, the optimal quantity of a product demanded by 
consumers does not equate to the optimal quantity supplied by suppliers. This is a direct result of a lack of certain 
economically ideal factors, which prevents the equilibrium from being reached. 
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gradually certain sectors that were increasingly dynamic and knowledge and technology intensive, 
starting from textiles in the 1960s up to bio- and nano-technology in the 1990s and 2000s (Peres and 
Primi 2009).   
After this quite unsatisfactory period, that culminated with the Latin American debt crisis of 1982, the 
region was involved in a new wave of liberal policies, fostered through the so-called “Washington 
Consensus”, a comprehensive set of reforms advocating for free market policies following the canons 
of rational expectations macroeconomics18 (Williamson 1990). Embraced by the United States and by 
the Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, this approach 
was largely promoted in developing countries, but its result in terms of growth and employment 
generation was controversial. Let us think again of the case of Argentina, where the neo-liberal ‘recipe’ 
was implemented at its full capacity: price stability and GDP growth was obtained at the increasingly 
unsustainable cost of rising unemployment and indebtedness (see chapter 1.2). 
In recent years approaches based on the methodology of the so-called ‘hard-sciences’ were designed, 
such as the Growth Diagnostics or Decision Tree framework suggested by Hausmann, Rodrik and 
Velasco (2005), based on the importance to identify the “binding constraints” on growth in each 
country and, hence, to prioritize reforms in certain areas in order to remove those constraint, or the 
“randomization” approach based on the use of randomized control trials on social experiments used to 
assess poverty problems and to design appropriate policies based on the microeconomic evidence 
found (Banerjee and Duflo 2011).   
1.3.3 New structural economics: original elements and links with ‘old’ theories 
New structural economics is a relatively new approach to economic development designed by Justin 
Yifu Lin, former Chief Economist at the World Bank and Professor at the China Centre for Economic 
Research at the Peking University. It is based on two fundamental (and apparently antithetical) 
theoretical ‘platforms’: the neo-classical theory and the ‘old’ structuralism. It is neo-classical in the sense 
that it recognizes that differences in structure between developed and developing countries arise from 
differences in their endowment structures and that the economy is determined by market forces. On 
the other hand, it keeps some features of the structuralism á-la-Prebisch recognizing that in developing 
countries there are structural rigidities caused by political or economic distortions, for instance in price 
                                                          
18
 The rational expectations approach proved that in market economies sustained periods of inflation lead to more 
expected inflation that is built on wages and other payments. Therefore, it refuses the structuralist foundation for the 
state’s role in using fiscal and monetary policy, since in the context of continuing nominal wage increases, restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies mostly affect output and unemployment and have little effect on inflation (Lin 2011).  
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signaling due to oligopoly or monopoly. Therefore it recognizes for the State a role to play in 
establishing a fair environment for the economic transactions (Lin 2011).  
New structural economics is based on three key pillars: 
- Optimal economic structures are different at various stages of development: this happens 
because, at a given period t, the economy’s factor endowments (defined as the relative 
abundance of natural resources, labor, human and physical capital) are different. The concept of 
comparative advantage then becomes crucial in determining the economic sectors that a 
country should exploit and develop in depth in order to gain the most; 
- Economic development cannot be divided into rigid “stages” as suggested by Rostow (1990), so 
that a “big push” in terms of public investment is needed to allow the economy to make a 
transition from an agricultural-driven development to the industrial and services-driven stages. 
On the contrary, it should be seen as a continuum from a low-income agrarian economy to a 
high-income industrialized economy, where development takes place according to a gradual and 
incremental pace; 
-  The market is the fundamental mechanism for efficient resource allocation but, in order to face 
negative externalities produced by distortions in the transactions costs and price structures, the 
government should play a facilitating role in the industrial diversification, in the technological 
upgrading and in the provision of infrastructure, in terms both of ‘hardware’ (roads, ports, 
airports, telecommunications) and ‘software’ (legal framework, financial procedures, respect and 
enforcement of the rule of law) (Lin 2011).  
How is it possible to translate these principles into practice? Lin identifies seven main areas: 
- Fiscal policy: countercyclical policies are seen as the appropriate strategy, drawing upon the 
Keynesian framework. Investments in infrastructure are considered the best expansionary tool 
in periods of negative cycle and, thanks to the exploitation of the domestic comparative 
advantages, the country’s fiscal position and external account are likely to be sound; 
- Public revenue management policy: not all revenues coming from exports should be 
accumulated as foreign currency reserves in order to mitigate the risks of external vulnerability 
but an appropriate share of these should be used to invest in human, infrastructural and social 
capital so as to facilitate diversification, technological upgrading and a quicker catch-up process 
with high-income economies on the ladder of economic development; 
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- Monetary policy: interest rate policy in developing countries can be used as a counter-cyclical 
tool. Liquidity traps are less likely to be found in these countries, so that lowering interest rates 
in such contexts would encourage investment in infrastructure; 
- Financial development: the optimal financial structure at a given stage of development is 
determined by the prevailing industrial structure and the average size of firms. It follows that 
low-income countries should choose small, local banks as the main axis of their financial 
system: this would better provide small scale firms with adequate financial services; 
- Foreign capital: foreign direct investments (FDI) are seen as a favorable source of foreign 
capital since they are usually targeted towards industries consistent with a country’s comparative 
advantage; 
- Trade policy: trade liberalization should be seen as a further way to exploit domestic 
comparative advantages, but in order to foster industrial development and upgrading a 
gradualist approach to trade openness may be implemented in the earlier stages of 
development; 
- Human development: since human capital is seen as part of a country’s resource endowment, 
investment in education and training should be pursued, but it should be commeasurable with 
the accumulation of physical capital, in order not to over or under supply the economic system 
with too low or high educated people, which may turn into a binding constraint in both cases 
(Lin 2011). 
This approach does not come up with radically new ideas in economic thinking but, as it has been 
defined, is “old wine in new bottles” (Mc Culloch 2013). What is interesting of this approach is that 
it is not dogmatic and it has a certain degree of flexibility that allows to implement different 
instruments according to the specific economic structure of the country and its stage of 
development. It shares many elements both with the old structuralism and neo-liberalism, simply 
recognizing the need to adopt a comprehensive overview on economic situations and the fact that, 
in the past, top-down approaches that did not use to take into consideration the specific situations 
of the countries.  
On the other hand, it is not an independent theoretical framework, and this is probably its major 
flaw since it does not add anything really innovative to economic development theory. The concept 
of comparative advantages, for instance, is a bit contradictory in Lin’s theory, as he assumes that 
the public sector should intervene to address market failures, but in this case it would defy rather 
than support the notion of comparative advantages (Rodrik 2012). Therefore, this principle should 
be better interpreted in its dynamic meaning rather than in the static one. In order to guarantee a 
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sustained development and an effective transition from a low-income to a high-income situation, 
the exploitation of static comparative advantages, based only on the relative factor endowments at a 
given time t, is not enough, since this would lead in the long run to underdevelopment and weak 
productive structures (Ortiz and Schorr 2009). The Ricardian model of international trade, in its 
basic version, does not adopt an inter-temporal approach and is therefore based on a static view of 
comparative advantages. However, variations in the relative proportion of factors (depreciation of 
capital, technological upgrades, increase of skilled labor) lead to changes in the ranking of 
exportable goods at each time t according to the comparative advantage of each export activity Et , 
implying that exporting the latter is only profitable at time t (Bruno 1970). In other words, a 
dynamic perspective is much more realistic, since within an economy productivity changes and 
growth factors come in and trade goods can no longer be ordered independently of time. For 
instance, as an economy moves towards more advanced development stages, the component of 
skilled labor tends to increase and a country that showed a comparative advantage in the intensive 
use of land or cheap labor can turn to a country whose comparative advantage is in the use of 
highly qualified labor.  
Moreover, another questionable point of Lin’s approach is that it is not always clear how to ‘pick 
up winners’, i.e. how to choose sectors provided with a “latent comparative advantage” on which 
most of private and public investment should converge (Krueger 2012). In other words, there is the 
risk that New Structural Economics will be used for political purposes as an excuse for 
governments to support specific industries, and therefore be as detrimental for development as the 
old theories were.  
Table 1.3.1 compares the three theories highlighting points of convergence and divergence.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3.1 – New structural economics vs. structuralism and neo-liberalism: a comparison 
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Source: elaboration of the author, based on Lin (2011) 
 
POLICY STRUCTURALISM NEO-LIBERALISM NEW  STRUCTURAL ECONOMICS 
FISCAL  Expansionary policies are desirable for 
their counter-cyclical effect (the fiscal 
multiplier is >1) 
Expansionary policies are not 
desirable induce wrong expectations in 
firms and households 
Counter-cyclical, expansionary policies are 
good in developing countries that export a lot 
thanks to their comparative advantages. In 
this way they can maintain a current account 
surplus 
PUBLIC REVENUE MANAGEMENT Creation of state-owned enterprises in 
strategic sectors generating large public 
revenue to be used for social 
investments 
Accumulation of foreign currency 
reserves to maintain macroeconomic 
stability 
A portion of the revenues should be used to 
finance domestic or regional projects that 
facilitate structural change 
MONETARY Central banks should be under the 
government’s control and aimed at 
influencing interest rates and sector 
credit allocation 
The main goal is price and 
macroeconomic stability. Central 
banks should be independent from 
governments 
Interest rate policy can be used as a counter-
cyclical tool and as an instrument to 
encourage infrastructure and industrial 
upgrading investments 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT Governments have to correct potential 
market failures mobilizing savings and 
allocating credit to support the 
development of advanced capital-
intensive industries 
Financial liberalization, through a well 
defined system of property rights and 
a sound competition would guarantee 
the creation of a well functioning 
financial system 
Size and structure of the financial system 
depends on the country’s stage of 
development. For instance, it would be better 
for low income countries to choose small, 
local banks able to finance small firms 
FOREIGN CAPITAL Tight restrictions, both in terms of 
inflows and outflows, in order to 
prevent foreign governments or 
multinational corporations to take 
control of domestic strategic economic 
assets 
Full capital mobility may allow a more 
efficient allocation of savings and 
increased opportunities for 
diversification of investment risk 
FDIs are seen as an appropriate source of 
financing because they are usually targeted to 
companies in the sectors where the recipient 
country has a comparative advantage 
TRADE Gradual openness; focus on inward-
looking strategies (ISI) 
Complete openness to free trade and 
removal of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers 
Gradualist openness with temporary 
protection of industries not consistent with 
static comparative advantages 
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1.3.4  Back to ‘old’ theories? Factors endowments and comparative advantages 
In this paragraph I will try to recall and assess the factor endowments of Argentina in terms of physical 
and human resources. Identifying these will help to have a clearer picture of the economic structure of 
the country and to elaborate some policy recommendations for the future economic development. 
The following figures were elaborated using data from the World Bank Indicators. They compare 
Argentina over the course of the last three decades to the world, the rest of Latin America, the group of 
high-income countries, and Brazil and Chile. The former is the biggest country in South America and 
biggest Argentina’s trading partner; the second is very similar to Argentina in terms of geographic, 
demographic and economic size and potential. This methodology of comparison was chosen in order 
to show whether and where Argentina has a different performance with respect to the other subjects 
included in the sample. 
Is Argentina a natural-resource intensive country? It seems that agriculture is very important for the 
country’s economy, both in absolute and relative terms. The share of arable land over the total land 
area is about 10%, much more than Brazil and Chile (even though the latter has particular geographical 
features) (Figure 1.3.1). Argentina shows also a very high ratio of agricultural land in terms of hectares 
per person, given by the fact that the country’s surface is huge and the population is quite low (around 
40 million people). This proportion is much higher than every other term of comparison included in 
my sample (Figure 1.3.2). The role of agriculture in terms of value added over GDP is also more 
prominent than in the rest of the world and even slightly more than in Brazil and Chile (9.7% during 
the last decade versus respectively 9.2% and 9%). What is interesting to note in this case is the sharp 
increase of agricultural value added in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, when the neo-liberal policies 
based on the stress given on financial speculation and on a fixed exchange rate that harmed exports 
reduced the role of the primary sector (Figure 1.3.3). Finally, how profitable  is agriculture? The rent of 
natural resources in Argentina weighs almost 10% of GDP, again showing the same dynamics of value 
added with respect to the 1990s (Figure 1.3.4). 
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Figure 1.3.1 – Argentina vs. other countries, Arable land as % of land area (1983-2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on World Bank data 
Figure 1.3.2 – Argentina vs. other countries, Agricultural land, hectares per person (1983-2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on World Bank data 
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Figure 1.3.3 – Argentina vs. other countries, Agricultural domestic value added, % of GDP 
(1983-2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on World Bank data 
Figure 1.3.4 – Argentina vs. other countries, Total natural resources rent, % of GDP (1983-2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on World Bank data 
With respect to capital intensity, Figure 1.3.5 shows Argentina’s position with respect to gross capital 
formation vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In this case the country has performed worse than the other 
subjects in the sample (17% of GDP on average in the last decade compared to 20% in Brazil and 21% 
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in Chile), denoting a substantial gap in capital availability that should be provided by an increase of 
investments, especially coming from abroad (see chapter 1.2).  
In terms of human capital, Argentina seems to perform well. The rate of enrollment to tertiary 
education (Figure 1.3.6) is very high and in line with the average of high-income countries (68%, much 
more than Brazil – 23% - and Chile – 57%). Moving ahead to the other sectors of the economy, value 
added in manufacturing and services show much higher values than agriculture (Figures 1.3.7 and 
1.3.8). How advanced is manufacturing, in terms of technological upgrading? In this case, Argentina’s 
record is quite poor compared not only to high-income countries but even to Brazil: the share of high-
tech exports over total manufacturing exports is only 8% against 12% in Brazil (Figure 1.3.9). This is 
quite evident also in terms of the domestic industrial production: the share of goods intensive in natural 
resources is still much higher (although it has slightly decreased over the course of the last twenty years) 
than that one of labor intensive and technology intensive goods (Figure 1.3.10).   
Figure 1.3.5 – Argentina vs. other countries, Gross fixed capital formation, % of GDP (1983-
2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on World Bank data 
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Figure 1.3.6 – Argentina vs. other countries, Gross enrollment rate to tertiary education (1983-
2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on World Bank data 
Figure 1.3.7 – Argentina vs. other countries, Manufacturing domestic value added, % of GDP 
(1983-2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on World Bank data 
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Figure 1.3.8 – Argentina vs. other countries, Services domestic value added, % of GDP (1983-
2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on World Bank data 
 
Figure 1.3.9 – Argentina vs. other countries, Share of high-tech exports over manufacturing 
exports (1992-2011) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on World Bank data 
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added of the manufacturing and services sector. However, the gap in capital availability seems to be a 
stumbling block for the development of a more competitive manufacturing in terms of technological 
intensity, despite the satisfactory presence of human capital. 
Assessing the structure of the country’s comparative advantages would go beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but the analysis shown in the above suggests that Argentina still has a relative better position in 
terms of the exploitation of its agricultural resources, so that the primary and the manufacturing sectors 
related to agricultural and food processing seem to be better positioned with respect to the other 
countries analyzed, given the relative abundance of these resources. Nevertheless, in a dynamic 
perspective Argentina should aim at improving its competitiveness upgrading the technological content 
of its exports if it wants to go up the ladder of economic development and reach the status of high 
income country. The gap in capital availability should be filled by policies aimed at attracting more 
FDIs, so that the abundance of human capital may be also exploited in a more efficient way and evolve 
the domestic structure of competitive advantage. Labor is already a relative cheap resource, since the 
undervalued  exchange rate contributed to keep salaries low. In the next paragraph I will provide some  
suggestions at this respect.  
1.3.5 Some policy recommendations for Argentina’s development 
After the failure of neo-liberalism, it seems that Argentina undertook a very different way. The peronist 
governments led by Néstor and Cristina Kirchner implemented a set of policies that were described in 
the previous chapter and that are based on maintaining an undervalued exchange rate in order to boost 
exports and to have cheaper production factors, a rigid control of the State on the economy through 
nationalizations, the direct management of foreign currency reserves and controls on capital flows, and 
expansionary fiscal policies, not only counter-cyclical but also pro-cyclical, as a fundamental tool to 
obtain political gains in terms of popular consensus. All this set of policies is inspired by the so-called 
“neo-developmentalism”, that tries to reproduce the old developmentalist policies that were used to be 
implemented in the period after World War II in the framework of a capitalist model of society. 
However, in Argentina this process of structural change, based on a renewed State intervention, a 
different composition of the working classes, and a new model of capital accumulation, has been only 
partly successful so far. The dominant classes, mainly represented by commodity exporters, maintained 
their position of economic leadership in the country, and the biggest companies operating in Argentina 
still mainly belong to foreign capital: foreign-owned enterprises went from representing 32% of the top 
500 firms in 1993 to more than 48% in 1998 and 66% in 2007 (Féliz 2012). In other words, the 
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Kirchnerist project has not been totally effective in readdressing Argentina’s design of society, since the 
new model of capital accumulation reproduced the same structure of winners and losers.  
Dynamic comparative advantages should be further exploited in sectors that show forward linkages and 
that are included in value chains. In the case of Argentina, this becomes pretty clear  for those 
manufacturing sectors related to agriculture (food processing, production of high-quality wines, 
machinery for agriculture). Moreover, industries with dynamic comparative advantages will show a 
higher income elasticity, a faster technological progress and a fast-improving labor productivity. 
Therefore, as suggested by Ortiz and Schorr (2009), Argentina’s development process could be based 
on a more equilibrated industrialization process, more vertically integrated and able to exploit 
economies of scale, through the empowerment of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), an important 
element of Argentina’s industrial fabric, and their inclusion in value chains. This strategy might lead to 
genuine competitiveness gains, not simply based on wage reductions determined by the undervalued 
exchange rate.   
The analysis provided in the previous paragraph provides support to the following reasoning. In terms 
of resource endowments, Argentina is abundant with agricultural lands and a relatively highly-skilled 
human capital, although it is less endowed with capital than its Latin American neighbors and exports 
in relative terms a small share of high-tech goods. Moreover, the undervalued  exchange rate allows to 
keep wages relatively low compared to the rest of the world. Argentina should therefore exploit its 
current comparative advantages in terms of the production of agricultural and food products and of 
manufactured goods or services that are more labor-intensive. Due to the fact that labor is cheap, on a 
dynamic perspective the country might shift its productive structure towards  goods that use intensively 
skilled labor, and in the meantime focus to develop its manufacturing industry in sectors that are linked 
to agriculture, aiming at upgrading the technological content of the goods it produces. 
It is fundamental for Argentina to become progressively more included in the global economy 
increasing its competitiveness and its degree of integration with the rest of the world. In order to do 
some reasoning about that, it is useful to adopt the approach of global value chains (GVCs). The 
Global Value Chain (GVC) approach provides useful tools to analyze the implications of international 
production fragmentation for economic development. A value chain is defined as the sequence of all 
activities involved from conception to marketing a product (Gereffi 1999). The chain becomes global if 
those activities are carried out in different countries. One important aspect is that some activities in the 
chain add more value and are more profitable than others, and that some actors in the chain have more 
power than others.  
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Argentina’s insertion in GVCs is currently quite scarce (Fanelli 2012, González, Hallak, Schott, Soria 
Genta 2012). The OECD (2013) computes a country’s participation in GVCs as the percentage of its 
exports contained in a GVC: this takes into account “upstream links” (looking back along the value 
chain and measuring foreign inputs or value added in a country’s exports) and “downstream links” 
(domestic inputs or value added contained in other countries exports by looking forward along the 
value chain. It is then possible to assess and summarize Argentina’s positioning inside GVCs as follows: 
- Its participation is mainly driven by downstream links as other countries use Argentinean 
intermediates in their exports. In terms of upstream links, Argentina’s main share is represented 
by its exports of natural resources; 
- Agriculture, mining and transport and telecommunication services are the main sectors where 
Argentina’s exports are mainly involved in GVCs through its intermediate exports; 
- In terms of value added, the majority of the final demand for manufactured goods and market 
services in Argentina represents valued added that has been created domestically (81% against 
19% of foreign value added); the proportion becomes higher as the economy moves towards 
the services sector; 
- Nevertheless, Argentina’s share of global value added contained in exports is low (only 0.5%). 
Some sectors have a higher share on global trade in terms of value added than in gross exports, 
namely agriculture and food, reflecting the high proportion of domestic value added embodied 
in their production (OECD 2013). 
It seems that Argentina’s main problems in terms of insertion in GVCs are due to the facts that wages 
are too high for firms to enter segments of chains where low-skilled labor tasks are required and that 
firms do not generally possess the skills and market knowledge to perform more complex activities in 
the chain such as design and marketing (González, Hallak, Schott, Soria Genta 2012). Therefore, one 
might say that Argentina risks to get stuck in the so-called “middle-income trap”19 and to be unable to 
gain international competitiveness. Moving forward to the more advanced segments of those chains 
through technological upgrades and labor skills improvements might help the country to better exploit 
its comparative advantages in a dynamic fashion. For instance, the exploitation of agricultural 
                                                          
19
 At middle levels of income, economic growth and structural upgrading become more arduous – the so-called 
Middle-Income Trap. Wages are too high and, at the same time, workers’ skills are too low to be globally competitive 
either in low or high skilled sectors. The experience of Latin American with the Middle-Income Trap has been very 
different from that of the NICs. While the latter were able to surpass middle-income status in a relatively brief period 
of time, Latin American countries have remained in the middle-income zone for decades (Jankowska, Nagengast and 
Perea 2012).  
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commodities requires more and more effort in R&D activities (let us think of genetically modified 
beans or of the high quality wines sector) or the production of high-tech machinery, two things that 
might increase productivity in this sector. Or, another sector where Argentina has an interesting 
potential to develop is the high-end footwear industry, where Argentina could exploit wide availability 
of high quality raw leather, its long tradition in shoe manufacturing, and high-quality design which is in 
some cases linked to multinational luxury brands (González, Hallak, Schott, Soria Genta 2012). 
But, first and foremost, Argentina’s economy needs a clear and stable framework in order to grow fast 
and steady. As I showed in the previous chapter, the inconsistency between economic policies 
implemented over the course of the last decade and the serious deficiencies in the country’s “software”, 
i.e. the business and institutional environment, created a situation unfavorable for investment and 
productivity increases. It is then necessary for Argentina to adopt clear macroeconomic policies. Some 
personal recommendations follow:  
- Fiscal policy: Argentina’s government has been adopting too ‘relaxed’ fiscal policies during the 
last few years. Countercyclical, expansionary policies based on an increase of public spending 
were necessary in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 crisis in order to boost economic growth and 
to fight poverty, but nowadays the priority should be to adopt a longer-term perspective 
targeted on maintaining a surplus in the current account balance. As shown in the previous 
chapter, it has just turned negative and the trend is expected to get even worse (-0.5% in 2014). 
This situation would not help Argentina in case of regional or global economic crises that 
would expose the country to a fall in exports due to a crisis on the demand side. However, 
perspectives are more gloomy because of the proximity of the Presidential elections in 2015, 
that might induce the Government to increase social spending in order to raise consensus; 
 
- Public revenue management: part of the revenues coming from exports should be used to 
recover the level of foreign currency reserves accumulated over the course of the last decade, so 
that the country might be able to face external shocks. Moreover, more investments in 
infrastructural projects and in R&D, aimed at enhancing Argentina’s competitiveness in terms 
of ‘hardware’ (in physical and human capital terms) would be the most appropriate in this 
period, in order to allow the economy to move a step ahead; 
 
- Monetary policy: the government had to face a difficult balance between the exchange rate and 
the interest rate, based on the trade-off between maintaining a devalued local currency to boost 
exports, and the risk of letting inflation rising out of control. During the last two years, the 
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Argentine currency lost again value vis-à-vis the dollar and, at the same time, the interest rate 
rose, reaching 13.25% in July 2013. This reflects the governments’ attempts to calm down 
inflation and to sharply limit capital flows, which have been basically forbidden since the 
beginning of 2012. The increased demand for US dollars, traditionally a store of value for 
Argentine people given the fluctuations of the domestic currency and the periods of hyper-
inflation, led the government to impose strict limitations on capital flows in order to keep the 
amount of foreign currency reserves and to use them to pay public debt. This is why today in 
Argentina there is a sort of “multiple exchange rate” system (Burke 2012) that forces people to 
pay more to obtain dollars on the black market. The so-called “blue dollar” was sold at the end 
of August 2013 at 8.80 ARS against an official exchange rate of 1 US$ against 5.66 ARS: a sharp 
depreciation with respect to one year ago, when the unofficial and official exchange rates were 
respectively 6.30 ARS and 4.66 ARS for 1 US$ . This system, with a black-market premium of 
55.4% with respect to the official rate, is harming both domestic companies that have to deal 
with abroad and foreign businesses with the intention to invest in Argentina. This picture 
explains why a more clear framework of monetary policy would be needed. First of all, less 
attention should be paid in the medium-long run to keep a weak exchange rate but different 
strategies to increase competitiveness on a permanent basis should be pursued; secondly, 
controls on capital flows should be reduced, otherwise Argentina will not be able to fill the gap 
in capital availability (see Figure 1.3.5) needed to stimulate investment; thirdly, a progressive 
reduction of interest rates will be also useful to attract capitals and investments. Stabilizing the 
domestic monetary system will take time, but this sequence of policies is probably the only 
sustainable in a long-term perspective; 
 
- Financial development: Argentina’s banking sector suffers from serious problems of 
underdevelopment. Over the last 50 years its size increased only by 3% in terms of peso-
denominated deposits (FOP 2013) and is today five times smaller than Chile’s banking system. 
This seriously harms the performance of firms, especially the smallest ones that suffer the most 
from the lack of capital available for investments. Again, also in this case the system needs more 
stability: lower inflation and more certainty on the exchange rate would induce savers to hold 
more peso-denominated bank deposits and assets instead of holding US dollars, traditionally 
considered as a safer store of value; 
 
- Foreign capital policies: similar considerations applied to the monetary policy can be also 
applied to the potential measures aiming at attracting more FDIs. The recent wave of 
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nationalizations, as well as the poor legislative and infrastructural system (see chapter 1.2.2), 
make Argentina one of the countries in the world where doing business is mostly difficult. 
Procedures to ease business, as well as a more stable monetary and financial environment are 
necessary to increase external confidence in the country and attract more capitals; 
 
- Trade: more openness to international trade is required. In recent years, after that complete 
liberalization was implemented during the 1990s, Argentina’s economic system was harmed by 
a too drastic opening and by a too rigid, non competitive exchange rate. After the 2001-2002 
crisis, exports started booming again because of an undervalued  exchange rate and renewed 
protectionist measures, such as tariff and non-tariff barriers (see chapter 3.3). Some degree of 
protection on certain goods might be helpful in the short run to allow industrial or services 
sectors connected by forward linkages with sectors that today present comparative advantages, 
but such measures should be lifted only temporarily because in the long run they would simply 
harm productivity and competitiveness, damaging customers that would not get access to 
cheap, good quality goods. Moreover, protectionism negatively affects Argentina’s relationship 
with its neighbors, especially Brazil and the other members of MERCOSUR, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, not only in terms of trade exchanges but also in terms of the participation in regional 
and global value chains, especially in the agricultural industry (Stanley 2010). In an era of 
“hyperglobalization”, characterized by an unprecedented increase of trade integration, not only 
in terms of gross trade flows but also in terms of value added (Subramanian and Kessler 2013), 
the advantages of more openness would be many: a deeper inclusion in GVCs; a full access to 
global markets; the opportunity to increase competitiveness through the channel of external 
competition.  
1.3.6 Focus: Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)’s role in Argentina’s economic structure  
In this paragraph I want to focus on the role of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) as a potential 
driver of economic growth in Argentina. It is important to take into account the weight of SMEs in 
Argentina’s industries since they represent, as I will show below, a fundamental part of the domestic 
economic system.  
First of all, it is necessary to define what SMEs are. There are several definitions according to the size in 
terms of employees or economic turnover. The European Commission defines enterprises according to 
their dimensions as follows: 
- Less than 10 employees: micro enterprise 
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- Between 11 and 50 employees: small enterprise 
- Between 51 and 250 employees: medium enterprise 
- More than 250 employees: big enterprise 
According to the turnover, this is the classification: 
- Less than 2 million €: micro enterprise 
- Up to 10 million €: small enterprise 
- Up to 50 million €: medium enterprise 
- More than 50 million €: big enterprise 
However, Argentina adopts slightly different ranges to define SMEs. In terms of employees, the 
Observatory SMEs Foundation (Fundación Observatorio PyMEs, FOP) adopts the following classification: 
- Less than 10 employees: micro enterprise 
- Between 11 and 50 employees: small enterprise 
- Between 51 and 200 employees: medium enterprise 
Moreover, the Secretariat for SMEs and Regional Development (SEPYME), depending on the Ministry 
of Industry, adopts a further classification according to their turnover:  
- Less than 1.8 million ARS (240.000 €): micro enterprise 
- Between 1.8 million and 10.3 million ARS (1.37 million €): small enterprise 
- Between 10.3 million and 183 million ARS (24.3 million €): medium enterprise 
- More than 183 million ARS: big enterprise 
Despite their limited size, SMEs are very important for economic growth both in developing and 
developed countries. As the World Bank shows, in middle income countries (between 1,000 and 11,500 
US$ per capita) they generate on average 39% of GDP, while in high income countries this share goes 
up to 51%. Moreover, they are considered a useful asset for developing industrial economies since they 
are labor-intensive providing more opportunities for low-skilled workers, they are correlated with lower 
distribution income inequality, they are an important part for the supply chain of Multi National 
Companies, they are important in the transition from agriculture-centered economies to industrial and 
services oriented, and they are important centres of technological innovation thanks to their flexibility 
and propension to risk taking (Newberry 2006).  
What is the situation of SMEs in Argentina? According to the FOP (2013), they are very relevant for 
the industrial sector accounting for 44% of total enterprises and 42% of employees (Figures 1.3.10/a 
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and /b). This proportion increases further if we take into account also micro enterprises, which in 2010 
accounted for 54.1% of total firms. The proportion of Micro and SMEs increased over time, 
representing more than 96% of the total number of firms in Argentina  (Figure 1.3.11).  The most 
important sub-sectors are production of food and beverages (15.7%) and textiles and shoes (14.9%) 
(Figure 1.3.13). They also show a remarkable performance in terms of export and international 
competitiveness: 17.2% of industrial SMEs in 2011 exported at least 5% of their production, with an 
average exported share of 19%. The main destinations of their exports are Brazil (18.4%), Paraguay and 
Uruguay (38.4%), while Chile (14.6%), rest of Latin America (13%) and rest of the world (15.3%) 
account for much lower percentages. These are further evidences of the importance of such sectors for 
Argentina’s economy: since almost half of the labor force in national industry works in SMEs, and 30% 
of them is active in sectors with comparative advantages (as shown in the previous sections of this 
chapter), then it becomes crucial to consider these firms as a main asset of the national industrial fabric. 
They are also important for the international performance of Argentina’s economy, even though their 
potential seems to be limited to the regional dimension and in particular to their inclusion in 
MERCOSUR (Brazil + Paraguay and Uruguay account for more than 50% of their exports). 
Figure 1.3.10/a – Argentina, Industrial firms, % of firms  according to the number of 
employees  (%, 2012) 
 
Source: FOP 
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Figure 1.3.10/b – Argentina, Industrial firms, distribution of employees according to the firms’ 
size  (%, 2012) 
 
Source: FOP 
 
Figure 1.3.11 – Argentina, distribution of firms according to the number of employees) (%, 
2003-2010) 
 
Source: CEPAL 
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Figure 1.3.12 – Argentina vs. other countries: industrial firms, distribution according to the 
number of employees (%, 2012) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on OECD data 
 
Figure 1.3.13 – Argentina, industrial firms according to their sector of activity (%, 2011) 
 
 
Source: FOP 
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Figure 1.3.15 - Italy, industrial firms according to their sector of activity (%, 2009) 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Figure 1.3.16 – Germany, industrial firms according to their sector of activity (%, 2009)
 
Source:  OECD  
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Figure 1.3.16 - US, industrial firms according to their sector of activity (%, 2009) 
 
Source: OECD 
A comparison with other countries suggests that the industrial structure is not much different from 
developed economies like  Italy and Germany, where the proportion of MSMEs is also very high 
(Figures 1.3.12). In Chile, another South American country with a similar level of development, the 
proportion of micro firms on the total is much smaller, possibly because of a productive structure 
mainly focused on the exploitation of resources in the mining sector. Moreover, the comparison related 
to the distribution of firms across sectors20 shows that Argentina shares with Italy a similar structure 
(Figure 1.3.15) especially in relation to textiles, food and beverage, and metal products). In particular, it 
seems that Argentina has a bigger proportion of firms in the sectors expected to have a comparative 
advantages. This can be considered a positive factor, and the presence of a high number of SMEs in 
these sectors can be also considered  positive for their flexibility and their innovative and creative 
attitude.  However, a high number of MSMEs can also present some drawbacks. They are more 
vulnerable in presence of shocks and they are more affected during a crisis or in presence of structural 
problems of the economy. While micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are more dynamic, 
flexible and able to specialize and organize in so-called industrial clusters than bigger firms, their size 
also hinders their ability to respond to the challenges posed by economic globalization. As the example 
of Italy, a developed country, shows, many firms are undercapitalized, often because of their size and 
this prevents them from investing on a regular basis, for example in R&D activities: in 2010 almost 
                                                          
20
 However, in this case only the sectoral distribution across all manufacturing firms (regardless for their size) was 
available.  
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40% of micro enterprises did not invest at all, according to the Bank of Italy (Subacchi and Tentori 
2013. In Argentina, the structure of industrial SMEs is similar to that one of a developed country, in 
terms of number and sector distribution. However, in Argentina’s context they are affected by 
structural problems, especially in terms of their ability to get access to credit and financing. Limited size 
of the banking sector (see previous paragraph) also contributed to negatively affect the performance of 
SMEs, so that 60% of them decided not to apply for banking loans for the difficulties in obtaining 
them (FOP 2013). Moreover, other problems that act as ‘bottlenecks’ against their development are: 
- Small firms with limited infrastructure endowment 
- Small firms with too low level of activity 
- Medium firms with competitiveness problems 
- Medium firms unable to increase their size (FOP 2013) 
There is an unsatisfied demand for banking credit by SMEs that has not been filled yet, despite several 
governmental programs (FONAPYME, Credit of the Bicentennial initiative) implemented to improve 
their access to finance. Macroeconomic policies aimed at fighting inflation should be the key to solve 
the problem of credit, since this is the main problem limiting the size of the domestic banking sector, as 
most of deposits are denominated in US dollars. A substantial increase of deposits denominated in 
Peso would provide a stronger basis upon which it would be possible to build a more efficient credit 
system and guarantee resources for new investments to SMEs. 
Another fact that needs to  be stressed is that  the propensity to export is higher as the average firm 
size increases (FOP 2013). However, despite the problems aforementioned there is a high potential for 
SMEs in Argentina to develop. Let us have a look at the structure of revealed comparative advantages 
(RCA) held by Argentina’s industrial firms. The RCA index is used in international economics to 
calculate the relative advantages or disadvantages of a country in certain sectors of the economy, using 
trade flows as a proxy to define them. RCAs are equal to the proportion of the country’s exports of the 
industry under consideration divided by the proportion of world exports of the same industry. If the 
ratio is >1, then the country has a RCA in the production of the goods of that specific industry. 
Looking at Argentina, CEPAL found out that the country has RCA in vehicles and leather products, 
while the sector of agricultural machineries is approaching to 1 (Rivas and Stumpo 2013). The sector of 
leather products is one of the main industrial sectors in Argentina (this is also why it is heavily 
protected by the Government, as I will explain in part 3): it has a good potential but it is too labor 
intensive, so that all the improvements in this sector are captured by increases of employment. On the 
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other hand the sector of agricultural machinery presents a higher potential in terms of technological 
content and upgrade.  
Another sector with a high development potential is the wine industry. Argentina is increasingly 
producing world-quality wines and is currently the 5th global producer of wine, the 7th largest exporter 
and the 7th largest domestic consumer (Prosperar - UNIDO 2010). Development of SMEs in this 
sector looks particularly profitable in the future because wine industry is a good example of a value 
chain that can be upgraded at the local (regional) or global level allowing Argentina to play a role of 
leadership in the most advanced segments of the production: there are new investment opportunities 
for the inputs required for production and packaging. From bottles, cardboard cases, corks, metal 
capsules and labels to specialty machinery, aluminum tanks and chemical inputs, the expanding wine 
industry is demanding more quantity and diverse supplies to meet world demand. There are more than 
1300 wineries in the country, 85% of which are SMEs (Prosperar - UNIDO 2010). Wine industry is 
one of the sectors that received the highest amount of FDIs in the recent past: between 1999 and 2004 
750 million US$ for greenfield projects flew into the industry, 62% of which coming from overseas 
investors (Prosperar - UNIDO 2010) contributing also to the technological upgrade of the sector. Wine 
industry represents today a niche of advanced development in the country and is a perfect example of 
how the country should grow following the simple prescriptions of the new structural economics.  
Therefore, there are some sectors that would be able to further increase and become globally 
competitive, exploiting the dynamic comparative advantage mechanism explained in the previous 
sections. SMEs might be key players for the growth of these sectors, but difficulties in terms of access 
to credit and exploiting their export capacity prevent them from deploying all their potential. A further 
inclusion of SMEs in GVCs, as well as the implementation of strategies aimed at strengthening their 
complementarities (for example the creation of “clusters”) would help those firms and Argentina’s 
economy overall.   
1.3.7 Conclusion: the need of coherent economic policies to enhance competitiveness and attract 
investments 
In this chapter I provided some general policy indications for a potentially alternative model of growth 
and economic development in Argentina, keeping as a central point of the analysis the importance of 
becoming more competitive on an international basis.  
A brief summary of the paradigms of development followed through the last decades was useful to 
show advantages and disadvantages of  each approach, starting from structuralist policies and going 
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until new structural economics through the experience of neo-liberalism. The key element to bear in 
mind, made evident from the diachronic perspective that I adopted, is lack of coherence in economic 
policies: the Governments ruling the country over the course of the last decades have constantly 
changed the development paradigm they were referring to implement economic policies, in a quite 
different way from other States, for example Chile, that remained coherent to neo-liberal and 
monetarist policies since the 1970s, despite the change of different political regimes. As shown in the 
previous chapter, this uncertainty resulted in a “stop and go” pattern of growth and in a strong 
volatility of growth, which had a negative influence on inflation, the solidity of the financial sector and 
the soundness of the fiscal position. Therefore, what Argentina primarily needs is a clear and stable 
policy orientation, so that this can help to gain more confidence and trust from financial markets and 
attract capitals available for investment from within and without the country.  
Fiscal policies should be less expansionary in periods of growth for the economic system to be 
sustainable in the long run, as well as monetary policies should be clearer (inflation should be stabilized 
and currency flows should be allowed) in order to promote internal and external investments. This 
would help firms, especially SMEs, to get better access to credit and to upgrade their global 
competitiveness. A further degree of openness of the economy in terms of trade and capital flows 
would complement these measures helping Argentina to be better inserted in GVCs. 
To sum up, Argentina shows an enormous economic potential. The risk is to get caught, once again, in 
a situation of  “middle income trap”, which usually affects growing economies that end up in 
stagnation, failing to upgrade to the level of high-income countries (Aiyar, Duval. Puy, Wu, Zhang 
2013).21 If the country wants to move ahead and obtain at last the status of high income, developed 
economy, should change its direction and look for its place within the global economic system, 
accepting its rules and exploiting its own advantages vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
  
                                                          
21
 The Middle Income Trap occurs when a country's growth stagnates after reaching middle income levels. The 
problem usually arises when developing economies reach the stage in which rising wages and declining cost 
competitiveness unable them to compete with advanced economies in high-skill innovations, or with low income, low 
wage economies in the cheap production of manufactured goods. 
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PART II – ARGENTINA IN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTH 
AMERICAN INTEGRATION: AN APPLICATION OF THE 
GRAVITY MODEL 
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2.1 Regional Trade and Economic Integration in South America: an Application of the 
Gravity Model 
2.1.1 Research questions and structure of the chapter 
Research questions and motivation 
South American countries have experienced a strong and stable economic growth in the first decade of 
the 21st century, after the last regional crisis which took its origins from the default of Argentina on its 
external debt. The main reason of this ‘boom’ in the economic cycle of these countries can be found in 
the high prices and availability of commodities like soy (as in the case of Argentina and Brazil), copper 
(Chile), oil and gas (Venezuela and Bolivia). These favorable conditions have had a strong effect on 
exports, which rose according to their volume and to their value as well.  
In the last decades, several projects for economic integration originated in the Latin American region. 
The two most advanced ones are the Andean Community (CAN), founded in 1969, and the Common 
Market of the South (MERCOSUR), established in 1991. Both organizations were born as free-trade 
areas and now they are custom unions: therefore, their principal purpose is to promote regional trade. 
In this first chapter I apply the gravity model of bilateral trade, augmented with some variables of 
interest, in order to answer three main research questions. 
The first one is to assess the impact of the different variables of interest included in the gravity model 
on regional trade in South America, and especially to assess whether and how the two most important 
regional integration organizations (CAN and MERCOSUR) promote trade. The second one is to 
analyze in detail the determinants of external trade of Argentina, with particular reference to the 
context of MERCOSUR and to the partnership with other important commercial partners such as the 
United States, the Euro Area and China. As Argentina is the core topic of my thesis, this issue will be 
analyzed in detail in the second chapter of this part, with a particular attention to the possible causes 
which may have prevented Argentina from achieving a better trade integration with its partners (e.g. the 
variability in the real exchange rate).   
My objective is first of all to point out how the regional agreements influence trade in the different 
sectors. In fact, the production structure of the South American countries is not homogeneous. There 
are some middle-income countries with a high level of economic development (Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile) which production is quite differentiated among sectors and where manufacturing plays an 
important role; other countries characterized by a relatively high income but which economy 
completely relies on the exploitation of crude materials (Venezuela); some countries with a lower level 
of development (in some cases very low) which are still strictly dependent on the agricultural and 
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extractive sector (Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru). How are the patterns of trade in such an heterogeneous 
economic context? Can the gravity model explain trade flows in this scenario, where the levels of 
development are different and inter- industrial trade seems to prevail on intra- industrial trade, 
according to the hypotheses drawn by the literature on this topic? And, also, how do the regional 
agreements influence trade integration among countries so different in economic size (MERCOSUR 
includes huge States like Argentina and Brazil and small ones like Uruguay and Paraguay) and structure 
of production? 
Furthermore, my other objective, with regard to the analysis of Argentina, is to assess how the country 
performs in terms of regional trade within the context described in the first empirical part of the 
chapter. How did the macroeconomic variables influence the external trade of Argentina? Was the 
trend in the GDP growth an important determinant for its exports? What about the exchange rate 
variability and the uncertainty derived from this factor? 
 
Structure of the chapter 
 
After a paragraph recalling the basic history of economic integration in South America and the attempts 
made by the Andean Community and the MERCOSUR, I will focus on the theory behind the gravity 
equation. 
To test this equation for the South American context, I will use five different datasets: the first one 
contains data about total exports, the other four include data of exports in different productive sectors 
(food and live animals, manufacturing, commodities, crude materials). My aim is to point out how the 
regional preferential trade agreements affect the exchanges in these different sectors. 
To do so, I run the gravity model using different regression techniques and compare the results 
obtained. I use a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML), an OLS Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects estimator, and a Tobit estimator. Recent econometric literature has shown that the 
PPML regression is the most efficient to estimate the gravity equation. Therefore, I will focus more on 
the results obtained with this technique and I will apply some robustness checks. Comments on the 
results will follow.  
The second chapter will be dedicated on the empirical analysis of trading flows of Argentina. The 
structure of this section will be similar to the first one: after a brief theoretical review about the 
variability in the real exchange rate and the different methodologies used to compute it, a quick recall of 
the macroeconomic recent history of Argentina will be provided (although a much deeper analysis was 
the object of part I). Then, results of the new regressions will be presented and commented.  
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2.1.2 The Andean Community (CAN) and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR): history, 
aims, functioning 
 
First attempts of integration 
 
Trade liberalization was considered one of the best ways to achieve cooperation among states and to 
promote economic development after the Second World War. These were the main reasons why 
different organizations promoting trade liberalization and economic integration were created: the most 
important were the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), founded in 1944 and turned 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and the European Economic Community (EEC), 
risen in 1957 upon the basis of the European Community of Carbon and Steel, and then transformed 
into the European Union (EU) after the enforcement of the Treaty of Maastricht (1994). 
The South American region showed at first an attitude of hostility towards these projects of 
liberalization and integration. In fact, after World War II, many governments in the area believed that 
the Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) would have been the most appropriate strategy to help 
the South American countries to walk on the way of economic development, that had to be reached 
through the protection of the national infant industries and the push towards urbanization. This 
inward-looking strategy was followed by the majority of the States of the region, also those ones who 
were more endowed with natural resources and favored by the “commodity lottery” (Bulmer-Thomas, 
2003).22 Therefore, the nominal and effective rates of commercial protection were kept extremely high, 
going in the opposite direction of the GATT, which rounds of negotiations concluded with strong 
tariff reductions (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003).   
Nevertheless, the small size of national markets gave rise to the first projects of regional integration. In 
1960 the Latin American Association for Free Trade (ALALC) was founded among Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay: the aim was to establish a free trade zone through a 
progressive reduction of tariffs according to the principle of the most favored nation.  
The failure of the ALALC, principally due to a lack of commitment of its biggest members (Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico) led to the constitution of another organization, the Latin American Association of 
Integration (ALADI), created in 1980. The mechanism of the ALADI should have opened the way 
                                                          
22
 The commodity lottery is a definition intended to draw differences among commodities. Materials with forward 
linkages (i.e. that require further processing before export), like meat, can act as a stimulus to industrialization and 
urbanization, as in the case of Argentina. Otherwise, commodities that require only labor for their extraction (as the 
case of guano in Peru) did not pose the basis for the growth of a solid industrial sector. This is a strong explanation 
why South American countries followed different patterns of economic development.  
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towards the institution of a common market, but the economic crisis faced by Latin American 
countries during the ‘80s (the so-called “lost decade”) prevented this organization from reaching its 
objective (Lara, 2011). 
 
The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) 
 
The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) represents the most ambitious project of economic 
integration in South America. Created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción among Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay (Bolivia and Chile became associate members, while the membership of 
Venezuela is still pending because of the negative pronunciation of Brazilian Parliament), MERCOSUR 
marked a further step on the integration process, since it created not only a free trade zone but also a 
custom union. The Protocol of Ouro Preto, signed in December 1994, determined the full enforcement 
of the organization through the establishment of the common external tariff and of its institutional 
structure. Since 1995 most of items traded faced zero duties, but a certain level of protection remained 
for categories of goods like automobiles, which represent a strategic asset for the manufacturing sector 
of both Argentina and Brazil.  
In the intention of its founders, the organization was modeled upon the experience of the European 
Union, and the last step of this process should be the achievement of a ‘common market’ through the 
coordination of the national macroeconomic policies.  
The effectiveness of MERCOSUR has been strictly dependent on the economic performance of its 
main members, Argentina and Brazil. Intra-regional trade increased during periods of boom, while it 
was negatively affected during periods of recessions. As it was shown by Bittencourt, Larson and 
Thompson (2005), the stability of the organization was in doubt due to the Brazilian crisis in 1998, 
which led to the devaluation of the national currency and to severe commercial disputes with Argentina 
(that during those years was pegged to the US dollar through a currency board regime), and to the 
fierce economic slowdown of the latter in 2002. The researchers attribute the troubles faced by 
MERCOSUR to a lack of policy coordination among the members, which could have helped to 
mitigate the issues arising among them. This lack of coordination has also been stressed by Baer, 
Cavalcanti and Peri (2002), who described how the divergence in monetary policy between Argentina 
and Brazil affected regional trade in a negative way. The deficits in the trade balance registered by 
Argentina in the first years of the MERCOSUR, and by Brazil afterwards, provoked a rise of the tariffs 
regarding sensitive goods as automobiles and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 1999, with the 
clear objective of gaining competitiveness in export. These factors led to an increase in the volatility of 
real exchange rate: since the theory suggests that an increase in the bilateral exchange rate translates 
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into a lower cost of producing tradable goods, exports should be positively correlated with the 
exchange rate. A high level of volatility in the exchange rate was shown having a negative impact on 
bilateral trade between the two countries (Baer, Cavalcanti, Peri 2002): which is exactly the effect a 
regional trade agreement should be aimed to avoid. Moreover, as it was pointed out by Busse, Hefeker 
and Koopmann (2004), the Argentine crisis is a proof of the fact that unilateral currency pegs have the 
risk to produce misalignments with the trade partners. Also Malamud (2005) underlines how the 
success of the organization strictly depends on the economic performance and on the political views of 
its two biggest members, but also recognizes that in its first seven years of life regional trade increased 
four times, this effect explained by trade creation rather than trade diversion. On the other hand, two 
main failures are attributed to the organization: the inability of promoting trade not only in goods but 
also in services, movements of capitals and people (recalling the famous ‘four liberties’ of the European 
Union) and the failure in expanding its membership (Malamud 2005).  
In more recent years, commercial integration within the organization has faced other problems 
originated by different factors, not only economic (the global recession in 2008) but also political 
(disputes between Argentina and Uruguay). 
 
The Andean Community (CAN) 
 
Before MERCOSUR, which represents up to this moment the deepest attempt of trade integration in 
South America, another organization was created with the aim of promoting economic cooperation 
among its members. This institution was called Andean Community of Nations (CAN) (the agreement 
is also known as the Andean Pact – AP) and was created in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Peru. The AP was set up as a reaction against the failure of the ALALC and had a more ambitious 
project: it had the aim of creating a custom union with a common external tariff. Venezuela joined in 
1973 but Chile withdrew in 1976, as its neoliberal policies, adopted by the Pinochet regime and based 
on further tariff reductions and opening to Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), were considered 
incompatible with the purposes of the organization (Bulmer-Thomas 2003).  
In 2005 the MERCOSUR States became associate members after signing an agreement of cooperation. 
Chile also became associate in 2006, while in the same year Venezuela withdrew.  
A free-trade area was finally set up in 1993, thus leading to a strong increase in regional exchange.  
In the first years after the implementation of the common tariff, trade among members of the CAN 
nearly doubled, even if after 1997 we see a slight decrease in multilateral exchange (UN Comtrade 
Statistics Division). The impact of the free-trade area was less important in comparison with the 
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implementation of MERCOSUR, which could count on a stronger institutional basis and on a much 
bigger economic size of its main members, Argentina and Brazil.  
In conclusion, it is possible to say on one hand that the Andean Community seems having had a strong 
impact in promoting trade among its members. Moreover, this organization can potentially avoid the 
contrasts risen within MERCOSUR, since the members are more similar with each other according to 
the level of economic development and productive structure. In fact, the economy of Andean countries 
is mainly based on the exploitation of agricultural and extractive commodities. 
 
2.1.3 The gravity model of international trade 
 
The gravity model has become one of the most important theoretical frameworks to analyze the 
determinants of flows of bilateral trade at an empirical level. The first, and most simple, formulation of 
the gravity equation takes its origins from the works of Tinbergen (1962) and Linnemann (1966): it 
states that bilateral trade between two countries is directly proportional to their ‘size’ (measured in 
economic terms through the product of their Gross Domestic Product, GDPs) and inversely 
proportional to their geographic distance. The latter variable is used as a proxy for trading costs and 
barriers. 
Therefore, here is the gravity equation in its basic form: 
 
          
     
     
       
 
Where Xij are exports from country i to country j, Y stands for the GDP and D for the distance. 
Across the years, the equation has been applied to several case studies and the gravity model has been 
augmented with other variables. One important contribution comes from Krugman (1991a) who, going 
deeper from the concept of the comparative advantage, traditional in international trade theory, 
stressed the importance of increasing returns to scale in bilateral trade arising from concentration and 
proximity of production rather than from dispersed markets. The benefits arising from concentration 
translate not only in an increase of trade flows, but also in terms of efficiency (lower costs and bigger 
scale), specialization of labor (a concentration of higher-skilled workers is favored) and knowledge 
flows which are able to generate positive technological externalities (Krugman 1991b).  
The gravity model is also used to explain intra-industrial trade: it means that two or more countries can 
specialize in producing different varieties of the same good and trade among each other if tastes are 
identical and homothetic. This is what has been suggested by Helpman (1987), and later by Debaere 
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(2002), who applied this version of the gravity model to a group of OECD countries, according to the 
fact that the similarity in the level of development (measured in terms of income per capita) should be a 
condition promoting intra-industrial (for instance manufacturing products) rather than inter-industrial 
trade (ex. manufacturing vs. agricultural products). This effect, considered not at a specific regional 
level but for a more general pair of countries, is known as the Linder Hypothesis (Linder 1961), 
according to which countries with similar levels of economic development (measured through per 
capita income) will have more similar tastes and then will exchange more between themselves.  
Therefore, the theory suggests that the gravity equation succeeds in explaining multilateral trade if the 
countries in the sample are specialized in the production of differentiated goods, which is more likely in 
the case of manufacturing rather than agriculture: this is a reason why the gravity model would be more 
suitable for OECD countries. Nevertheless, the equation seems working well also for developing 
countries. Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2000) showed that the gravity equation can arise from 
different types of models. Some in fact imply a “home market” effect, in the sense that an increase in 
the exporter’s income has a more than proportionate effect on exports, while others imply the 
opposite, called “reverse” home market effect. The first effect seems holding for differentiated goods, 
while the latter is more pronounced for homogeneous goods (Feenstra, Markusen and Rose 2000). 
Attempts were also made in order to assess the impact of the so-called “multilateral resistance terms” 
(Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003), which represent a deeper contribution to catch the effect of 
trading costs and other variables affecting bilateral trade in a negative way. 
Many empirical analyses were applied to measure the impact of these variables to bilateral trade flows. 
The South American region, object of this dissertation, has been already investigated in previous 
empirical works. Carrillo and Li (2004) applied the gravity model to a sample of South American 
countries to examine the effects on intra-regional and intra-industrial trade in the period 1980-1997. 
They also looked for the impact of regional trade agreements like MERCOSUR and the Andean 
Community (see previous paragraph). The researchers found that the AC had a significant effect on the 
reference products, while MERCOSUR had a stronger impact on capital intensive goods (Carrillo and 
Li, 2004). Another work by Bittencourt, Larson and Thompson (2005), applied on MERCOSUR 
countries, shed more light on the issue of trading barriers. After taking into account the 
macroeconomic internal problems of the main MERCOSUR members (Argentina and Brazil), they 
showed that an increase in exchange rate volatility contributes to affect regional trade in a negative way.  
Research on the South American area about the determinants of trade flows is still not very spread and 
deepened: nevertheless, the existing research pointed out some interesting results about the 
confirmation of the validity of the gravity model , the effectiveness of regional trade agreements and 
the importance of taking into consideration macroeconomic cycles in order to augment these gravity 
89 
 
models and to obtain a better goodness of fit. On the other hand, the datasets have to rely on relatively 
small samples, due to the restricted number of countries present in South America (ten Hispanic 
nations) and in organizations as MERCOSUR (only four). My research is aimed to go in the direction 
of giving another small contribution to the explanation of regional trade flows. 
 
2.1.4 The estimation of the Gravity Equation: some econometric issues 
 
Traditionally, the gravity equation is formalized as a log-linear regression: therefore, the coefficients of 
the different variables have to be interpreted in terms of elasticity.  
 
                                              
 
One of the main econometric techniques used to estimate the gravity equation is the Tobit estimator. It 
is considered particularly suitable for this kind of regression, since real data show that, in many cases, 
trade between a pair of countries can be literally zero. As explained by Liu (2009), the standard 
censored Tobit model assumes that 
 
                          
       
 
Where X is a vector of covariates affecting bilateral trade. Such an estimator has been used in many 
estimates of the gravity model since it takes into account also the observations that take on a value of 
“0”. In fact, the Tobit estimation takes account of all the observations (Xij = 0 and Xij > 0 both) by 
using maximum likelihood to combine the probit and regression components of the log-likelihood 
function (Baum 2006).  Nevertheless, as it has been pointed out by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), 
the gravity equation was modeled on the basis of the Newtonian gravitational force which, by 
definition, cannot take on a value of zero. Therefore, the Tobit estimator could not fit the data very 
properly. 
The second class of estimator is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The regressions on the models of 
bilateral trade can be run using a Fixed-Effects (FE) or Random-Effects (RE) estimator. In particular, 
in panel data regressions on a gravity model, time varying country fixed effects could be used to absorb 
the “multilateral resistance effects” pointed out by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). For instance, if 
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the researcher is trying to assess the impact of being member of a particular trade-promoting 
organization, without time varying country FE there could be the risk of misattributing to the 
membership to that particular organization the effects on bilateral trade that should be actually 
attributed to other factors (Liu 2009). 
Also this kind of technique presents some problems:  as OLS estimators require in this case a log-linear 
regression, and the requirement for an estimation to be consistent is that the residuals are statistically 
independent from the covariates, the log of the residuals must be independent from the covariates as 
well. The expected value of the logarithm of a random variable depends both on its mean and on the 
higher moments of the distribution. Nevertheless, the classic log-linear gravity regressions only 
consider the first-order approximation and leaves the highest order moments in the residuals. 
Therefore, problems of heteroskedasticity arise affecting the efficiency of the estimator (not minimum 
variance anymore) and also its consistency, since it is estimating the log of the dependent variable, and 
not the variable expressed in levels (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006).  
Also another class of estimator that could appear suitable for a gravity model presents some problems. 
The Non-linear Least Squares (NLS) estimator, in fact, provides inefficient results since more weight is 
given to the observations with a higher variance, therefore leading again to heteroskedasticity issues. 
Another drawback of this class of estimators, as pointed out by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), is 
that they are not invariant to the scale of the dependent variable. Therefore, measuring trade in dollars 
rather in thousand dollars will lead to different estimations of the elasticities.  
A possible solution to this series of problems is to estimate the gravity equation in a multiplicative form 
(without taking the logarithm of exports, the dependent variable) and allow for heteroskedasticity. As it 
has been shown by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the Poisson regression seems to be a good 
approach to do it. The Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator takes on the following 
form: 
 
                                 
 
It means that the conditional mean of the dependent variable (exports) is equal to the exponential of 
the mean of the covariates. Therefore, the coefficients obtained can be interpreted in terms of elasticity 
if the dependent variable is expressed in levels and the covariates are in logarithms (Liu 2009). 
What are the benefits of using this estimator? As the PPML estimator gives the same weight to all 
observations, the risk of giving more weight to those ones with the higher variance (thus increasing the 
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‘noise’ present in the regression) is not present anymore. Therefore, the issue of heteroskedasticity can 
be controlled and reduced.  
Moreover, in a subsequent paper Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2009) showed that the PPML estimator 
performs well also in the case when the dependent variable has a large proportion of zeros, thus 
replying to the doubts risen by some other researchers against this methodology (Mártinez Zarzoso, 
Nowak-Lehmann and Vollmer 2007). A simulation provided evidence of the fact that the PPML 
estimator is an advisable technique also in the case of a big proportion of zeros in the dependent 
variable, since the solutions used by estimators based on log-linearization are unreasonable, because 
they lead to unconsistent estimates (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2009).  
Empirical applications of the Poisson regression to the gravity equation have shown that this technique 
leads to more efficient estimates. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have tested it first in a cross-section 
regression, showing that OLS techniques generate over-estimations of some fundamental variables (as 
the GDP of exporter country) and exaggerate also the role of geographical distance and of trade 
organizations. On the other hand, the PPML estimator appears to be consistent and efficient since it 
passes the test of the Eicker-White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors. 
I am also interested in results coming from a panel-data regression, since the empirical part of this 
dissertation is based on the analysis of a panel data set. Liu (2009) applied the Poisson estimator to a  
panel including all the members of GATT/WTO, in order to analyze the functioning of the gravity 
equation and the impact of preferential trade agreements. The Poisson regression showed that the 
agreements subscribed in the GATT/WTO system were effective in promoting trade not only at the 
intensive margin (deepening of the existing relationships) but also at the extensive margin (creation of 
new bilateral relationships).  
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) applied the PPML technique on a panel data estimation aimed to 
assess the impact of currency unions in promoting multilateral trade. To do so, they used a gravity 
model augmented with a dummy variable representing the sharing of a common currency. They found 
that the Euro did not have a remarkable impact in promoting regional trade, since the level of exchange 
was already very high before the introduction of the common currency.  
The application of the PPML technique will be the core of the empirical part of this dissertation. 
2.1.5 Data and estimation techniques 
My sample consists of ten countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela. They are all the Hispanic countries of South American area and they 
form part of the two integration organizations (Andean Community and MERCOSUR), with the 
exception of Chile, which is only an associate member to MERCOSUR, and of Venezuela, which 
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withdrew from the Andean Community in 2006 and was admitted in July 2012 in the membership of 
MERCOSUR. I decided not to exclude Chile since it is one of the main economic actors in the region 
and because I do not want to assess only the impact of being member of the CAN or of MERCOSUR, 
but I am considering other variables as well. Moreover, Chile is an associate member both to CAN and 
MERCOSUR. 
Each countries is considered in pair with all the other ones, in order to form 90 pairs of commercial 
partners [n * (n-1)]. Each pair is considered over a period of 28 years, since 1985 to 2012.23 Therefore, 
the dataset is a panel made up of 2520 observations.  
The model to be estimated is the following: 
 
                                                                    
                                                   
                         
 
While for the Poisson regression is: 
 
                                                                  
                                                    
                   (6) 
 
The variables of interest are typical of a gravity model. As in the previous works by Carrillo and Li 
(2004) and Liu (2009), the dependent variable is represented by the exports of country i to country j 
(Xij) while the main covariates are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the exporter country (GDPi), 
the GDP of the importer country (GDPj) and the distance between the two countries. According to the 
theory predicted by the gravity model, GDPs of both countries should be positively correlated with the 
dependent variable (see previous paragraph).  Exports and GDPs are measured in US current million 
dollars and the sources are, respectively, United Nations Comtrade Statistics Division (Standard 
International Trade Classification. Rev.4) and the World Bank Databank. The distance, measured in 
kilometers, was obtained by computing the great circle distance between the main economic cities of 
                                                          
23
 A time series from 1985 to 2012 was available only for total exports data. Disaggregated data regarding exports of 
every single commodity were available only until 2009. Therefore, the regressions on different sectors are based on a 
sample included between 1985 and 2009.  
93 
 
the countries in the sample: they do not coincide with the capital cities in the case of Brazil (São Paulo 
instead of Brasilia), Bolivia (Santa Cruz de las Sierras instead of La Paz), Ecuador (Guayaquil instead of 
Quito). The reason of this choice is the attempt to give a slightly better meaning to this variable, which 
is a quite rough proxy for trading costs. According to the predictions of the gravity model, the farther 
two countries are from each other (and then the more difficult is to trade), the lower the bilateral 
exchanges should be. 
The variable Difgdpij measures the difference in the GDP per capita between the exporting and the 
importing country.24 I introduced this variable to check if the Linder hypothesis holds. Linder (1961) 
gives a different explanation from the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and he suggests that two countries 
trade more with each other as the domestic structure of preferences and the level of economic 
development are more similar. A way to approximate this effect is to include the difference in GDP per 
capita (Choi 2002, Carrillo and Li 2004). The variable was introduced also in its squared form in order 
to check for the right functional form. The data come from the World Bank Databank and they are 
measured in US current dollars. The expected sign is negative, since the lower is the difference in the 
level of incomes, the higher the amount of bilateral trade should be.  
The variable RERij measures the real exchange rate between each pair of countries. It has been 
obtained using this formula: 
 
 
            
            
   
    
    
      
 
Where NER stands for the nominal exchange rate. The RER was computed according to the 
methodology proposed by Liu (2009) instead of the traditional way which uses the Consumer Price 
Index in place of the GDP deflator. In this case the latter was chosen since data about Consumer Price 
Index were not available for all countries in each of the years considered. The expected sign of this 
variable is positive: a higher real exchange rate could be interpreted as a proxy for competitiveness and 
therefore stimulate exports from one country to the other. 
The variable MER is a dummy which takes on value “1” if both countries belong to MERCOSUR, “0” 
otherwise. The variable AC takes on value “1” if both countries belong to the Andean Community, “0” 
otherwise.  
                                                          
24
 In this case GDP is written in small capitals in order to distinguish between aggregate GDP, used for the first two 
variables, and per capita GDP.  
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The variable COB is another dummy which takes on value “1” if the two countries share a common 
border. It is another approximation for the trading costs and it should be positively correlated with the 
dependent variable.  
The dummies from year 1985 to 2011 (2012 was excluded because it works as the base-year and 
therefore if included it would cause problems of multicollinearity) were chosen to capture the effect of 
macroeconomic events – or other variables not included in the model – on bilateral trade. In fact, along 
the period considered, there are several events that should be controlled. They are: 
- 1989: hyperinflation crisis in Argentina after the failure of the project of the “Peso Austral” ; 
- 1995: full enforcement of MERCOSUR after the sign, in December 1994, of the Ouro Preto 
protocol (see previous paragraph); 
- 1999: bilateral crisis between Argentina and Brazil due to the devaluation of the Brazilian 
currency in order to gain competitiveness; 
- 2002: economic crisis in Argentina after the default on the external debt in December 2001; 
- 2009: effects of the global financial crisis originated in 2008 
- 2011: the economic recovery after a new rise of global demand.  
For these reasons, the outputs of the regressions published in this chapter show only the coefficients of 
the dummies related to these six years. 
Five different data sets were used in order to perform five regressions. The first dataset uses as 
dependent variable the value of total exports and it estimates the impact of the different variables on 
the export sector as a whole. The other four regressions use data related to the exports in different 
productive sectors, which are: 
- Food and live animals; 
- Manufactured goods; 
- Commodities; 
- Crude materials except fuels. 
The data were obtained also in this case from the UN Comtrade Statistics Division. The regressions 
will be performed in order to answer two main questions. The first aims to assess if the gravity equation 
is able to explain regional trade in the South American context. The second is directed to point out how 
the regional preferential trade agreements (Andean Community and MERCOSUR) affect trade 
considered globally and in the different productive sectors. 
Four different estimation techniques were used (see previous paragraph): the models were estimated 
with the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML), an OLS Fixed Effects and an OLS 
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Random Effects and with the Tobit estimator. According to the literature review, we expect the 
Poisson estimation to be the most reliable among the four. 
 
2.1.6 Results 
The outputs of all the regression are shown in the tables at the end of this chapter. The tables compare 
the outputs obtained in each of the five regressions with the different techniques of estimation. The 
dependent variable is expressed in levels for the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimation and 
in logarithmic form for the OLS Fixed and Random Effects and for the Tobit estimation, following the 
properties of the different estimators (see previous paragraph). The coefficients have to be interpreted 
in terms of elasticity. Since the PPML method of estimation is the most interesting and efficient, in 
order to facilitate the reading the results of those estimations will be included in the text.  
The first table presents the outputs of the regressions using total exports as dependent variable. 
According to the PPML regression (table 2.1.1), the main variables of interest have the expected sign: 
the GDPs of the trading countries are positively correlated with exports and they are significant at the 
1% level. The GDP of the exporter country seems to have a slightly stronger impact, correspondent to 
an increase of 0.28% in bilateral trade for a 1% increase in GDP.  
Distance is, as expected, negatively correlated with exports but significant at the 10% level. This result 
can be compared also with the Common Border variable, which is significant at the 5% level and has a 
positive impact in the promotion of trade. 
The Linder effect seems to play no substantial role in determining the trade patterns in the region. The 
coefficients are low, both in the linear and in the quadratic form, but strongly significant. 
Also the real interest rate seems not to be an important determinant of bilateral trade. The sign is 
positive but its impact is negligible, even if strongly significant. 
The dummies created in the attempt to capture the effect of the regional integration have a positive and 
significant impact. Belonging to the Andean Community seems to have  a positive and strong impact 
on bilateral trade (0.348), while belonging to MERCOSUR seems to have a negative impact (-0.204). 
This result is quite striking, since the efforts for economic integration and the expectations for its 
positive consequences were bigger for MERCOSUR rather than for the Andean Community. A deeper 
reasoning will be the object of the next paragraph and chapters. 
Regarding the effects of the macroeconomic and other external factors, we can see that all the year 
dummies are significant at the maximum level. The interpretation of these coefficients has to be 
considered in relation to the excluded dummy, related to the year 2012, which coefficient is coincident 
with the mean of exports in that year. The coefficients taken on by the other dummies have to be 
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interpreted as the differences between each year’s mean and the base year, 2009. Therefore, an 
important improvement of bilateral commercial relations can be seen in the year 1995 (from -1.363 in 
1994 to -1.085), possibly as a result of the full enforcement of MERCOSUR. In 1999, the coefficient 
turns out to be again more negative (from -0.984 in 1998 to -1.189), as formulated in our hypothesis. 
Another strong decrease of the coefficient can be seen in 2002 (from -1.062 in 2001 to -1.206), which 
could be partly explained by the economic crisis in Argentina. The variable starts to have lower and 
lower differences below the mean from that year on and assumes a positive difference in relation to the 
mean of the base year, possibly an evidence in favor of the strong economic growth which created a 
favorable climate for exports and regional trade. The more positive coefficients in relation to the year 
2012 could be interpreted as a period of economic slowdown due to the global financial crisis broken 
out in the last quarter of 2008. The R2 of the regression is equal to 0.299, therefore it seems that the 
model helps to explain nearly one-third of the determinants of exports. By the way, it is worth to point 
out that for log-likelihood regressions there is no measure of the R2 : therefore, other measures of the 
goodness of fit are used to compute the so-called “pseudo-R2”, which cannot be interpreted in the 
same way. Therefore, the values of the R2 obtained after PPML and Tobit regressions will be 
considered less reliable. 
 Table 2.1.1 – Total exports, PPML Estimation, results 
Xij LogGDPi 0.285 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogGDPj 0.212 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogDist -0.039 
  (0.216) 
 LogDifgdpij 0.033 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogDifgdpsq 0.000 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogRER 0.016 
  (0.000)*** 
 COB 1.262 
  (0.276)*** 
 AC 0.348 
  (0.000)*** 
 MER -0.204 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1989 -2.318 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1995 -1.085 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1999 -1.189 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2002 -1.206 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2008 -0.034 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2011 0.074 
  (0.000)*** 
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 cons 7.115 
  
R-squared 
(1.751)*** 
0.299 
                  N   2520 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: elaboration of the author 
The second column of table 2.1.7 shows the results obtained by the OLS Fixed Effects regression. This 
estimator does not seem to be the best option to use, since it drops the variables that take on constant 
values (in this case, LogDist and COB), and the coefficients and reach too high levels of significance, 
although they take on the expected signs in most cases.  
The third column shows the results of the regression using the OLS Random Effects estimator. The 
main variables still have the expected sign and they are significant, even if in this case the GDP of the 
recipient country seems to have a slightly bigger impact on bilateral trade (0.647 against 0.616). The 
difference in the income per capita and the real exchange rate again do not play any significant role. 
The impact of being member of the Andean Community is still bigger than belonging to MERCOSUR, 
even if in this case the variable MER does not reach the highest level of significance. Regarding the 
dummy year variables, they seem to follow the same pattern as in the PPML regression, and the 
principal years of interest confirm the hypothesis of this paper. The R 2 has a quite high value (0.642): as 
the sample size is reasonable, it can be considered as an evidence in favor of the goodness of fit of the 
model. 
The last column of the table lists the coefficients obtained running the Tobit regression. The 
coefficients are very similar to those obtained with the OLS Random Effects. The ‘core’ variables of 
the gravity equation are strongly significant and take on the expected sign. The R2 takes on a lower 
value but, since Tobit estimation provides only “pseudo-R2” , as explained in the above.  
Let us move to the regressions regarding the estimates for the different productive sectors, starting 
from food and live animals (Tables 2.1.2 and 2.1.8). Regarding the OLS estimates, as the Hausman test, 
run for all different datasets, showed that in all cases the Random Effects estimation provides 
consistent coefficients, for sake of simplicity I will comment only the results of the RE regression. 
The results present the same, expected signs for the main variables of interest. In this case, the GDP of 
the exporter country seems to play a much bigger role in determining bilateral trade, as it is possible to 
realize looking at the coefficients of the regressions (0.969 for PPML, 0.537 for OLS RE, 0.463 for 
Tobit). The difference in GDP per capita presents now a bigger coefficient (-0.111) and is strongly 
significant in the Poisson regression, even if the sign is negative. The coefficients of the other 
regressions are slightly positive but not significant. The Linder effect seems not to take place in this 
case, and this could be explained by the fact that the products of this sector are primary goods which 
98 
 
respond less to the similarity in the levels of income: these results would suggest a lower elasticity of 
demand with respect to income for this category. See next section for further comment. 
Apart from these considerations, the principal result of this second set of regressions is the negative 
sign taken on by the variables AC and MER. It seems that the regional integration did not play a 
positive role in promoting trade for this category of goods. A deeper reasoning on this result will be 
provided in the next paragraph. 
Table 2.1.2 - Food and live animals exports, PPML estimation, results 
Xij LogGDPi 0.969 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogGDPj 0.179 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogDist -0.657 
  (0.340)* 
 LogDifgdpij -0.111 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogDifgdpsqij 
 
LogRER 
-   
 
-0.017 
  (0.000)*** 
 COB 0.780 
  (0.387)** 
 AC -0.435 
  (0.000)*** 
 MER -0.038 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1989 -1.854 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1995 -0.440 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1999 -0.500 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2002 -0.674 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2008 0.162 
  (0.000)*** 
 Cons 2.253 
  (2.743) 
 N   2,250 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: elaboration of the author 
The results obtained for the category of manufactured goods (Tables 2.1.3 and 2.1.9) are not very 
different from the first category analyzed. The expected results for the main variables of interest still 
hold (therefore confirming the good specification of the basic gravity model), while the effects of the 
difference in GDP per capita seems to be again negligible. The impact of the Andean Community and 
MERCOSUR appears negative also in this case. In the PPML estimation, in fact, the signs of the 
coefficients are negative and strongly significant, while in the OLS Random Effects they are not 
significant, even if they are strongly positive.  On the other hand, the results obtained by the Tobit 
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estimation look quite different regarding the MERCOSUR dummy: in this case the coefficient turns 
out to be positive (0.733) and significant at the 1% level.   
 
Table 2.1.3 - Manufactured goods exports, PPML estimation, results 
Xij LogGDPi 1.228 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogGDPj 0.175 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogDist 
 
LogDifgdpij 
-   
 
-0.093 
  
LogDifgdpijsq 
 
(0.000)*** 
-   
 LogRER 0.028 
  (0.000)*** 
 AC -0.570 
  (0.000)*** 
 MER -0.168 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1989 -1.078 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1995 -0.136 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1999 -0.343 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2002 -0.457 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2008 0.376 
  (0.000)*** 
 cons -8.252 
  
R-squared 
(0.198)*** 
0.48 
 N 2,250  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: elaboration of the author 
The fourth set of regressions is about the effects on exports in the sector of crude materials (except 
fuels, Tables 2.1.4 and 2.1.10). The coefficients obtained for the PPML estimation look quite puzzling, 
since for the first time the gravity equation seems not to work as expected: in fact, the correlation of 
the dependent variable with the trading countries’ GDPs is negative. The effect of MERCOSUR is in 
this case positive and strongly significant, while the impact of Andean Community is negative.  
The coefficients of trading countries’ GDPs change sign after running the OLS RE regression: in this 
case they take on, as expected, the positive sign and they are strongly significant. The same effect can 
be seen with the Tobit estimation.  
This set of regressions provides a different pattern of the dummies related to each year considered in 
the sample. Differently from the other categories of goods, the coefficients turn positively over the 
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mean of the base year much before (look at the value of 1995 for both OLS RE and Tobit) and then 
they stay over the value of the base year.  
 
Table 2.1.4 - Crude materials exports, PPML estimation, results 
Xij LogGDPi -0.405 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogGDPj -0.237 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogDist 0.003 
  (0.557) 
 LogDifgdpij 0.021 
  (0.000)*** 
 Logdifgdpsqij 0.000 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogRER 0.023 
  (0.000)*** 
 COB 0.655 
  (0.472) 
 AC -1.182 
  (0.000)*** 
 MER 0.541 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1989 -1.257 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1995 -0.479 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1999 -0.765 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2002 -0.769 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2008 0.440 
  (0.000)*** 
 Cons 33.699 
  
R-squared 
(4.408)*** 
0.014 
 N   2,250 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: elaboration of the author 
 
The fifth and final set of regressions uses as dependent variable the data referring to exports in the 
commodities sector (Tables 2.1.5 and 2.1.11). The PPML estimation says that the prediction of the 
gravity equation holds only for the importing country’s GDP, which is strongly positive and highly 
significant (0.859). For the first time, the Linder effect and the real exchange rate seem playing some 
role, even if LogDifgdp does not take on the expected sign (0.441). The impact of AC and MER are both 
positive, strong and highly significant (5.732 and 1.664). The OLS RE regression, on the other hand, 
seems not to confirm the positive impact of the regional organizations in the exchange of commodities, 
as in the case of the Tobit regression, but shows a positive coefficient for the difference in GDP per 
capita. The Tobit estimator, differently from the PPML, attributes a stronger impact in promoting trade 
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to the exporting country (0.792 with the highest level of significance). The results regarding the year 
dummies show different coefficients according to the estimators used but, apart from the Tobit 
regression, show the same pattern: values above the average of 2009 which decrease strongly in 2008.  
The following paragraph will be dedicated to the interpretation of the results obtained. 
 
Table 2.1.5 – Commodities exports, PPML estimation, results 
Xij LogGDPi -0.060 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogGDPj 0.859 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogDist -0.318 
  (0.610) 
 LogDifgdpij 0.441 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogDifgdpsq -0.000 
  (0.000)*** 
 LogRER 0.118 
  (0.000)*** 
 COB 1.215 
  (0.712)* 
 AC 1.907 
  (0.000)*** 
 MER 0.980 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1989 0.778 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1995 0.791 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy1999 0.591 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2002 1.137 
  (0.000)*** 
 Dummy2008 0.699 
  (0.000)*** 
 _cons 
 
R-squared 
-2.055 
 
0.021 
  (4.934) 
 N 2250 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Source: elaboration of the author 
 
2.1.7 Robustness checks 
As the most recent literature has shown that the PPML technique is the most suitable to estimate the 
gravity equation (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006), I focused on this technique to check for the good 
specification of the model. A Ramsey’s reset test was run on the total exports data set in order to assess 
if the functional form has been well specified and for the presence of omitted variables. 
As the reset test performed for the panel regression did not reject the null hypothesis of bad 
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specification, a set of cross-section regressions was run for each year of the sample, and a reset test was 
run for each regression. I did this because the South American context is quite complex and many 
events took place in the economic field during the period of interest. 
Table 2.1.12 reports the coefficients of the main variables of interest of the gravity equation and the 
result of the reset test. The coefficients of LogGDPi and LogGDPj are always positive as expected, while 
LogDist is negative. The model passes the test until 1997(with the exceptions of 1992,1994 and 1996)  
and in 2002 and 2008 again, while in the remaining years the value of the reset test cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of misspecification. The evolution of trade in the two regional blocks shows that after 
1997 there was a slowdown, and then a decrease, in regional trade, which sharply increases again in 
2002. Therefore, I could suppose that the test fails because of the breakdown in the positive trend. A 
deeper analysis of this result will be object of future research. 
A Hausman test was run to test if the Random Effects regression satisfies the requirement of 
consistency. The RE regressions passes the test for each of the five datasets and therefore it is 
consistent: I will refer to this regression for the comments of the next section.  
 
2.1.8 Interpretation of the results 
The main research questions formulated at the beginning of this chapter: were whether and what 
impact did the main regional organizations for trade and economic integration have in the promotion 
of multilateral exchange. 
The regressions performed show that the gravity equation is effective in explaining regional trade, at 
least for its principal variables. LogGDPi and LogGDPj are positive and significant (often at the highest 
level) in most cases and they show an elasticity close to 1 in many cases. In the regressions using the 
data about exports of commodities, PPML and OLS RE regressions show a stronger impact of the 
importing country rather than the exporting. This could be consistent with the explanation provided by 
Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001), who suggest the existence of a “reverse market effect” in the case 
of homogeneous goods. Commodities generally do not need a lot of processing and they are not 
differentiated; therefore, this could be evidence in favor of the effectiveness of the gravity equation also 
in the case of developing economies that rely more on inter-industrial rather than on intra-industrial 
trade. The only exception is represented by the crude materials sector: in this case both LogGDPi and 
LogGDPj  have a negative sign in the PPML regression. This could be explained with the fact that the 
main source of exports for the poorest countries in the South American region (Bolivia and Paraguay, 
for instance) come from crude materials that do not need a lot of processing, therefore they are more 
labor and natural resource intensive rather than capital intensive. 
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The geographic distance is the other main variable of the model. LogDist always takes on the expected 
negative sign, even if the highest level of significance is not reached in all cases. The coefficients of 
LogDist can be considered together with the results of the variable COB, which is another proxy for 
trading costs. These results could be interpreted with the fact that the countries in the sample form part 
of the same region and the distance among each other is not so high in terms of kilometers: therefore 
the variable is not significant at the highest level in some regressions. Nevertheless, the coefficients 
show a reasonably high level of elasticity and this could be the result of the difficulties in transportation 
due to the geographical barriers existing in South America (the Andean mountains and the Amazon 
forest) and to the lack of infrastructures (highways and railways). 
No strong evidence was found in favor of the Linder effect, even after introducing the variable Difgdp 
in its squared form to check for the right functional form. The coefficients taken on in the different 
regressions are very low but often significant: as the theory predicts a negative correlation between the 
difference in the level of per capita income and bilateral trade (Choi 2002), the results obtained could 
be explained by the fact that South American countries are not homogenous according to the level of 
economic development and of the structure of preferences. The coefficient is positive and significant 
(0.441) only in the Poisson regression regarding exports in the commodities sector: the sign, which is 
opposite from what suggested by theory, conveys that a bigger difference in income per capita 
promotes more trade in this sector. As we have seen, a bigger effect is associated to the importing 
country: therefore, a stronger demand for imports could come from the poorest countries in the region, 
which have to rely on agricultural goods to satisfy the basic needs of low income people. 
As in the case of the Linder effect, no strong results were found for the real exchange rate. LogRER 
takes on low values in all regressions except in the case of the commodities sector, where in the PPML 
regression it shows a coefficient of 0.118 (significant at the 1% level). A higher competitiveness in this 
sector, where the prices of the goods are strictly reliant on the stock markets, seems to stimulate 
exports more intensively than in other fields. A deeper reasoning on this could be the object of further 
research. 
The preferential trade agreements of Andean Community and MERCOSUR are puzzling. If we look at  
total exports, the AC takes on a positive coefficient (0.727) while MERCOSUR is negative (-0.101) in 
the PPML regression, where they are both highly significant. I explain this with the fact that the 
Andean countries are more similar with each other, both in terms of economic size and productive 
structure, while the heterogeneity among MERCOSUR countries could have played as an obstacle 
towards a deeper integration. The effect of AC and MERCOSUR is negative in the food and live 
animals sector and in the manufacturing sector, while it is strongly positive in the commodity sector 
(1.907 and 0.980 respectively). I suggest that this happens because the goods that these countries 
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produce and export most are in the agricultural and mining sector. Moreover, the political and 
economic contrasts of Argentina with the other members (mainly Brazil) contributed to slow down the 
integration process. A more detailed analysis of this dynamics will be provided in the remainder of the 
thesis.  
Finally, the year dummies confirm the hypothesis formulated at the beginning. The macroeconomic 
events, for which we could control only by including these dummy variables, have played an important 
role in affecting the patterns of regional trade. The economic crises of Argentina in 1989 and 2002 had 
a negative impact, as well as the devaluation of Brazilian currency in 1999 and the global financial crisis 
in 2008, while the full enforcement of MERCOSUR in 1995 had a positive effect. The strong 
coefficients and the high levels of significance of this variable suggest the importance of Argentina and 
Brazil in determining the trends of regional trade. This is evidence in favor of what suggested by 
Krugman (1991) about the concentration of production centers, but it also sheds light on the negative 
effect that political issues between countries can have on economic relationships. 
 
2.1.9 Conclusions and indications for further research 
Starting from the previous empirical research by Carrillo and Li (2004) and Liu (2009), and from the 
methodology suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), this chapter showed that the gravity 
equation performs well in describing the phenomena of trade creation in the South American region. 
The Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator, compared to the OLS Fixed and Random 
Effects techniques and to the Tobit estimation technique, provides the results most significant and 
coherent with the theory. GDPs of the trading countries do have a positive and strong impact on 
bilateral trade, while distance is negatively correlated. No strong evidence of the Linder effect was 
found, possibly because South American countries are heterogeneous according to their level of 
economic development and their structure of preferences. 
The second research question did not have a complete positive answer: the organizations for economic 
integration present in the region (the Andean Community and the MERCOSUR) have played an 
important role in promoting trade among its members, but not in all sectors. The AC has been 
unexpectedly more effective in promoting exports, especially in the sector of commodities, while 
MERCOSUR had a bigger impact in the sector of crude materials, while if considered overall its impact 
was even negative. A higher level of similarity, according to the economic size and the structure of 
production, among the Andean countries, can provide an explanation to these results. 
The macroeconomic events occurred in the region were decisive to draw the economic cycles and the 
trade patterns of the countries in the region. After controlling for particular events – the full 
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enforcement of MERCOSUR, the economic crises in Argentina and Brazil – I showed that the impact 
of these two countries had an influence over the trend of the whole region.  
Commercial and other economic disputes between these two main actors, mostly via the channel of the 
volatility in the exchange rate, are likely to affect trade integration in the region and the development of 
MERCOSUR towards the creation of a common market, modeled upon the experience of the 
European Union. I leave to further research the exploration of these dynamics and the effects they can 
have on the economic integration in the region, while in the next chapter I will focus on the 
determinants of Argentina’s trading flows 
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Table 2.1.6 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
                  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Standard Deviation Min  Max 
                  
 
Xij   2520     376.4518     1119.077  .001  17605.62 
LogXij   2520      3.993782     2.405427  -6.907755 9.775973 
LogGDPi  2520      10.76201     1.433914  8.496537 13.66216 
LogGDPj  2520      10.77852     1.440542  8.462107 13.66216 
LogDist   2520      7.747351     .6482529  5.313206 8.550628 
LogDifgdp   2520     7.550762    1.010149     2.079442    9.073489 
LogRER        2520         -.3378967          5.212262       -15.26929       15.26929 
                  
Note: Xij measured in U.S current million $ 
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Table 2.1.7 - Total exports estimations 
     PPML    OLS Fixed Effects   OLS Random Effects   Tobit 
                     
Xij/LogXij LogGDPi   0.285 (0.000)***   0.483 (0.210)**   0.616 (0.165)***    0.574 (0.047)*** 
  LogGDPj   0.212 (0.000) ***   0.586 (0.177)***   0.647 (0.148)***    0.628 (0.045)*** 
  LogDist   -0.039 (0.216)    -   -0.545 (0.244)***    -0.512 (0.245)** 
  LogDifgdpij  0.033 (0.000)***   -0.026 (0.045)   -0.017 (0.045)    -0.020 (0.029)* 
  LogDifgdpsqij  -0.000 (0.000)   -0.000 (0.000)   -0.000 (0.000)    -0.000 (0.000) 
  LogRER   0.016 (0.000)***   0.025 (0.023)   0.022 (0.022)    0.023 (0.007)*** 
  COB   1.262 (0.276)***    -   1.097 (0.313)***    1.156 (0.319)*** 
  AC   0.348 (0.000)***   0.969 (0.357)**   0.628 (0.287)***    0.727 (0.150)*** 
  MER   -0.204 (0.000)***   -0.291 (0.268)   -0.015 (0.258)    -0.101 (0.170) 
  Dummy1989  -2.318 (0.000)***   -2.333 (0.290)***   -2.183 (0.281)***    -1.947 (0.178)*** 
  Dummy1995  -1.085 (0.000)***   -1.204 (0.275)***   -1.122 (0.273)***    -1.148 (0.159)*** 
  Dummy1999  -1.189 (0.000)***   -1.297 (0.244)***   -1.235 (0.246)***    -1.255 (0.157)*** 
  Dummy2002  -1.206 (0.000)***   -1.322 (0.253)***   -1.262 (0.255)***    -1.281 (0.157)*** 
  Dummy2008  -0.034 (5.02)***   0.280 (0.227)   0.316 (0.233)    -0.305 (0.152)** 
  Dummy2011  0.074 (0.000)***   0.275 (0.134)**   0.251 (0.132)*    0.258 (0.149)* 
cons   7.115 (1.751)***   -7.896 (6.957)   -9.162 (5.248)***    -7.844 (2.441)*** 
  R-squared  0.299    0.54    0.642     0.199 
  N   2,520    2,520    2,520     2,520 
                     
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; standard errors for OLS regressions obtained using the Cluster option. logdist and cob constant, omitted by OLS FE 
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Table 2.1.8 - Food and Live animals sector  estimations 
     PPML    OLS Fixed Effects   OLS Random Effects   Tobit 
                     
Xij/LogXij LogGDPi   0.969 (0.000)***   -0.819 (2.876)    0.537 (0.154)***    0.463 (0.137)*** 
  LogGDPj   0.179 (0.000)***   -3.795 (1.172)***   0.319 (0.148)***    0.205 (0.127) 
  LogDist   -0.657 (0.340)*    -   -0.859 (0.380)**    -0.773 (0.374)** 
  LogDifgdpij  -0.111 (0.000)***   0.366 (0.554)   0.056 (0.127)    0.039 (0.069) 
  LogDifgdpsqij   -   -5.04 (2.630)*   -0.000 (0.000)    -0.000 (0.000)* 
  LogRER   -0.017 (0.000)***   -0.090 (0.071)   -0.028 (0.027)    -0.031 (0.019)** 
  COB   0.780 (0.387)**    -   1.156 (0.514)**    1.344 (0.310)*** 
  AC   -0.435 (0.000)***   -1.789 (1.483)   -0.611 (0.301)**    -0.715 (0.234)*** 
  MER   -0.038 (0.000)***   -3.136 (0.939)***   -0.100 (0.421)    -0.167 (0.207) 
  Dummy1989  -1.854 (0.000)***   -8.332 (2.726)***   -2.397 (0.348)***    -2.563 (0.256)*** 
  Dummy1995  -0.440 (0.000)    -3.385 (1.587)***   -0.821 (0.260)***    -0.908 (0.194)*** 
  Dummy1999  -0.500 (0.000)***   -2.554 (1.110)***   -0.528 (0.214)**    -0.598 (0.184)*** 
  Dummy2002  -0.674 (0.000)***   -2.885 (1.188)***   -0.744 (0.210)***    -0.815 (0.188)*** 
  Dummy2008  0.162 (0.000)***   0.321 (0.396)   0.134 (0.108)    0.133 (0.163) 
  cons   2.253 (2.743)   137.091 (85.365)   8.531 (5.893)    12.669 (5.132)** 
  R-squared  0.144    0.19    0.4185     0.091 
  N   2,250    2,250    2,250     2.250 
                     
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; standard errors for OLS regressions obtained using the Cluster option. logdist and cob constant, omitted by OLS FE 
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Table 2.1.9 - Manufactured goods estimations 
     PPML    OLS Fixed Effects   OLS Random Effects   Tobit 
                     
Xij/LogXij LogGDPi   1.228 (0.000)***   0.839 (0.476)*   0.665 (0.135)***    0.655 (0.141)*** 
  LogGDPj   0.175 (0.000)***   0.262 (0.306)   0.815 (0.145)***    0.512 (0.137)*** 
  LogDist    -    -   -0.755 (0.289)***    -0.593 (0.422) 
  LogDifgdpij  -0.093 (0.000)***   -0.035 (0.087)   0.002 (0.079)    -0.16 (0.051) 
  LogDifgdpsqij   -   -0.000 (0.000)   -0.000 (0.000)    -0.000 (0.000)*** 
  LogRER   0.028 (0.000)***   0.046 (0.021)**   0.044 (0.020)**    0.046 (0.011)*** 
  COB    -    -   1.178 (0.471)**    1.499 (0.573)*** 
  AC   -0.570 (0.000)***   -0.819 (0.348)**   -0.507 (0.318)    -0.671 (0.191)*** 
  MER   -0.168 (0.000)***   0.582 (0.484)   0.733 (0.434)    0.701 (0.160)*** 
  Dummy1989  -1.078 (0.000)***   -1.828 (0.464)***   -1.052 (0.275)***    -1.308 (0.220)*** 
  Dummy1995  -0.136 (0.000)***   -0.481 (0.265)*   -0.098 (0.162)    -0.228 (0.158)*** 
  Dummy1999  -0.343 (0.000)***   -0.681 (0.225)***   -0.358 (0.132)***    -0.467 (0.148)*** 
  Dummy2002  -0.457 (0.000)***   -0.802 (0.219)***   -0.491 (0.146)***    -0.594 (0.149)*** 
  Dummy2008  0.376 (0.000)***   0.435 (0.084)***   0.441 (0.082) ***    0.439 (0.123)*** 
cons   -8.252 (0.198)***   9.664 (14.403)   -8.061 (5.382)    -1.413 (5.395) 
  R-squared  0.206    0.48    0.571     0.263 
  N   2,250    2,250    2,250     2,250 
                     
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; standard errors for OLS regressions obtained using the Cluster option. logdist and cob constant, omitted by OLS FE 
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Table 2.1.10 - Crude materials estimations 
     PPML    OLS Fixed Effects   OLS Random Effects   Tobit 
                     
Xij/LogXij LogGDPi   -0.405 (0.000)***   -0.168 (0.660)   0.858 (0.181)***    0.792 (0.146)*** 
  LogGDPj   -0.237 (0.000)***   -0.216 (0.242)   0.308 (0.140)***    0.246 (0.131)* 
  LogDist   0.003 (0.557)    -   -0.682 (0.394)*    -0.600 (0.368) 
  LogDifgdpij  0.021 (0.000)***   -0.084 (0.093)   -0.083 (0.095)    -0.086 (0.048)* 
  LogDifgdpsqij  0.000 (0.000)***   0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000)    0.000 (0.000) 
  LogRER   0.023 (0.000)***   0.036 (0.026)   0.029 (0.021)    0.031 (0.015)** 
  COB   0.655 (0.472)    -   1.747 (0.537)***    1.881 (0.499)*** 
  AC   -1.182 (0.000)***   -0.175 (0.367)   -0.495 (0.271)*    -0.423 (0.250)* 
  MER   0.541 (0.000)***   -0.112 (0.359)   0.108 (0.338)    0.070 (0.224) 
  Dummy1989  -1.257 (0.000)***   -1.146 (0.510)**   -0.026 (0.370)    -0.131 (0.269) 
  Dummy1995  -0.479 (0.000)***   -0.06 (0.401)   0.721 (0.310)**    0.653 (0.217)*** 
  Dummy1999  -0.765 (0.000)***   -0.291 (0.383)   0.270 (0.313)    0.217 (0.203) 
  Dummy2002  -0.769 (0.000)***   -0.465 (0.344)   0.077 (0.295)    0.026 (0.204) 
  Dummy2008  -0.440 (0.000)***   0.446 (0.172) *   0.442 (0.174)***    0.443 (0.185)* 
  cons   33.669 (4.408)***   25.441 (16.369)   -10.253 (0.565)    -7.591 (5.307) 
  R-squared  0.014    0.13    0.4355     0.091 
  N   2,250    2,250    2,250     2,250 
                     
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; standard errors for OLS regressions obtained using the Cluster option. logdist and cob constant, omitted by OLS FE 
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Table 2.1.11 - Commodities estimations 
     PPML    OLS Fixed Effects   OLS Random Effects   Tobit 
                     
Xij/LogXij LogGDPi   -0.060 (0.000)***   -0.148 (1.511)   0.167 (0.156)    0.792 (0.146)*** 
  LogGDPj   0.859 (0.000)***   2.595 (1.222)**   0.728 (0.150)***    0.246 (0.131)* 
  LogDist   -0.318 (0.599)   0.000 (0.000)   -0.822 (0.344)**    -0.600 (0.368) 
  LogDifgdpij  0.441 (0.000)***   0.216 (0.339)   0.259 (0.277)    -0.086 (0.048)* 
  LogDifgdpsqij  -0.000 (0.000)***   -0.000 (0.000)   -0.000 (0.000)    0.000 (0.000) 
  LogRER   0.118 (0.000)**   -0.059 (0.049)   -0.064 (0.033)*    0.031 (0.015)** 
  COB   1.215 (0.712)***   0.000 (0.000)   0.725 (0.478)    1.881 (0.499)*** 
  AC   1.907 (0.000)***   -0.062 (0.444)   -0.423 (0.298)    -0.423 (0.250)* 
  MER   0.980 (0.000)***   -0.433 (0.776)   -0.496 (0.532)    0.070 (0.224) 
  Dummy1989  0.778 (0.000)***   2.378 (1.725)   1.306 (0.558)**    -0.131 (0.277) 
  Dummy1995  0.791 (0.000)***   1.818 (1.063)*   1.281 (0.430)***    0.653 (0.217)*** 
  Dummy1999  0.591 (0.000)***   1.529 (0.855)*   1.242 (0.423)***    0.217 (0.203) 
  Dummy2002  1.137 (0.000)***   1.583 (0.878)*   1.271 (0.468)***    0.026 (0.204) 
  Dummy2008  0.699 (0.000)***   0.354 (0.365)   0.414 (0.365)    0.443 (0.185)** 
  cons   -2.055 (4.934)   -45.871    -0.983 (5.760)    -7.591 (5.307) 
  R-squared  0.021    0.09    0.228     0.032 
  N   2,250    2,250    2,250     2,250 
                     
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; standard errors for OLS regressions obtained using the Cluster option. logdist and cob constant, omitted by OLS FE 
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Table 2.1.12 - Cross Section PPML regressions results and Ramsey-Reset tests 
              
Year   LogGDPi  LogGDPj  LogDist  (prob>χ2)
 Reset test  
             
          
1985   0.6289   1.060   -0.2326   0.5273 
1986   0.7518   1.0344     -0.3317   0.6230 
1987   0.7456     0.8098   -0.6663   0.5365 
1988   0.8981   0.8932   -0.3490   0.8586 
1989   0.6673   0.6847   -0.2020   0.6630 
1990   0.8621     0.6957   -0.4218     0.9801 
1991   0.7537   0.6215   -0.5875   0.9144 
1992   0.9299   0.6914   -0.7509   0.1367 
1993   0.9419   0.6998   -0.7792   0.8654 
1994   0.8851   0.7331     -0.7928   0.4680 
1995   0.7850   0.7104   -0.6568     0.6479 
1996   0.8636   0.8330   -0.7427   0.2399 
1997   1.0270   0.9495   -0.9522     0.5439 
1998   0.9531   0.8727     -0.8258     0.0612 
1999   1.0201   0.9559   -0.9121   0.0017 
2000   1.0825   1.0428   -0.9656   0.0055 
2001   0.8486   0.7635   -0.8448   0.0005 
2002   0.7542     0.7891   -0.9763   0.8189  
2003   0.9003   0.9110   -0.9633   0.2354 
2004   0.9630   0.8734   -0.8866   0.1967 
2005   1.0387   0.9297   -0.9592   0.1036 
2006   1.0330     0.9479   -0.9242     0.1473 
2007   1.1099   0.9937   -1.0651   0.1826 
2008   0.6944     0.4162   -0.2804     0.8203 
2009   0.9745     0.8743   -0.8566   0.0631 
2010   0.5214   0.4285   -0.0209   0.0259 
2011   0.5582   0.4672   0.0004   0.0020 
2012   0.4337   0.4324   0.0831   0.0481 
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2.2 Argentina in the context of regional and global trade 
 
2.2.1 Research questions and structure of the chapter 
In the second chapter of this part I will focus on the external trade of Argentina, in order to see, at an 
empirical level, which are the determinants on the exports and imports of this country. I will run 
several regressions which will be different from each other according to the variables included in the 
models and the number of observations, both from the point of view of the periods covered and from 
the point of view of the individuals considered (i.e. the trading partners of Argentina). In particular, the 
main goal of this chapter is to assess which is the behavior of Argentine external trade across the last 25 
years by taking into consideration some crucial variables of interest, which are: 
- The variability of the real exchange rate, which has been the object of several empirical analyses 
but was never applied to research about this country; 
- The level of tariffs, which still constitute a high barrier of trade for Argentina, although it has 
been member of MERCOSUR, the most advanced regional economic organization, for 20 
years. 
 In order to do so, a basic gravity model will be used as in the first part of the chapter, augmented with 
the variables described in the above and other regressors which will be presented in the following 
paragraphs. The next section will be dedicated to establish a theoretical framework about the exchange 
rate variability in order to provide some tools which will be at the basis of the next empirical part. 
2.2.2  The role of exchange rate variability in international trade 
Micro foundations of the implications of exchange rate variability in international trade 
To approach the problem of the variability in the exchange rate, which is a macroeconomic variable, it 
can be useful to start from a microeconomic foundation of this issue. In fact, it is interesting to recall 
that the fluctuations in the exchange rate involve an important component of risk. The risk theory says 
that an increase in risk will lead risk-averse individuals to reduce their efforts (in terms of consumption 
or production, for example) in their risky activity and to shift their choices to less risky ‘assets’. 
Therefore, the utility function of the ‘risk averse’ economic subject will be concave because of her 
decreasing marginal utility. On the other hand, a ‘risk loving’ individual will prefer to hold more risky 
‘assets’ and her utility function will be convex, presenting an increasing marginal utility. According to 
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De Grauwe (1988) this microeconomic theory can be applied to international trade: if we look at a 
domestic producer of a generic country X, the risk is in the price he obtains for selling in the foreign 
market. The source of risk is given by the exchange rate. As we can see from the profit function: 
                               
the tilde indicates that the variable is a random one: in fact the price of the products sold in the foreign 
market is given by:       
   , where   is the exchange rate and    is the foreign currency price (De 
Grauwe 1988). Therefore, the component of risk and uncertainty is given by the exchange rate 
determined at the international level.  
The reasoning at the basis is the following: if an increase in the variability of the exchange rate increases 
the expected marginal utility of income from exports, then this increased variability will lead to more 
export activity. If producers are sufficiently risk averse (R > 125), an increase in exchange rate risk raises 
the expected marginal utility of export revenue and therefore induces them to increase their export 
activity. On the other hand, if R < 1, that means that producers are risk loving and therefore their 
marginal utility is increased by a higher exchange rate risk. (The third possible case is when R=1 and 
therefore the producers are indifferent between exporting or not, since they are risk neutral).  
Why should I take into consideration all the three cases, even if the most reasonable seems the first 
one? Because an increase in risk involves both a substitution and an income effect: 
- The substitution effect takes place when an increase in risk is seen to lower the attractiveness of 
an activity and leads people to shift their decisions of production; 
- The income effect goes in the opposite direction and if the drop in the expected total utility of 
export revenue can be offset by increasing resources in the export sector (De Grauwe, 1988). 
This is the reason why the total result can be uncertain. Nevertheless, in the reality the individuals are 
more likely to be risk averse: therefore, the macroeconomic reasoning which will be explained in the 
next paragraph will be based on the micro assumptions that the utility function of the producers are 
concave and separable, in order to exclude that the income effect may offset the substitution effect. 
 
 
                                                          
25
 “R” stands for the “coefficient of relative risk aversion”. 
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How to measure and compute exchange rate variability 
There are several empirical works which try to assess the impact of exchange rate variability on 
international trade. In this paragraph I will provide a short literature review of the main empirical tests 
and findings. 
De Grauwe (1988) tries to study the importance of exchange rate (ER) variability in explaining the 
slowdown of international trade since the breakup of the fixed-exchange rate international regime 
(occurred in 1971) and the shock in oil prices (1973). He applies a gravity model to estimate bilateral 
trade flows among the ten major industrial countries in two periods (1960-69 and 1973-84). He uses a 
gravity model where the ER variability is defined as the variability of the yearly percentage changes of 
the bilateral ER between the currency of country i and the currency of country j around the mean 
changes observed during the sub period t (De Grauwe 1988). Therefore, it is the standard deviation of 
the yearly growth rates of the ERs around their mean. He considers both the nominal and the real ER, 
but he gets to the conclusion that the latter is a better measure because it takes into account inflation 
differentials. De Grauwe found that this variability has a negative impact on bilateral trade and that it 
accounts for 20% the reduction  of the total decline in the growth of international trade (De Grauwe 
1988). It is a long-run ER variability and it is a likely source of protectionist pressure, thus explaining 
this negative effect on international trade. That is why the researcher concludes that the ER variability 
produces a sort of “political economy” effect through the induction of more protectionist measures. 
Another study by Dell’Ariccia (1998) examines the impact of the ER variability in the context of the 
European Union. According to the researcher, the gravity model of international trade is particularly 
suitable to the EU countries since they are relatively homogeneous in terms of technology, factors 
endowments and per capita income (Dell’Ariccia 1998). His sample consists of 14 EU countries (the 
members of the Union at those times) more Switzerland and covers a period of 20 years from 1975 to 
1994. The researcher underlines that the main problem is to define a variable that captures the element 
of instability in the ER appropriately (Dell’Ariccia 1998). Therefore, he uses three different types of 
measure in order to be able to compare them. In particular, they are: 
- The standard deviation of the first differences of the logarithmic ER, which has the property of 
being zero in case of a rate following a constant trend and of giving a bigger weight to the most 
extreme observations; 
- The average absolute difference between the previous period forward rate and the current spot, 
which advantage should be to pick up the presence of a lack of credibility in case of semi-
flexible exchange rates; 
116 
 
116 
 
- The percentage difference between the maximum and the minimum of the nominal spot rate 
over the t years preceding the observation, which stresses the importance of medium run 
uncertainty (Dell’Ariccia 1998). 
The results of the regressions confirm the hypothesis of the presence of a negative impact of the ER 
variability on regional trade. The coefficients are similar for the three methods used to compute the 
variable and for each regression a small but significant evidence of a negative effect is found. 
The two researches described in the above take into account developed countries: does the same 
hypothesis hold for developing countries? If such an hypothesis should be confirmed, then also a test 
for middle income countries (as in the case of this chapter regarding Argentina and Latin American 
countries) can be performed and possibly give interesting results. A work by Arize, Osang and Slottje 
(2000) tries to verify this relationship by studying the issue of ER variability for a group of 13 Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). They address the problem starting again by the consideration that an 
increase in variability increases risk in trade because the ER is agreed on at the time of the trade 
contract, but payment is not made until the future delivery actually takes place (Arize, Osang and 
Slottje, 2000) .  
Regarding the methodology used to compute the variability of the ER, they apply the “moving sample 
standard deviation” of the bilateral real ER, which can be expressed as follows: 
       
 
 
                  
 
 
   
 
 
 
     
Where R is the natural logarithm of the real effective ER and m=7 is the order of the moving average.26 
They use a cointegration analysis to establish whether there is a long-run equilibrium between exports 
and the ER variability. The results suggest the existence of a negative and statistically significant long-
run relationship between export f lows and exchange rate volatility in each of the 13 LDCs (Arize, 
Osang and Slottje 2000).  
Another example of the use of the moving average methodology regards an empirical work on 
Brazilian exports within the context of MERCOSUR (Larson, Bittencourt and Thompson 2005). Their 
                                                          
26
 The order of the moving average is generally arbitarily chosen and it determines the kind of information I want to 
include in my sample. For example, in this case, the order “7” chosen means that in the sample data about the 
exchange rate over the previous 7 years will be included . Therefore, the measure of variability that will be obtained 
offers a long-run perspective.  
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study attempts to capture the lack of macroeconomic coordination among MERCOSUR countries in 
order to show that this factor prevented the four members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Paraguay) 
from achieving a closer integration. They used the real bilateral ER as a proxy to measure the impact of 
this lack in coordination, computed as the moving average standard deviation of the log differences of 
the bilateral real ER (Sijt ) given by: 
       
                  
  
   
   
 
 
 
    
Where Xij,t is the bilateral real ER, xij,t = ln(Xij,t) and k=2,4,6,8,9 years.
27 The sample used for these 
regressions include Brazilian trade with the other three members of MERCOSUR and cover a period 
from 1989 to 2002. The authors analyze first the impact of ER variability on total trade first and then 
by disaggregating the analysis for  different sectors of goods (agriculture, chemicals, livestock, mining 
and oil, manufacturing). The main results of this empirical research reveal that Brazil’s trade is 
negatively affected not only by its own ER movements but also by the variability observed in its trading 
partners. The results suggest that the disharmonized policies within MERCOSUR cause substantial 
price and exchange rate variability, thus increasing risk and creating a negative environment for bilateral 
trade due to the risk aversion of the economic agents (Larson, Bittencourt and Thompson 2005).   
Has this problem been addressed with regard to the case  of Argentina? Sedano (2005) explains that 
misalignments in the value of national currencies of states belonging to the same regional trade 
organization can have negative effects on the integration process. This appears to be the case of 
MERCOSUR, in particular regarding the currency policy of Argentina and Brazil. In fact, currency 
devaluation is one of the most commonly used economic policies by a country to gain competitiveness 
and increase its exports when it faces trade balance of payments deficits (see also part I). That is why 
the collapse of the Real Plan28 in January 1999, which led to a devaluation of the Brazilian currency, 
caused a shock in MERCOSUR stability by producing a trade surplus of Brazil with respect to 
Argentina: a gap which the latter was not able to fill even after the collapse of its currency board regime 
in January 2002. It is interesting to stress the fact that, in the first period subsequent to the Brazilian 
                                                          
27
 In this case different orders of the moving average were taken into account in order to check for the robustness of 
the results.  
28
 The Real Plan is the name of a monetary policy implemented by Brazil in 1994 in order to stop inflation and obtain 
macroeconomic stability. The Plan was different from the Argentine currency board in the sense that it did not peg the 
“real” (the name of the new Brazilian currency) to the US Dollar, but it imposed that each Real should be backed 
exactly by one US Dollar in the Central Bank’s foreing currency reserves.  
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devaluation, its trade balance deficit decreased not because of a rise in exports towards Argentina but 
because of a fall in imports (Argentine goods had become much more expensive, since the peso was 
still pegged to the dollar). In the second period, subsequent to the failure of the currency board, the 
trade balance became positive in favor of Brazil, which could increase its exports even more (+87% in 
2003, +62% in 2004), while Argentine exports did not increase despite the devaluation. The author 
describes this process as an example of “trade diversion”: Argentina started to import more from Brazil 
than from other partners, such as the United States or the European Union because the devaluation of 
the Argentine peso contributed to depress the national income which approached the Brazilian level. 
This particular version of the “Linder Effect” (see chapter 2.1) established trade diversion within 
MERCOSUR favoring only one country, Brazil, also because it was the first to devaluate. That choice 
in economic policy gave Brazil a sort of “first mover advantage”, which started to change irreversibly 
the direction of trading flows between the two countries (Sedano, 2005).  
The issue of the variability of the exchange rate, considered as a proxy for the lack of macroeconomic 
coordination among the most important members of MERCOSUR, will be the object of the next 
paragraph, where it will be considered together with the other determinants of the international trade of 
Argentina through a set of regressions which constitute the second empirical ‘piece’ of this chapter. 
 
2.2.3 The external trade of Argentina: empirical research 
This paragraph will be dedicated to the description and the analysis of the empirical work done on 
Argentina. An econometric application of the gravity model of international trade will be applied on the 
bilateral trade of Argentina with several commercial partners in order to answer some fundamental 
questions. The main goal of this work is to look at the traditional variables of the gravity model and to 
see how Argentina has performed in the context of MERCOSUR across time and also in the global 
context: in fact, one of the regressions that were run includes in the sample not only the members of 
MERCOSUR, but also the most important global economic actors (the United States, the European 
Union and China). To do so, a specific econometric technique will be used. As I showed in the first 
empirical part of this part, the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation technique has 
proved to be the most efficient and suitable for the gravity model. Therefore, this research would like 
to add as elements of innovation the fact that for the first time an empirical analysis about trading flows 
of Argentina is done and that a new methodology is applied: in fact, the previous applications of the 
gravity model on the Latin American region are less efficient than the PPML technique, as elaborated 
by Santos Sylva and Tenreyro (2006).  
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The economic context 
 
A much more detailed presentation of the economic context of Argentina was already provided in part 
I: for the purposes of this part of the thesis, it will be useful to recall just a few information about the 
main macroeconomic issues and challenges that the South American country faced in the last two 
decades. 
After a period of deep recession and inflation (for some periods hyperinflation), occurred in the second 
part of the ‘80s after the collapse of the military regime and the restoration of democracy (1983), the 
newly elected Government of Carlos Saúl Menem, in the person of the Ministry of Finance Domingo 
Cavallo, decided to adopt in 1991 a ‘shock therapy’ on the monetary side in order to obtain price 
stability: it pegged its currency, the argentine peso, to the US dollar, thus establishing a currency board 
regime.29 The measure, called “Convertibility Law”, established a perfect convertibility of the peso with 
the US dollar on the basis of a 1:1 parity, and reached the objective of defeating inflation. Nevertheless, 
due to an appreciation of the dollar that started in 1995, the argentine currency resulted in being 
overvalued: this factor led to a deterioration of Argentine competitiveness and to an appreciation of its 
real effective exchange rate (REER, weighted for the external trade of the country), which rose by over 
75% (Zaza 2011). Therefore, despite a perfect nominal stability in the exchange rate, in real terms this 
situation led to a new disequilibrium.  
Nevertheless, the “Convertibility Law”, together with the application of the neo-liberal principles and 
prescriptions contained in the so-called “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990), which consisted 
basically of massive privatizations and in the opening of the country to external trade and Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI), Argentina’s economy started to grow again. Nevertheless, the economic 
system still presented many problems: the level of unemployment remained extremely high (in the 
order of 20%) and the country was vulnerable to external financial shocks, as was shown by the 
Mexican financial crisis of 1995, which spread out in the Latin American region producing the so-called 
‘tequila effect’, a sort of contagion which induced financial investors to run away from Argentine assets. 
The economy recovered again but it entered a period of new recession in 1999: in this occasion the 
                                                          
29
 “A currency board regime is one where the domestic currency is backed (usually 50% or more) with foreign reserve  
currency, and where the currency board is obligated to convert domestic currency into foreign currency on demand at 
a fixed price. With the exception of Argentina and Hong Kong, currency boards have tipically been implemented by 
small developing economies” (M. Goldstein, “Managed Floating Plus – Policy Analyses in International Economics, 
Institute for International Economics, 2002.   
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main reason was due to the exchange rate, which was kept artificially overvalued, harming the 
competitiveness of Argentine goods. As seen in the previous paragraph, the decision taken by Brazil in 
order to devaluate its currency and to shift from a fixed band to a completely floating exchange rate 
was a bad strike for Argentine exports. Recession, combined with the dramatic rise in external public 
debt (from 35% over GDP in 1995 to 151% in 200230), made the situation worse and worse. The series 
of emergency financial packages negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), consisting in 
a total amount of 23,8 billion US$ in the form of conditional loans, had just the effect of worsening the 
crisis and delaying the moment of the collapse. By the end of 2001 the Government of President De la 
Rua imposed a limit on cash withdrawals (the corralito) in a desperate attempt to keep the currency 
board alive, since the fear of a devaluation drove millions of Argentine people to withdraw all their 
savings in US dollars in order to keep the value of their money high.  The Government was forced at 
last to declare the default on its external debt and to abandon the hard peg regime, devaluating the peso 
and establishing a new floating currency regime by fixing the value of peso to around 1:3 against the US 
dollar. This second deep shock in the exchange rate policy caused a ‘trade diversion’ effect, as we saw 
in the previous paragraph, contributing to the further deterioration in the trade balance of Argentina 
with Brazil. Nevertheless, the devaluation of peso contributed to boost Argentine exports to other 
destinations in the world, together with the boom in the world price of such agricultural commodities 
as soy beans. This ‘revival’ of the ‘export-led growth model’ (strongly supported by the new peronist 
Governments of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner) boosted the Argentina’s 
economy, whose GDP started to increase again since 2003 at impressive rates: the GDP increased by 
8,8% in 2003, 9% in 2004, 9,2% in 2005, 8,5% in 2006 and 8,7% in 2007, with a slowdown in 2008 and 
200931 due to the global financial crisis that had also the effect of decreasing the world prices of 
agricultural commodities. However, an already well-known problem showed up again: in the first 
decade of the 2000s  the high rate of inflation, (which has remained at a double-digit level) has 
contributed to increase the variability of the real exchange rate.  
  
Data set and estimation technique 
The empirical research consists of three different regressions: in each of these the aim is to apply the 
gravity model of international trade to the specific case of Argentina, but different countries were 
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 Source: Zaza,2011. 
31
 Source: Ministerio de la Economia Argentina (MECON)  
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included in the regressions and different periods covered. According to the methodology, all the three 
regressions were performed using a panel-data estimation. The regression technique involves the 
application of the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator in the formulation designed by 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro, since in the previous chapter the comparison among the different 
econometric techniques (PPML, OLS and Tobit) has shown that the first one is more efficient than the 
others. 
Before starting to explain in detail the models performed, I will quickly recall the results obtained in the 
first part of the work. That empirical part is going to be useful as it provides a framework of regional 
trade in the Latin American context, where Argentina is located and operates. The gravity model took 
in consideration, besides the traditional variables of interest (GDPs of the two countries and the 
distance) also the difference in the GDP per capita (known as the “Linder effect”) among the different 
pairs of the countries in the sample (90 pairs for 10 countries), the real exchange rate, and a couple of 
dummy variables in order to isolate the effect of the Andean Community (AC) and the MERCOSUR in 
promoting regional trade among its members. Finally, a set of yearly dummy variables was included in 
order to capture other macroeconomic events that could not be taken into consideration in the other 
variables present in the model. The main results obtained were: 
- The ‘classical’ variables of the gravity model work as expected (the signs of the GDPs are 
positive while the distance is negatively correlated with external trade) 
- The “Linder effect” doesn’t take on a negative sign, according to the main economic theory, 
but it can be explained.  In fact, the sign should be negative in case of intra-industrial trade, 
between countries which have a similar production structure and, then, similar tastes. That is 
why the GDP per capita is a good variable to have a proxy for this mechanism. Nevertheless, in 
South America the economic structures of the different countries are quite heterogeneous, so it 
is possible to explain regional trade at an inter-industrial level 
- Regarding the dummy variables, belonging to the Andean Community seems to have been a 
more important factor in promoting the increase of trade among its members, more than 
happened within MERCOSUR, which has a negative impact overall (this slightly changes in the 
regressions disaggregated for different sectors). There are two possible explanations: the 
excessive asymmetries in the economic size and structure of the members of MERCOSUR and 
their cyclical coming back to protectionist measures 
- The yearly dummies are effective in capturing the macroeconomic cycles which took place in 
the period covered (1985-2012) 
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- The Reset test performed to verify the correctness of the functional form gave a negative 
response. Nevertheless, after repeating it for each year at a cross-sectional level, it gave a 
positive result at least for the first fifteen years in the sample: afterwards, the dramatic 
macroeconomic disequilibria provoked a change in the functional form.  
The next three models are especially dedicated to analyze external trade of Argentina. The first one 
takes into account the trading flows of Argentina with the other members of MERCOSUR (Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay) across a period of 25 years, from 1985 to 2009. It is important to say that, in 
this case and in the following, not all the pairs of countries will be included in the gravity model but 
only those ones where Argentina takes part. Moreover, the dependent variable is constituted by the 
total exports between the pair of countries considered, built up as the sum of the different goods 
classified in the databank of the United Nations Comtrade Statistics Division, according to the 
Standard International Trade Classification, revision 4. Therefore, the sample size consists of 6 pairs of 
countries x 25 years x 49 products, for a total of 7350 observations.32 The model is the following: 
                                                                  
Where          is the log of the products of the gross domestic products of the two countries at time 
t,          is the log of the products of the gross domestic products of the two countries at time t, 
          is the log of the distance between the two countries (measured with the method of the great 
circle distance and between the two main economic centers),          is the log of the real exchange 
rate between the two countries at time t and       is the variability in the real ER between the two 
countries at time t. The last one is the most important variable of the model and it was created using 
the “moving average standard deviation” (MASD) method described in the previous paragraph: it was 
computed on an yearly basis with a lag of ten years, therefore including data from 1975.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 Unfortunately, it was not possible to have a more updated time series since data of disaggregated exports were 
available only until 2009.  
123 
 
123 
 
Figure 2.2.1 – Real exchange rate variability in the MERCOSUR area, 1985-2009 
 
Note: the variability was computed through the MASD methodology. 
Source: elaboration of the author on IMF Data Bank 
As it can be seen, the variability was higher in the first fifteen years considered. This can be explained 
with the high inflation typical in Argentina during the ‘80s and, even if at a lower extent, with the 
appreciation of the US dollar which kept a certain level of currency instability through an overvaluation 
of the Argentine peso.  
The second model considers again the context of MERCOSUR, but it applies a different methodology 
to compute the ER variability. In fact, the MASD measure presents two main drawbacks: 
- It was computed using yearly data of the real ER, but it is clear that changes in the RER are 
often determined by changes that take place in a much shorter period (months, weeks, even 
days) 
- The lag is arbitrarily chosen but it can give too much ‘noise’ in the measure of variability if it is 
too close to the moment when the time series starts, or, on the other side, be not precise 
enough if it is too far. 
Therefore, a better measure should be found in order to capture and isolate properly the effect of the 
ER variability. Monthly data of the nominal ER and of the inflation rate were collected (again from the 
IMF Data Bank), and the variability of the RER was obtained by computing the standard error on a 
yearly basis, plus a lag of three months. This method should offer a more precise measurement and the 
use of a more ‘reliable’ lag (the RER in month ‘x’ is more likely to depend on the RER of a few months 
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before, instead of some years before). In this case the time series is shorter and covers a period from 
2003 to 2009 (total size of the sample is of 2058 observations) in order to isolate the examination of the 
external trade of Argentina across the last decade, after the last economic crisis. Moreover, another 
variable was introduced in the model, as we can see from the equation below: 
                                                                       
The impact of tariff was considered important and a negative impact is expected on exports. In fact, 
during the last years a series of new protectionist measures was taken by the members of MERCOSUR 
and it was a factor that prevented these countries from achieving a deeper integration.  
Figure 2.2.2 – Real exchange rate variability in the MERCOSUR area, 2003-2012 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on IMF Data Bank using the SE methodology 
As it is possible to see from the graph above, the main source of variability in the last decade was 
represented by the exchange rate of Argentina with Uruguay. A possible explanation of this can be seen 
at first in the effects of the devaluation of peso, and in the high inflation rate suffered by Argentina 
during these years. Nevertheless, with respect to the other countries variability seems it was much 
lower, as an evidence of a tangible improvement of the macroeconomic stability in the region. 
Therefore, the question whether RER variability has been an obstacle in the regional integration 
process is going to be asked.  
What about trade of Argentina with the rest of the world? In order to test also for this case the dataset 
has been expanded with the observations of trading flows with the United States, the Euro Area and 
China. In this case, the length of the time series was an obliged choice because the Euro, currency of 
the Eurozone, was officially enforced since January 1999: therefore this panel regression covers a 
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period from 1999 to 2009 and the sample size consists in 12x11x49=6468 observations. The model is 
the following: 
                                                             
                                        
                                          
                                        
                      
In this case the variable “tariffs” could not be included since in the data base of the UN Comtrade 
Statistics Division data about all the pairs of countries were not available (for example, a single tariff 
towards European countries is not applied). Moreover, as the time series is reasonably long, the yearly 
dummy variables were included again in the model. Regarding the ER variability, the same method as in 
the previous regression was applied. This is the trend of the variability in the period covered for the 
pair of countries considered: 
Figure 2.2.3 - Real Exchange Rate Variability, MERCOSUR  + United States, Euro Area, 
China, 1999-2012 
 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on IMF Data Bank using the SE methodology 
The next paragraph will be dedicated to the analysis of the results obtained. 
Results and interpretations 
All the results are listed in the tables presented at the end of this chapter. Regarding the first regression 
(Table 2.2.1), which considers Argentina and the other MERCOSUR countries from 1985 to 2009, the 
main variables of the gravity model are significant and take on the expected value, are strongly 
significant (at the 1% level) and have a relevant impact on trade: GDP and population are positively 
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correlated with exports (with an elasticity respectively close and superior to 1) while distance has a 
negative effect (with an elasticity of -0,1, which is quite obvious since the distance is relatively small 
and, as a consequence, also the transportation costs). The real interest rate is slightly negative correlated 
and significant, while the variability of real ER takes on the expected sign (negative) but it does not 
reach a sufficient level of significance. The Reset test, performed to check for the correctness of the 
functional form, it is passed and gives a positive response.  
The second regression (Table 2.2.2) covers a shorter time series (2003-2009) and the same group of 
countries (MERCOSUR area) but with a different methodology to compute the variability of the real 
ER. In this case, there are not relevant differences regarding the classical variables of interest (the 
elasticity effect on population is still more than proportionate), but the variability of RER now turns to 
be strongly significant but with a negligible effect on regional trade of Argentina. The variable 
logTARIFF is negative, as expected, strongly significant and with a reasonably large coefficient (-0.376). 
The Reset test in this case does not give a completely positive response, but the level observed is not 
much below the critical value of the χ2 distribution. 
The third and last regression (Table 2.2.3) covers the period 1999-2009 and includes a bigger number 
of countries which are trading partners of Argentina (MERCOSUR + United States, Euro Area and 
China). Population is positively and strongly correlated to external trade and distance takes on a 
negative and significant value (-1.356, much more than a proportionate effect in terms of elasticity); 
nevertheless, GDP this time is negatively and significantly correlated with exports, which is not quite 
straightforward to explain. Again, variability of the real ER is not significant and takes on a negligible 
impact, while the yearly dummy variables are significant at the maximum level and suggest to follow the 
correct path of the macroeconomic cycles. The Reset test is not passed, but again the value observed is 
quite close to the critical value of the distribution.   
Therefore, the Gravity Model seems to perform well and to explain, at least in its main variables (GDP, 
population and distance), the external trade of Argentina. Moreover, the PPML estimator gives good 
responses, also in terms of the functional form and it appears to be an efficient estimator. The 
examination on the issue of variability of ER gives back as an answer the fact that the variability was 
not a decisive factor in preventing Argentina from trading more with its economic partners. The 
application of a more precise and reliable methodology, used in the second and third regression, 
suggests that this variable is not fundamental in explaining the partial failure of MERCOSUR. Other 
factors should be taken into account other elements that increased the volatility and uncertainty of the 
economic environment, such as the macroeconomic asymmetries among Argentina and the other three 
members in terms of size and productive structure and the commercial disputes which led to a revival 
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in protectionist measures. These measures regarded both tariff (as seen by the strong negative impact 
of the latter on regional trade) and non-tariff barriers, whose effect is more difficult to capture with an 
econometric variable.  
 
2.2.4 Conclusions and implications for further research 
 
This empirical part focused on Argentina and it tried to describe the behavior of the country in the field 
of external trade, with particular regard to its regional dimension as a member of MERCOSUR. The 
application of the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood regression technique for the estimation of the 
Gravity Model showed its efficiency, due to the significance of the coefficients and the general correct 
specification of the functional forms of the models that were run. The issue of the variability of the real 
exchange rate does not seem to be a major constraint to  Argentina’s external trade, as it was shown by 
the methodology chosen in the two last regressions (standard error on yearly basis with a lag of three 
months). Nevertheless, some problems are pending and questions remain open. The low goodness of 
fit of the regressions suggests that there is much more to explain the external trade of Argentina with. 
Two channels are the macro and microeconomic asymmetries present among the members of 
MERCOSUR, and the revival of protectionist measures within the organization. According to this 
external economic environment, which role can Argentina play as a regional and global player? I will 
discuss and explore these questions in the next part.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
128 
 
128 
 
Table 2.2.1 -  Estimation of Argentina’s trade with MERCOSUR countries, 1985-2009, 
PPML regression 
 
 Xij 
logGDPij 0.930 
 (0.052)*** 
logPOPij 1.494 
 (0.035)*** 
logDISTij -0.128 
 (0.042)*** 
logRERij -0.041 
 (0.011)*** 
VARij -0.155 
 (0.120) 
_cons -46.282 
 (3.586)*** 
R2 0.15 
N 7,350 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; VARij computed with the MASD methodology 
 
 
 
Table 2.2.2 - Estimation of Argentina’s trade with MERCOSUR countries. 2003-2009, PPML 
regression 
 
 Xij 
logGDPij 0.434 
 (0.000)*** 
logPOPij -0.776 
 (0.000)*** 
logTARIFFij -0.326 
 (0.000)*** 
logDifgdpij 
 
VARij 
-0.008 
(0.000)*** 
0.004 
 (0.000)*** 
_cons 25.239 
 (0.228)*** 
R2 0.07 
N 2,058 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; VARij computed with the SE methodology 
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Table 2.2.3 - Estimation of Argentina’s trade with MERCOSUR countries + United States, 
Euro Area and China,  
1999-2009, PPML estimation 
 
 Xij 
logGDPij -0.744 
 (0.020)*** 
logPOPij 0.710 
 (0.048)*** 
logDISTij -1.356 
 (0.080)*** 
VARij -0.000 
 (0.000) 
dummy1999 -1.131 
 (0.216)*** 
dummy2000 -0.952 
 (0.234)*** 
dummy2001 -1.158 
 (0.217)*** 
dummy2002 -2.293 
 (0.245)*** 
dummy2003 -1.906 
 (0.238)*** 
dummy2004 -1.536 
 (0.214)*** 
dummy2005 -1.185 
 (0.207)*** 
dummy2006 -0.755 
 (0.210)*** 
dummy2007 -0.246 
 (0.211) 
dummy2008 0.293 
 (0.212) 
_cons 40.006 
 (1.908)*** 
R2 0.19 
N 6,468 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; VARij computed with the SE methodology 
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Table 2.2.4 - Ramsey’s RESET test performed for regressions on Argentina’s trade 
 
 
- Argentina + MERCOSUR, 1985-2009: 
 
           chi2(  1) =    0.00 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9628 
 
- Argentina + MERCOSUR, 2003-2009: 
chi2(  1) =    1.50 
Prob > chi2 =    0.2203 
 
- Argentina + MERCOSUR, US, EA and China: 
 
chi2(  1) =    1.47 
Prob > chi2 =    0.2258 
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PART III – A VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE:  
ARGENTINA IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
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3.1 Argentina and the IMF: a problematic relationship  
3.1.1 Structure of the chapter 
This chapter will investigate the relationship between Argentina and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Buenos Aires has had a problematic and swinging relationship with the IMF since the 
establishment of the organization. As I will show, the ambivalent ties of Argentina with the IMF are 
deeply rooted in the volatility of the economic policies adopted over the course of the second half of 
the 20th century, which were the result of a highly uncertain political scenario. That is why the “routine 
of dependency” (Kedar 2013) that took place between Argentina and the Fund ended up with 
deteriorating the macroeconomic situation of the country and making the debt crisis unsustainable, 
leading to the default on the external debt at the end of 2001. The tense relations that followed 
afterwards was characterized by the repayment of Argentina’s entire debt to the IMF in 2005 and 
culminated with the declaration of censure by the Fund’s Executive Board against Argentina for not 
providing reliable statistical data on its Consumer Price Index and GDP.33 The progressive self-
isolation of Argentina from the IMF, I argue, is the long-run result of mistakes made by both sides. On 
one hand, the inability to move on a coherent path towards economic growth and the frequent 
deployment of populism and economic nationalism by several Argentine governments (last but not 
least the recent experience with Néstor and Cristina Kirchner) progressively diverted the country from 
collaboration with the Fund. On the other hand, wrong policies and wrong timing of the loans granted 
by the IMF to Argentina made the economic situation even worse in some circumstances. The final 
outcome of this complicated relationship contributes to pose at risk the role of Argentina within global 
economic relations as a potential “pariah” (Brandt and Erixon 2013).  
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to show how the current behavior of Argentine policy makers 
towards the IMF, which can be considered irrational in view of the framework of International Political 
Economy developed at the end of this part (see chapter 3.4), is also the result of a long-run troubled 
relationship. The remainder is organized as follows: after a section recalling the history of the 
relationship between Argentina and the IMF, the chapter will focus on the current problems providing 
an analysis of the country’s behavior within the international macroeconomic context.   
 
                                                          
33
 The Statement of the Executive Board can be accessed at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr1333.htm 
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3.1.2 History: from triumph… to tragedy 
The Bretton Woods system and the inclusion of peripheral countries 
World War II was such a dramatic event that not only produced a horrible cost in terms of human 
lives, but also changed drastically and irreversibly the distribution of political, military and economic 
power at the global level. Although the United States had been the first economy in the world in terms 
of real GDP already well before 1900 (Figure 3.1.1), the United Kingdom still retained the role of 
unique ‘super-power’ thanks to its colonial empire. The main center of global trade and financial 
transactions, London was keeping on enjoying its position of supremacy because the pound sterling 
was the reference currency as a means of payment and storage (Cassis 2009). On the other hand, the 
United States were pursuing a strategy of domestic growth and development and showing a low level of 
commitment in international economic affairs, apart from the interest in the hemispheric relationship 
with Latin American countries (Bulmer Thomas 2003).  
Nevertheless, a slow process of redistribution of economic power was taking place and it was 
dramatically accelerated by the outburst of the world conflict. The economies of the European nations 
suffered from severe losses and were definitively overcome by the two new global super-powers: the 
US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
How was Argentina’s economy positioned during this period? Already a major exporter of agricultural 
commodities, the South American country had developed strong ties with the UK, being one of its 
biggest trading partners and providers of meat and other food products (Bulmer Thomas 2003). 
Therefore, although from a peripheral position not only in geographic terms but also proportional to its 
economic power and influence, Argentina became one of the richest countries in the world: if we look 
at its GDP per capita, it had been ranking well above Italy (used here as a term of comparison because 
of the similar demographic structure between the two countries) until the end of World War II and 
even for some years after (Figure 3.1.2). Partially immune by the economic consequences of the war 
(the heavy crisis produced by the conflict in Europe reduced the demand for domestic products), 
Argentina went out of the war as one of the most promising economies in the world. Then, what went 
wrong? 
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Figure 3.1.1 – Argentina vs. other countries, GDP (million 1990 international Geary-Khamis 
dollars, 1900-1945) 
 
Source: Maddison tables 
Figure 3.1.2 – Argentina vs. other countries, GDP per capita (million 1990 international 
Geary-Khamis dollars, 1900-1945) 
 
Source: Maddison tables 
The war was still going on in Europe and in the Pacific, but the future winners were already planning 
how to establish ex novo a new global monetary and financial system. Representatives of 45 countries 
gathered in Bretton Woods, a small village in New Hampshire (US), for a conference aimed at 
establishing two new organizations linked to each other: the International Monetary Fund and the 
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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, better known as the World Bank (WB). How 
these two organizations should function, it was decided after a debate between two contrasting visions, 
embodied by the US and the UK, and in particular by the Deputy Treasury Harry Dexter White and the 
British economist John Maynard Keynes. The two men had had the task to draft alternative plans for 
the functioning of the organizations: aim of the conference was to analyze and discuss the two plans 
and find a combination of them (Kedar 2013). According to Keynes, the new institutions should have 
promoted international trade and act as a coordinating body among central banks. He also advocated 
the creation of a single currency, the so-called Bancor, which would have played the role of a universal 
means of payment. Harry Dexter White’s project went even further and intended the two institutions 
not only as a means of macroeconomic and financial stabilization, but also as a vehicle for 
reconstruction after the war. This is why the World Bank became the institution specialized in the 
concession of grants and loans for the implementation of project enhancing economic and social 
development in poor countries, while the IMF retained the role of financial supervisor. In other words, 
they ended up with being the “stick” (the IMF) and the “carrot” of the new economic order (Kedar 
2013).     
At the meeting called for 1 July 1944, in addition to the US, the Soviet Union, the UK, Canada, China 
and European governments in exile, also allied countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia were 
invited to attend. All Latin American countries took part, except for one: Argentina. Why was it left out 
of the initial membership of the Bretton Woods institutions? The main reason is provided by the tense 
relationships originated with the US during the war. Argentina was in fact the only Latin American 
country that decided to remain neutral almost until the end of the conflict (it would decide to declare 
war against Germany and Japan only in April 1945, one year after the Bretton Woods conference). 
Since European countries represented the most important market for Argentine exports, the 
institutions were worried that taking a position (no matter whether with or against Germany) would 
have harmed its external trade-oriented economy. Nevertheless, Argentina was unable to avoid 
suffering from negative consequences: on one hand the fall of demand from the European continent, 
devastated by the war, on the other hand the retaliation from the US for not joining the Allies and 
consisting of the stop in shipping weapons, heavy machinery and oil-drilling and the provision of credit 
and financial instruments (Kedar 2013), seriously damaged Argentina’s economic performance.  
The initial exclusion of Argentina from the membership of the IMF and the World Bank is a first 
example of the theory underlying this research. The definition of the new economic order, imposed by 
the US that surged on the global stage as the new hegemon, was based on the promotion of the US 
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dollar as the reference currency and the economic expansion of the ‘West’ fostering trade and foreign 
investment and establishing a system of fixed exchange rates in order to reduce uncertainty and 
facilitate economic transactions (Arceo 2011). A clear distinction between ‘center’ and periphery’ was 
established, with the former represented by the US and the former by developing countries which 
decided to adhere to the economic model proposed by Washington within this new liberal order. This 
mechanism of asymmetrical dependency was made explicit by the establishment of the ‘cornerstone’ of 
the IMF system: the so-called “Stand-By Arrangements” (SBAs). Created in 1952, they are the most 
important instrument to help countries in crisis solve their balance of payments problems. SBAs have a 
duration which can vary between 12 and 24 months and allow applicant countries to borrow an amount 
up to 200% of their quotas34 for any 12-month period and to have cumulative access over the life of the 
program up to 600%. When the SBA is ongoing, the country has to comply a series of conditions 
which include quantitative criteria (mainly consisting in macroeconomic adjustment), structural 
reforms, regular reviews conducted by the IMF officials (IMF 2013a).  The IMF was also based on the 
so-called “par-value system”, which consisted in an agreement signed by the member States to keep 
their currencies pegged to the US dollar, which was pegged to the gold itself.35 Moreover, the Fund’s 
resources were decided to amount to 8.8 billion US$, for which every member had to contribute in 
proportion to its economic size and power. Table 3.1.1 shows how the resources were allocated among 
the countries which adhered from the very beginning.   
Table 3.1 .1 – IMF, Original distribution of Quotas (million US$) 
Country  Quota 
Australia 200 
Belgium 225 
Bolivia 10 
Brazil 150 
Canada 300 
Chile 50 
China 550 
Colombia 50 
Costa Rica 5 
Cuba 50 
                                                          
34
 Before the system was reviewed in 2009, member States were allowed to borrow up to 100% their quotas. 
35
 Member countries were allowed to change their par value by 10% under the approval bythe IMF that had to assess 
the existence of a “fundamental disequilibrium”. 
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Czechoslovakia 125 
Denmark n.a. 
Dominican Republic 5 
Ecuador 5 
Egypt 45 
El Salvador 2.5 
Ethiopia 6 
France 450 
Greece 40 
Guatemala 5 
Haiti 5 
Honduras 2.5 
Iceland 1 
India 400 
Iran 25 
Iraq 8 
Liberia 0.5 
Luxembourg 10 
Mexico 90 
The Netherlands 275 
New Zealand 50 
Nicaragua 2 
Norway 50 
Panama 0.5 
Paraguay 2 
Peru 25 
Philippine Commonwealth 15 
Poland 125 
Union of South Africa 100 
USSR 1,200 
United Kingdom 1,300 
United States 2,750 
Uruguay 15 
Venezuela 15 
Yugoslavia 60 
Source: Kedar 2013 
The accession of Argentina into the IMF and the evolution of the relationship 
I argue that the initial delay of Argentina’s admission within the IMF is the starting point of the relative 
isolation of the country inside global economy and imposed a negative ‘bias’ on the relationship of 
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Buenos Aires with multilateral institutions that has never faded away. Argentina joined the IMF and the 
World Bank twelve years after their creation, on 20 September 1956. Before it was admitted, the South 
American country was involved in long-lasting negotiation rounds with the Fund officials, which 
culminated with the final vote of the member countries that allowed Argentina in and with the official 
payment by Buenos Aires of a US$ 150 million quota to each institution (IMF 2013).  
Argentina was ruled in that period by General Juan Domingo Perón. Recalling the features of the so-
called ‘Peronism’ is not the purpose of this chapter (see part I), but it is important to bear in mind the 
nationalist and populist approach lying at the basis of this regime, since this is very similar to today’s 
attitude shown by the ‘Kirchnerism’. After World War II in Argentina, but also in other countries of 
the region, the mainstream economic policy was based on “inward-looking” strategies, mainly relying 
on manufacturing and on the fostering of domestic industrialization as the key to develop the economy 
and to achieve sustained growth (Bulmer Thomas 2003). In order to do so, tariff and non-tariff barriers 
on trade were imposed and systems of multiple exchange rates were implemented to discourage 
imports of manufacturing products.  
These policies were clearly against the prescriptions of the IMF, which advocated further openings of 
international trade and a system of fixed exchange rates. On the other hand, it must also be recognized 
that such policies, although targeting in the opposite direction to the indications of the Fund, forced 
Latin American countries to apply for SBAs with the IMF. Inward-looking models produced severe 
distortions in the current account balance of the countries implementing them: as they were designed to 
foster industrialization, they were bound to create a wedge between domestic and international prices 
damaging, in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, agriculture and exports (Bulmer Thomas 2003).  
Therefore, in a sense it is possible to say that these economic policies were functional to the 
maintaining of a relationship of dependency between Latin American countries and the Fund, and 
Argentina provides a clear example. The need for financial assistance through the application to a SBA 
involved, as explained in the previous paragraph, the fulfillment of specific conditions and led to the 
establishment of a permanent network between Washington and Buenos Aires: IMF representatives 
were sent permanently to Argentina (as well as in other countries under SBAs programs) in order to 
provide technical assistance and to constantly monitor and report the evolution of the economic 
situation of the country to the headquarters in the US. This led to the creation of what Claudia Kedar 
calls the “routine of dependency” (2013): something that goes beyond the simple size of the loans and 
the debts accumulated by the borrowing states, but that consisted in a daily relationship between 
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Argentina and the Fund which was primarily functional and beneficial to the survival of the structure of 
global economic power and of the epistemic community of IMF and Central Bank’s officials, more 
than to the economic stabilization and growth of Argentina in itself. This “routine of dependency” 
would last for almost 50 years before being suddenly broken by Néstor Kirchner in 2005. 
Argentina and the IMF: a sequence of SBAs doomed to fail 
Arturo Frondizi, who came to power after winning the elections in 1958, was the first President of 
Argentina applying for a SBA. A member of the Unión Cívica Radical (Civic Radical Union), the second 
main party in Argentina together with the peronist Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party), he originally was 
a strong opponent to the entrance of his country into the IMF because of his nationalistic view of the 
economy. His government decided to implement a “developmentalist” model in order to foster 
economic growth. Such framework considered the deterioration of terms of trade in agriculture and 
mining products as the main source of underdevelopment in countries that were primarily engaged in 
the export of commodities. Therefore, developmentalism advocated domestic industrialization and the 
expansion of energy and transportation infrastructure. Nevertheless, this model proved to be very 
inefficient since domestic industry was unable to be competitive vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Trouble 
occurred with this strategy and the urgent need for foreign capital flowing into the country convinced 
Frondizi of the need to ask for a loan from the IMF: receiving money from a multilateral institution, of 
which Argentina was a member itself, was in fact considered a more acceptable option rather than 
allowing foreign capital through the channel of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), because the latter 
would have been considered as a form of intrusiveness and external control on the domestic economy 
(Kedar 2013).   
After this first scheme, a second SBA was signed by the government of General Juan Onganía in 1967, 
who was ruling the country on the basis of an authoritarian regime. He was followed by General Jorge 
R. Videla in 1977, during the years of the brutal military dictatorship, and then by Raúl Alfonsín, leader 
of the UCR and first President democratically elected after the regime, in 1984 and 1987. Then it was 
Carlos Saul Menem, an atypical peronist President, who further intensified the relationships of 
Argentina with the Fund by signing SBAs in 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1998. The 
increasing number of loans received by Buenos Aires was symptomatic of the deterioration of the 
financial and macroeconomic conditions of the country: the last SBA signed in 2000 by President 
Fernando de la Rua could not prevent Argentina from facing its most severe debt crisis ever, but it 
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marked the point of no return showing that the “routine of dependency” had been winding around 
itself forming a vicious circle that ended up in a tremendous economic and social crisis. 
The opening of this first credit line to Argentina implied the implementation of a stability program that 
was supposed to follow a different path from developmentalism and state interventionism, and to 
require decrease in public expenditure and further openness to external trade through the unification of 
exchange rates. Nevertheless, Argentina was never able to follow a coherent set of economic policies at 
least in a medium term view, mainly because of the political instability that dominated the country until 
the mid 1980s. On the other hand, it is also worth noting that the approach of the Fund was 
completely politically neutral, in the sense that it did not discriminate between different types of 
regimes, although they proved to be authoritarian, as in the case of the military dictatorship that ruled 
Argentina between 1976 and 1983. In this case, the government of General Jorge R. Videla decided to 
adopt ultra-liberal economic policies, following the monetarist experiment of the “Chicago Boys” 
tested in Chile, at that time ruled by the military dictator Augusto Pinochet. The military Junta 
appointed José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz as the Minister of Economy: having cultivated ties with the 
“Chicago Boys” who were operating in Chile, he implemented a massive liberalization of the economy, 
allowing foreign goods to enter the country. This led to the dismantling of the domestic industrial 
system, because the overprotection that characterized the inward-looking years and a disproportionately 
overvalued currency prevented it from achieving a good level of competitiveness. The SBA signed with 
the IMF increased the burden of Argentina’s foreign debt paving the way for the first debt crisis 
suffered by the country in the early 1980s (Bulmer Thomas 2003). After Mexico’s default on its external 
debt in 1982, the crisis spread out through the rest of Latin America, that had been relying on 
borrowings from banks in order to fill the gap in capital accumulation. Argentina adopted the same 
strategy in order to finance its domestic expenditure, and by the beginning of the 1980s it had become 
extremely dependent on loans from foreign banks (Kedar 2013). The Mexican default produced a 
freezing in the concession of loans, so that Argentina remained short of liquidity in a period where 
public spending dramatically increased because of the conflict against the United Kingdom for the 
control of the Falkland/Malvinas islands.  
The devastating conclusion of the dictatorship led, together with the restoration of democracy and the 
election as President of Raúl Alfonsín, candidate of the UCR, to an attempt of detachment from the 
dependency on the IMF. In reality, the need for external capital was still high, so the Alfonsín 
administration continued to require financial assistance by the Fund (a new SBA was negotiated in 
1984) without following its economic prescriptions. During his term, a new shift to unorthodox 
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policies was implemented: the Austral Plan of 1985 and the Plan Primavera in 1988 drastically tried to 
reduce inflation by cutting three zeros on the nominal value of the domestic currency, but none of 
them was effective in addressing hyperinflation and in preventing Argentina from asking again the 
Fund for financial assistance (de Beaufort Wijnholds 2007).  
Another economic collapse in Argentina marked the end of the UCR in power leading to the return of 
a representative of Peronism, Carlos Saúl Menem. Winner of the Presidential elections in 1989, Menem 
had formerly been the governor of La Rioja province. He immediately proved to be a sui generis follower 
of Peronism, at least with regard to the management of the economy: despite adopting the traditional 
populist attitude, he imposed a dramatic ‘u-turn’ in economic policy embracing the principles of neo-
liberalism. Menem appointed as Minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo, who implemented a 
‘shock therapy’ in order to put finally an end to the hyperinflation spiral that had been affecting the 
country for a decade. The launch of the “Convertibility Plan” in 1991, consisting of the establishment 
of a currency board that pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar at a fixed exchange rate of 1:1, 
managed to reduce the inflation rate from above 3000% in 1989 to just 0.2% in 1996 (Figure 3.1.3). 
Then, the government started a wave of privatizations and deregulation of the economy which was 
fulfilling the principles contained in the so-called “Washington Consensus”36 embraced by the IMF, the 
World Bank and the US Treasury Department. The strategy was successful in the short run since it 
allowed Argentina to obtain macroeconomic stability and to start growing again, although the 
adjustment proved to be painful for the labor force, since the level of unemployment increased from 
8% in 1989 up to 19% in 1996 (IMF 2013). The adoption of these policy measures was necessary in 
order to maintain trust by the Fund and to continue receiving financial support and technical assistance. 
That is why in June 1991 the IMF approved a new SBA for 780 million Special Drawing Rights, 
replaced in 1992 by an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of 2,438 million SDRs.37 After the EFF signed in 
1992 expired in 1996, a new SBA was granted until 1998, and upgraded to a new EFF until 2000 
(Kedar 2013). Two main drawbacks of this strategy need to be stressed. First, once again Argentina 
                                                          
36
 Coined in 1989 by John Williamson, an economist from the Institute for International Economics, the term 
“Washington Consensus” referred to a set of ten policy measures to be implemented in Latin American countries 
troubled by the debt crisis and the macroeconomic imbalances of the 1980s in order to obtain macroeconomic 
stability. The ten principles were: 1) Fiscal policy discipline 2) Reordering public expenditure priorities from non-merit 
subsidies to basic health and education infrastructure (on a pro-growth and pro-poor basis) 3) A competitive exchange 
rate 4) Tax reform 5) Liberalizing interest rates 6) Trade liberalization 7) Liberalization of Inward FDI 8) Privatization 9) 
Deregulation 10) Enforcement and respect of property rights (Williamson 2004).  
37
 EFFs were designed in 1974 to provide assistance to countries experiencing serious relatively long-term payments 
imbalances, thus providing a longer engagement than SBAs (IMF 2013d).  
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drastically changed the kind of economic model adopted: the complete opening to liberalization and 
foreign capital caused a disruption of the domestic production system, preventing the country once 
more from strengthening and safeguarding its main assets with a forward-looking strategy. Second, the 
dollarization of the economy proved to be ineffective and unsustainable in the medium run. 
Nevertheless, the “routine of dependency” between Argentina and the IMF reached during the 1990s 
its peak leading to the crisis of 2001 and to the current situation of isolation that will be analyzed in the 
next section.  
The irreversible convertibility with the US dollar, albeit helping Argentina freeze the unstoppable rise 
of prices at the beginning of the 1990s, seriously affected the international competitiveness of the 
country, leading soon to a new slowdown of growth and to external vulnerability with respect to the 
neighbor countries. Lack of coordination with other Latin American countries like Brazil, which 
devalued its currency in 1998 leading to a misalignment of the bilateral exchange rate (see chapter 2.2), 
provoked shocks consisting of a fall in Argentina’s terms of trade and a tightening of external credit 
markets. Moreover, the insufficient degree of international openness of Argentina, together with the 
constraints in the exploitation of its comparative advantages in agricultural goods (represented by the 
highly protective agricultural policies adopted in the US and the EU, Fanelli 2003), further damaged the 
economic performance of the country, which got stuck in a new recession by the end of the 1990s 
(Figure 3.1.4). In other words, the reduction of the demand for foreign exchange due to a fall of 
international competitiveness and the parallel mounting-demand for short-term financing triggered a 
‘twin-crisis’ in Argentina (Fanelli 2007), contributing to garble more and more the dependency on the 
IMF.             
Figure 3.1.3 – Argentina, Inflation rate  (% average values, 1985-2002) 
 
Source: IMF 
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Figure 3.1.4 – Argentina’s real GDP growth before and during the Convertibility era (% 
average values, 1985-2002) 
 
Source: IMF 
The legacy left by Carlos Menem to the new President elected in 1999, Fernando de la Rúa, was not 
very promising: sky-rocketing foreign debt and reduced access to financing were the most evident signs 
of a serious deterioration of Argentina’s external position, as well as a 7.2 billion US$ fiscal deficit was 
warning that also the internal situation was turning really bad. Instead of concluding the experience of 
the Convertibility Plan, the new government kept on pursuing the same strategy trying to implement a 
plan of fiscal austerity made up by public expenditure cuts and tax increases (the so-called impuestazo). 
In order to cope with its increasing indebtedness, Argentina signed in March a new three-year SBA of 
7.2 billion US$, which had to be upgraded in January 2001 since it became clear that the county would 
not be able to meet its fiscal targets. A rescue package 39.7 billion US$ worth, including also 
supplementary financing from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, Spain and 
other commercial banks, was signed, representing the largest effort ever made by the IMF (Kedar 
2013). However, the perseverance of the IMF in providing assistance to Argentina can be compared to 
a doctor trying to reanimate a patient who is already dead and a last 7 billion US$ upgrade to the SBA 
in September 2001 could not avoid de la Rúa’s resignation and prevent Argentina’s government from 
declaring the default on its external debt on 24 December 2001.  
This epilogue represents the worst and least effective part of the troubled relationship of Argentina 
with the IMF described so far. Once again, mistakes from both sides were made revealing a quite 
surprising lack of any ‘learning-by-doing’ process both in Argentina’s and IMF’s officials. First of all, 
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the currency board should have been abandoned much earlier, once macroeconomic stabilization had 
been achieved. In order to keep such an exchange rate policy sustainable, a high degree of 
macroeconomic coordination with the country which currency is pegged to should be pursued in terms 
of inflation preferences and bilateral trade (de Beaufort Wjinholds 2003). The hard peg and the 
inflexible nominal wages and prices, together with a shock in the terms of trade, were the main source 
of severe macroeconomic imbalances (Perry and Servén 2003). Once confidence in a currency board 
regime wanes, the risk of a crisis is greater than under a floating exchange rate regime, leading to severe 
capital outflows and dramatic losses in foreign reserves in order to maintain the strict parity. Moreover, 
the IMF focused too much on central government’s deficit, without paying enough attention to the 
general government deficit, given the fact that public spending was constantly increasing in Argentina’s 
provinces (de Beaufort Wjinholds 2003).  
Forty-five years of a discussed relationship culminated in a dramatic failure of the program of financial 
and technical assistance provided by the IMF to a developing country. Domestic and external factors 
have to be investigated among the reasons why this “routine of dependency” led to the creation of a 
vicious, rather than a virtuous, circle. Political instability is the main reason that helps explain why 
Argentina was never able to put in place economic policies durable and sustainable at least in the 
medium run. Alternative economic models were implemented almost interchangeably without giving 
the domestic production system the opportunity to structurally adapt to the changes imposed from 
above and to gain in efficiency and international competitiveness. On the external side, lack of 
flexibility from the Fund in putting its ‘adjustment recipes’ into practice inevitably led to the failure of 
its prescriptions in such a peculiar case like Argentina. Next section will analyze the evolution of the 
relationship between Buenos Aires and the IMF and what are the long-run results of the current 
situation, in light of the troubled story of the past 50 years.    
3.1.3 The Kirchner era and the ‘divorce’ with the IMF 
The beginning of a new attitude 
Eduardo Duhalde was appointed President of Argentina by the Parliament in January 2002 after one 
month of high political and social instability following the shock caused by the imposition of the 
corralito (the possibility to withdraw only a small amount of money from ATM machines in order to 
avoid a run on bank deposits). He had no other option but revoking the Convertibility Law, allowing 
the peso to float and to devaluate vis-à-vis the US dollar. In the short run, Duhalde could not prevent 
Argentina from suffering from the heaviest recession ever (-10.9% of GDP in 2002), but from 2003 the 
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country started growing again at an unprecedented pace (an average of 8.5% between 2003 and 2008, 
Figure 3.1.5). The internal devaluation, together with the favorable international situation in the 
financial markets represented by high prices of agricultural commodities, helped Argentina rapidly 
recover thanks to an impressive boost of exports and a consequent accumulation of foreign reserves.  
Figure 3.1.5 - Argentina’s real GDP growth after the Convertibility (% values, 2001-2014*) 
 
Source: IMF *2013-2014: forecasts 
The relationship with the Fund was not over yet. In January 2003 the IMF approved another SBA of 
2.9 billion US$ for a short period of 8 months, necessary to cover the forthcoming financial 
obligations. The new agreement did not provide new net financing but extended payment expectations, 
also unlocking further loans from other multilateral organizations dedicated to social programs (IMF 
Survey 2003). Things changed radically after the new elections in April 2003, unexpectedly won by an 
outsider of the Peronism, the former governor of the Santa Cruz province Néstor Kirchner. A very 
different personality from his opponent Carlos Menem (who withdrew his candidacy after winning the 
first round with a very short margin), Kirchner embodied many of the traditional features of Peronism: 
economic nationalism and political populism. This is why his political discourse was characterized for 
being strongly critical towards the multilateral financial institutions, that in his view had led not only 
Argentina but other Latin American countries to suffer from economic and social crises. Kirchner’s 
government wanted to impress a radical change from the neo-liberal economic policies implemented by 
Menem under the supervision of the IMF and took advantage of the good economic situation in order 
to reaffirm Argentina’s full sovereignty (Correa da Silva 2012). The new President was also helped and 
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backed by the renewed political environment of Latin America, characterized by a predominance of 
left-wing leaders who developed a strong critical debate towards multilateral institutions inasmuch 
‘under the imperialist control of the US’. Tensions between the government of Buenos Aires and 
Washington increased as Kirchner used to criticize the IMF in multilateral fora (for instance at the 
United Nations) and the Fund expected Argentina to undertake measures to restructure its debt and 
embark on structural reforms (Kedar 2013). On 5 January 2006 Argentina unilaterally decided to fully 
repay its debt with the IMF for an amount of 8.98 million of Special Drawing Rights (9.8 billion US$), 
thus putting an end to its financial dependency on the Fund. This allowed Argentina save 842 million 
US$ in interest payments, but it represented at the same time a substantial detachment of Buenos Aires 
from Washington. The decision taken by the Kirchner government simply followed what Luis Inácio 
‘Lula’ da Silva, President of Brazil, did a few days before repaying in full the last loan received  by the 
IMF. Both repayments were welcomed by the Fund, as can be noted from the statement of the then 
Managing Director Rodrigo de Rato. “The decision made by Argentina’s authorities – he said – reflects 
their confidence that their external position is sufficiently strong to warrant early repayment. (…) We 
remain ready to assist the Argentine authorities in any way that would help them address the important 
challenges that lie ahead” (IMF Survey 2006). This statement diplomatically hid a certain amount of 
skepticism towards Argentina’s ability to ‘walk on its own legs’ and offered the country the opportunity 
to keep on receiving financial assistance. Nevertheless,  Kirchner’s sudden decision clearly signaled that 
the “routine of dependency” was at its end, symbolizing the final outcome of a complicated 
relationship characterized by failures more than successes.  
Argentina and the IMF in the present context: does detachment mean isolation?  
Much has changed in the global economic environment during the past few years. Especially after the 
financial crisis in 2008, the process of redistribution of power has accelerated and, in parallel to this, 
also a redefinition of global economic governance and institutions is being implemented. The 
governance of the IMF has also been changing in a more ‘democratic’ and inclusive sense, with a 
sensible redistribution of quotas and voting powers in favor of developing countries.  
How is Argentina positioned in this different and evolving scenario? As said in the previous paragraph, 
the country has stopped being a debtor to the Fund since the end of 2005. As of October 31, 2013, 
Argentina’s position in the Fund consists of a quota measured in 2,117 million SDRs. These holdings 
correspond to 0.89% of the total and account for a voting power measured in 21,908 votes (0.87% of 
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total votes).38 The size of Argentina’s quota can be compared to that one of a medium-sized European 
country (e.g. Austria and Denmark), while Brazil, a neighbor country which has a much bigger 
economic size, has a quota equal to 1.79 of total.39  
After repaying its debt with the IMF, Argentina’s detachment from the multilateral financial institution 
started to increase. My purpose here is not to argue that the end of the financial dependency of 
Argentina on the Fund was negative; on the contrary, if considered per se, it is a clear example of the 
improved macroeconomic conditions of the country. Nevertheless, Kirchner’s unilateral action also had 
a strong political meaning, in the sense that it showed Argentina’s refusal to the system embodied by 
the Bretton Woods institutions. A second step taken from Argentina in the opposite direction of the 
IMF was the refusal to comply with the annual “Article IV consultations”. This is a process of 
evaluation of any Fund’s member account, through which the IMF tries to assess the economic health 
and to forestall future financial problems. It is a sort of a ‘mutual vigilance’ that all member States agree 
to when joining the Fund. According to Article VIII/Section 5 (General obligations of members – 
furnishing of information) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF: 
“The Fund may require members to furnish it with such information as it deems necessary for its 
activities, including, as the minimum necessary for the effective discharge of the Fund’s duties, national 
data on the following matters: 
(i) official holdings at home and abroad of (1) gold, (2) foreign exchange; 
(ii) holdings at home and abroad by banking and financial agencies, other than official agencies, of 
(1) gold, (2) foreign exchange; 
(iii) production of gold; 
(iv) gold exports and imports according to countries of destination and origin; 
(v) total exports and imports of merchandise, in terms of local currency values, according to 
countries of destination and origin; 
                                                          
38
 The voting system within the IMF works as follows. Each member has a number of ‘basic votes’ (each member’s 
number of basic votes equals 5.5% of total votes), plus one additional vote for each SDR of 100,000 of a member’s 
country quota.  
39
 Information available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf 
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(vi) international balance of payments, including (1) trade in goods and services, (2) gold 
transactions, (3) known capital transactions, and (4) other items; 
(vii) international investment position, i.e., investments within the territories of the member owned 
abroad and investments abroad owned by persons in its territories so far as it is possible to furnish 
this information; 
(viii) national income; 
(ix) price indices, i.e., indices of commodity prices in wholesale and retail markets and of export and 
import prices; 
(x) buying and selling rates for foreign currencies; 
(xi) exchange controls, i.e., a comprehensive statement of exchange controls in effect at the time of 
assuming membership in the Fund and details of subsequent changes as they occur; and 
(xii) where official clearing arrangements exist, details of amounts awaiting clearance in respect of 
commercial and financial transactions, and of the length of time during which such arrears have 
been outstanding. 
(b) In requesting information the Fund shall take into consideration the varying ability of members 
to furnish the data requested. Members shall be under no obligation to furnish information in such 
detail that the affairs of individuals or corporations are disclosed. Members undertake, however, to 
furnish the desired information in as detailed and accurate a manner as is practicable and, so far as 
possible, to avoid mere estimates. 
(c) The Fund may arrange to obtain further information by agreement with members. It shall act as 
a centre for the collection and exchange of information on monetary and financial problems, thus 
facilitating the preparation of studies designed to assist members in developing policies which 
further the purposes of the Fund” (IMF 2011). 
Argentina submitted the information required for the Article IV procedure for the last time in 2006, 
right after repaying its debt with the Fund. In the Public Information Notice (PIN) released by the 
institution after completing the monitoring procedure, it is possible to find some very positive remarks 
acknowledging the improvement of the economic conditions of the country. “Net private capital 
flows” it is contained in the PIN “turned in positive in 2005 for the first time since 1999. The post-
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crisis fiscal adjustment is historically unprecedented. In 2005, the overall cash surplus of the 
consolidated government was 2.5% of GDP, underpinned by strong revenue performance (…) The 
exchange rate has remained stable amid sustained intervention by the Central Bank. Interest rates have 
risen gradually as bank lending has recovered and liquidity conditions have normalized. (…) There has 
been a demonstrable improvement in social conditions. By end-2005, the poverty rate has declined to 
34% from the peak of 57% reached in 2002(…)” (IMF 2006). However, some potential elements of 
warning are mentioned, first of all the worrisome increase of inflation, that “(…) has risen steadily at 
12.3%. (…) Provincial primary spending has been rising even more rapidly (around 19% in real terms 
in 2005) (…) (the provinces) moved into primary deficit in the second half of 2005” (IMF 2006). In 
conclusion, the Executive Board Assessment welcomed the strong growth performance recorded by 
Argentina, but at the same time urged the implementation of a “different policy mix and reforms to 
promote investment and supply, especially in areas where bottlenecks are of macroeconomic 
significance” (IMF 2006).  
Nowadays, Argentina is the only G20 country that does not comply with the “Article IV” consultations 
and has been adopting the same behavior as Venezuela, although the latter is not part of the G20. 
Parallel to the failure to comply with the consultations, Argentina has also started disclosing official 
statistic information which has been considered unreliable and accusations to manipulate data on GDP 
and Consumer Price Index have been addressed by the IMF to Argentina’s government. In particular, 
official figures released by the National Institute of Statistics (INDEC) would portray a better domestic 
economic situation than it actually is. Since 2007, doubts on the reliability of inflation data arose, 
because numbers provided by INDEC started to be considered well below the real values. In other 
words, political opportunity calculations would have pushed the government to the decision of 
‘cheating’ on the data in order not to show that inflation was already rising above ‘safety’ levels and, 
instead of being stable on values between 10-13% per year (as officially reported), it was estimated sky-
rocketing up to 25-30%. Such data drastically change the picture of real economic growth in Argentina, 
since a sustained increase in prices, well above the growth of nominal GDP, implies a reduced growth 
per capita in real terms. The IMF repeatedly warned Argentina on the importance of providing reliable 
data, as can be seen in the statement released by the IMF Executive Board on 1 February 2012. In this 
document, the Fund regrets “the absence of progress in aligning the quality of the official data reported 
to the Fund for the Consumer Price Index for Greater Buenos Aires (CPI-GBA) and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) with international statistic guidelines”. Therefore, the Board approved a decision calling 
on Argentina to “adopt specific measures within a period of 180 days” (IMF 2012a). In September 
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2012 a new statement by the Executive Board acknowledged that no substantial progress had been 
made in improving the quality of the information provided, threatening the possibility of undertaking 
further measures or negative sanctions against Argentina (IMF 2012b). In the meantime, at the IMF 
International Monetary and Financial Committee in April 2012, the then Argentina’s Minister of 
Economy, Hernán Lorenzino mentioned the commitment of his country to work together with the 
IMF in order to build a better Consumer Price Index and, referring to his country’s economic situation, 
criticized the Fund’s decision of including Argentina within the list of “overheating economies” in the 
World Economic Outlook issued in spring 2012. “Overheating is not a risk that can be placed at the 
same level as high indebtedness, reluctant growth and high unemployment. Countries like Argentina, 
with 80 percent productive capacity utilization, 6.7 percent unemployment and high investment rates 
should not be considered as overheated” (IMF 2012c).40 Again, it is useful to have a look at Minister 
Lorenzino’s speech at the following International Monetary and Financial Committee, in October 2012. 
In this occasion, he mentions the CPI only once, saying that “(…) we (Argentina) benefit from 
technical assistance from the IMF to develop a new CPI index on a national basis (…)” (International 
Monetary and Financial Committee 2012). Despite this reconciliatory statement, Argentina’s effort to 
provide better quality data was still considered too poor by the IMF, which decided to adopt a 
declaration of censure against the country on 1 February 2013 as “(…) the Executive Board found that 
Argentina’s progress in implementing the remedial measures (…) has not been sufficient. (…) The 
Managing Director is required to report to the Executive Board by November 13, 2013 on the status of 
Argentina’s implementation of the above remedial measures (…)” (IMF 2013c). What consequences 
could this decision imply? In theory, sanctions may be imposed, such as the loss of borrowing rights, 
the loss of voting rights, and culminate with the expulsion of Argentina from the organization (Webber 
2013). Lack of trust in data provided by Argentina’s government was shown also by independent 
economists and media. The example of a magazine like The Economist is clear at this respect: since 
February 2013, it stopped publishing data on inflation about Argentina from official sources, replacing 
them with CPI provided by an independent American society, Price Stats (The Economist 2013). 
Figure 3.1.6 shows the difference between inflation estimated on a monthly basis from 2008 to March 
2013 by the INDEC and that one estimated by Price Stats. Figures provide by the latter reveal a much 
                                                          
40
 Overheating risk takes into account the excess in standard deviation for domestic variables as the output relative to 
trend, the output gap, unemployment, inflation, external variables as terms of trade, capital inflows, current account, 
and financial ones like credit growth, house prices and equity prices. According to the WEO issue of Spring 2012, 
Argentina’s risk of overheating was mainly due to a too high variation in the output relative to trend, unemployment 
and inflation (IMF 2012c).   
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higher rise in consumer prices, which reflect, on a cumulative basis, on an annual average increase 
around 25%. 
Figure 3.1.6 – Argentina, monthly CPI, INDEC vs Price Stats  
(% values, January 2008 – March 2013) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author on INDEC, Price Stats data 
No official reactions from the Government followed this statement, although in previous occasions 
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner had blamed the IMF for pushing faulty economic policies 
and treated the relationship with the organization as irrelevant (Webber 2013a). Also, in a vigorous 
speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2012, Kirchner attacked the IMF 
Managing Director Christine Lagarde claiming full sovereignty and independence of Argentina from 
the Fund (Mercopress 2012). Nevertheless, Argentina’s embarrassment in front of this issue is quite 
evident, given country officials’ discomfort in addressing domestic inflation in public, as evident from 
the difficulty shown by Minister Lorenzino in answering to a Greek journalist about CPI in Argentina 
(Webber 2013b).  
3.1.4 Conclusion: from the “routine of dependency” to... a “routine of detachment”?   
In this chapter I took the evolution of the relationship between Argentina and the IMF as an example 
of how the country is positioning itself within the framework of global economy. I argue it is quite 
interesting and useful to analyze this pattern because linkages between Buenos Aires and the financial 
0.00% 
0.50% 
1.00% 
1.50% 
2.00% 
2.50% 
3.00% 
3.50% 
ja
n
-0
8
 
ap
r-
0
8
 
lu
g-
0
8
 
o
tt
-0
8
 
ge
n
-0
9
 
ap
r-
0
9
 
lu
g-
0
9
 
o
tt
-0
9
 
ge
n
-1
0
 
ap
r-
1
0
 
lu
g-
1
0
 
o
tt
-1
0
 
ge
n
-1
1
 
ap
r-
1
1
 
lu
g-
1
1
 
o
tt
-1
1
 
ge
n
-1
2
 
ap
r-
1
2
 
lu
g-
1
2
 
o
tt
-1
2
 
ge
n
-1
3
 
Price Stats 
INDEC 
153 
 
153 
 
institution trace back in the 1940s, so that it is possible to have a long-term period of Argentina’s 
inclusion in the international economic context.  
Initially excluded from the membership in the Bretton Woods institutions, Argentina then established a 
“routine of dependency” (Kedar 2013) with the IMF, having to apply - on a quite regular basis – for 
Stand-By Agreeements in order to solve its macroeconomic imbalances. Both internal problems, 
represented by political instability which reflected into the cyclical implementation and dismissal of 
incoherent economic policies, and external ones, as the Fund’s inability to adopt flexibility in its 
financial assistance and to anticipate that such policies as the “Convertibility Plan” in the 1990s were 
unsustainable in the long run, are the sources of the final outcome, represented by the drastic 
detachment of Argentina from the IMF.  
Despite the huge progress made by Argentina over the course of the last decade, in terms of economic 
growth, reduction of macroeconomic imbalances, social inclusion and fight against poverty, the 
progressive isolation the country is adopting within the Fund can be a strategic mistake for the role and 
leadership can play in the redefinition of global economic governance. In the current period, 
characterized by a transition from an asymmetric world dominated by the US economic supremacy to a 
multipolar scheme where regional powers can have their say (Tentori and Zandonini 2013), being ‘part 
of the game’ should be an imperative for a country like Argentina that is also member of the G20. 
However, while Brazil is playing a much more active role in the IMF, being a promoter of the quota-
scheme reform, Argentina has preferred to adopt a critical position, aligning itself to the position of 
Venezuela.  
The relatively small economic power of Argentina (compared to Brazil and Mexico in the rest of the 
Latin American region) should rather induce the local government to play a more active part in these 
institutions in order to be able to exert a stronger influence and to be involved in addressing global 
economic governance. Nevertheless, internal political calculations, represented by the need to maintain 
consensus of the population against political opponents in view of the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections, are more likely to increase this new “routine of detachment”, as I shall define it. Potential 
new economic troubles (commodity prices expected to fall down, inflation rising, foreign currency 
reserves deteriorating) might put Argentina in the position to ask for external financial assistance 
again.Should Buenos Aires find itself in the position of a “pariah in the world economy” (Brandt and 
Erixon 2013a), it might prove very difficult to ‘keep on track’ in the forthcoming years.  
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3.2. Argentina and the G20: the risk of isolation and irrelevance 
3.2.1 Structure of the chapter 
Among the global multilateral organizations, the Group of 20, better known as the G20, is the most 
recent. Since its inception as a ‘leaders-forum’ in 2008, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the 
G20 has shown a reasonable degree of effectiveness in addressing the severe macroeconomic 
imbalances unveiled by the crisis. Characterized by a low level of bureaucracy and institutionalization, it 
takes place with an annual summit of the leaders of the 20 members (19 States from all the continents 
plus the European Union). However, the annual meeting is just the tip of the iceberg of an intense 
preparatory work developed by the so-called “sherpas”, which meet regularly over the course of the year.  
Argentina is a member of the G20 together with Brazil and Mexico among Latin American countries. 
Being part of such a new and important forum should have made Argentina willing to play an active 
and collaborative role, but the attitude the country has adopted during these years reveals at least a 
problematic approach towards the decisions taken within the organization. A low rate of compliance 
with the decisions approved, together with lack of collaboration with other financial institutions 
(especially the International Monetary Fund, as I showed in the previous chapter), resulted in a 
progressive detachment of Argentina from the organization, up to the point that proposals for its 
expulsion have been pushed forward by some States. The vacant seat might be filled by Chile that, on 
the contrary, has been recently admitted in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and is considered a ‘model’ for complying to the economic policies of the 
current global order. 
What can the consequences of this ‘irrational’ attitude be for Argentina? Isolation in the redefinition of 
global economic governance can be detrimental for the country’s economic performance but also for 
the role it can potentially play on the global stage. This chapter will provide an introductory section on 
the G20, recalling the main stages of its still recent history, the internal functioning and the outcomes 
achieved so far. It will then offer a case study on the role of Argentina, in order to show the 
disappointing contribution of the country to the progress of the organization. Literature sources, as 
well as official documents, will be used in order to support the hypothesis formulated in the above. 
3.2.2 The G20: an organization searching for legitimacy and effectiveness 
A bit of history – From the G20 Finance to the G20 “2.0” 
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Global economic multilateralism had been negatively affected over the course of the past decade by 
several factors. On one hand, the standstill in the negotiation process of the Doha Round within the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) stopped the multilateral liberalization of international trade. This 
was mainly due to disagreements between ‘Western’ and developing countries on agricultural issues. On 
the other hand, the increasing use of bilateral and regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) helped 
increase trade liberalization, but at the same time complicated economic relationships at the global level 
leading to a situation defined as a “spaghetti bowl” (Bhagwati 1995). Moreover, when the financial 
crisis broke out in 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers spreading all over the world, severe 
macroeconomic imbalances among countries, in terms of current account imbalances and 
misalignments in the exchange rates, determined by a lack of coordination became evident.  
In other words, it was clear that an improvement in global economic governance was needed. 
Nevertheless, ‘traditional’ International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other multilateral organizations 
had proved to be inefficient and in need for reform. The existence of a trade-off between ‘universalism’ 
and efficiency was quite evident: the broader the membership becomes, the higher the probability that 
an organization’s internal governance is doomed to be little effective (Table 3.2.1). 
Table 3.2.1 – Universalism vs. efficiency in international organizations 
UNIVERSAL 
 
 
 
 
 
EFFICIENT 
 UN General Assembly 
 WTO 
 IMF and World Bank 
 G20 
 UN Security Council 
 G8 
 “G1” (i.e. unilateralism) 
Source: Chatham House 2013 
Organizations characterized by a limited and selected number of members and by a lower degree of 
bureaucratization and institutionalization can react more quickly to external stimulus and take decisions 
in a more rapid and effective way. This helps explain why the WTO and the IMF went through a phase 
of internal paralysis: their governance framework was not able anymore to respond to the deep and fast 
changes that the global economy was experiencing. 
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In response to these problems and challenges unveiled by the global crisis of 2008, the Group of 20 
(G20) was meant to be the new key multilateral economic and financial forum and a sort of a ‘new 
club’ at the heart of the process of reform in global governance (Subacchi and Pickford 2011). In 
reality, the G20 was created in the occasion of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 as a meeting 
between Finance Ministers of the member States. The idea, pushed forward by Paul Martin of Canada 
and Larry Summers of the United States, was to establish a forum for exchanging views between 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of advanced and emerging markets, thus extending the 
membership of the G7 meetings between the financial representatives of the seven most industrialized 
nations (Pickford 2013). The inaugural meeting took place in Berlin in December 1999. Criteria 
adopted to choose the members do not necessarily include the economic size, in terms of the country’s 
GDP, but also the geographic position (in order to have a balanced representation among the different 
regions) and the notion of “systemically important countries”. This is why countries with a potentially 
relevant economic and financial impact on other countries were invited at the table, also countries that 
could be defined as potentially “problematic” for the global economic system, namely Argentina and 
Turkey (Cooper and Thakur 2013). Table 3.2.2 shows the list of the 19 member States plus the 
European Union. 
Table 3.2.2 – The G20 members 
Region Country 
Africa South Africa 
North America United States 
Canada 
 Mexico 
South America Brazil 
Argentina 
Asia China 
Japan 
Indonesia 
India 
South Korea 
Eurasia Russia 
Turkey 
European Union 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Middle East Saudi Arabia 
Oceania Australia 
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The need for innovative policy responses was made urgent by the worse than expected outcome 
obtained by the coordinated action between the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank. The macroeconomic conditions advocated in response to the financial bubble burst in East Asia 
after a strong speculative attack against the Thai baht included higher interest rates and low inflation 
targets, but the net effect of these ‘austerity’ measures was deflationary, thus leading to a recessionary 
cycle in those economies (Cooper and Thakur 2013). This is another case that shows how responses 
coordinated by the IMF proved to be ineffective in addressing macroeconomic crises: as described in 
the previous chapter, in the occasion of the crisis in Argentina, the same solutions were applied to cope 
with a different problem (an overvalued currency and public spending running out of control). This led 
to a failure.  
One important step forward made by the newly-established G20 was the creation of the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF), which took shape in April 1999. The purpose of the FSF was to enhance 
cooperation among the various national and international supervisory bodies and international financial 
institutions so as to promote stability in the international financial system, in accordance with the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS).41 Nevertheless, the actions undertaken to shape this body were still 
quite ‘conservative’ and ‘orthodox’, since membership was reserved to the G7 finance ministers and 
central bank governors.  
Another element that might have prevented the G20 Finance from achieving a satisfactory degree level 
of effectiveness is its dependency on the United States. The purpose of this chapter is far from 
criticizing the role of Washington as a global economic leader, but as some scholars pointed out, the 
US was the real and only force behind the scenes of this process. In other words, the US wanted to 
deliver the outcome of reform without the impression of unilateralism: “The dominant state takes care 
to secure the acquiescence of other states according to a hierarchy of powers within the inter-state 
structure of hegemony. Some second-rank countries are consulted first and their support is secured. 
The consent or at least some of the more peripheral countries is solicited” (Cox 1993). This is why, 
despite a more ‘democratic’ decision-making procedure (according to the principle ‘one head one vote’ 
and differently from the IMF quota system) and the establishment of a hosting function on a rotating 
basis, depth and effectiveness of the G20 Finance was limited. 
                                                          
41
 Information on the FSF available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm 
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The crisis that broke out in the US in September 2008, after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers bank, 
and that rapidly spread all over the world revealing the failure of the financial globalization, made clear 
that new ways to address the challenges posed by the global economy with coordinated responses were 
needed. Hence, the idea of upgrading the G20 finance to a sort of ‘G20 2.0’, where the member States 
would have been represented by their leaders. The idea was proposed for the first time in 2004 at the 
Davos Forum jointly by Canada’s Prime Minister Paul Martin who, together the US Treasury Secretary 
Lawrence Summers, contributed in 1999 to the launch of the G20 Finance (Cooper and Thakur 2013).  
The first G20 meeting where the countries’ leaders took part was in Washington DC in November 
2008. In 2009 and 2010 summits were held twice a year because of the emergency situation of the 
global economy; after the recovery started to take place at the world level, annual meetings have been 
held. Table 3.2.3 summarizes the summits that have taken place so far and explains what countries will 
host the future summits that have already been scheduled. It is worth to remember that meetings are 
now chaired on a rotational basis.   
Table 3.2.3 – The G20 summits (2008-2015) 
Date Venue 
November 2008 Washington DC, US 
April 2009 London, UK 
September 2009 Pittsburgh, US 
June 2010 Toronto, Canada 
November 2010 Seul, Korea 
November 2011 Cannes, France 
June 2012 Los Cabos, Mexico 
June 2013 St. Petersburg, Russia 
2014 Australia 
2015 Turkey 
Source: www.g20.org 
Considered all together, these countries accounted in 2012 for 75.4% of world GDP (personal 
elaboration on IMF data). They represent indeed most of the global economy, although the shares and 
weights of this economic power are held quite disproportionately among them: on one hand the US 
and China account respectively by 21.9% and 11.5% of world GDP, on the other hand 7 countries 
represent less than 2% of world GDP (Figure 3.2.1 and 3.2.2).  
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Figure 3.2.1 – The GDP of G20 members (billion US$, 2012) 
 
Source: IMF 
Figure 3.2.2 – G20 member countries’ shares of World GDP (% values, 2012) 
 
Source: IMF 
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At the meetings several issues were addressed. The agenda of the G20 started becoming broader and 
broader, tackling also environmental issues such as the climate change or energy issues. The risk of a 
trade-off between effectiveness and comprehensiveness is therefore evident. Nevertheless, the ‘core’ 
economic issues can be listed as follows: macro actions, financial stability and reforms, International 
Financial Institutions finance and firewalls, IFI reform, growth, jobs and structural reforms, 
development, trade (Pickford 2013). According to this taxonomy, the most important results were 
achieved at Washington, London, Pittsburgh and Cannes. 
The first summit in Washington led to a commitment towards “closer cooperation on fiscal, monetary 
and financial stabilization” (G20 Washington Final Declaration 2008). An action plan on financial 
regulation and supervision was adopted, leading to a regulatory cooperation, and an expansion of the 
Financial Stability Facility was agreed, paving the way towards a cooperation of the latter with the IMF. 
With respect to international trade, a general commitment to “an open and global economy” was re-
launched, together with the promise to revive the WTO Doha Round, at that time at a standstill.  
The main achievement of the London summit was the establishment of the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB). Born as an upgrade of the Financial Stability Facility, the FSB has been created to “coordinate at 
the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard setting 
bodies and to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other 
financial sector policies”.42 National central banks, Finance Ministries and banking regulatory 
committees are represented within the Board, whose mandate mainly consists in the assessment of 
vulnerabilities for the global financial system, promotion of coordination and information exchange 
among authorities responsible for financial stability, collaboration with the IMF.  
The Pittsburgh summit was characterized by the collective commitment on achieving “strong, sustained 
and balanced growth”, which has become the ‘motto’ of the G20 since then (Zandonini 2013). The 
G20 was also designated as “the premier forum for our international economic cooperation”, as can be 
read in the Final Declaration. In order to implement and achieve sustained growth through cooperation 
a new tool was created, the so-called Mutual Assessment Process (MAP). The MAP is carried on in 
collaboration with the IMF, which provides technical analysis to evaluate key imbalances and how 
members’ policies fit together (IMF 2013e). Through the MAP, the member States agree to share 
                                                          
42
 See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm 
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information with each other and the Fund about their policy plans and expected performance over the 
next 3-5 years, while the IMF has to assess the potential global implications (IMF 2013e). The latest 
Umbrella Report, released by the IMF in 2012, warned about the risks of a new recessionary phase in 
many countries of the European Union (which eventually took place) and underlined the importance of 
enhancing coordination among all members, especially in terms of current account balance: in order to 
facilitate the process of fiscal consolidation in deficit economies, more action was required to surplus 
economies to facilitate demand rebalancing by addressing domestic distortions (IMF 2012d). 
More emphasis on growth was put at the G20 summit in Cannes, in October 2011. The “Action Plan 
for Growth and Jobs” was launched, on the basis of the new difficult economic situation that the Euro 
Area was going to face, given that some of its most important countries were going to be affected by a 
double-dipped recession (especially Italy and Spain). It was agreed that medium term foundations for 
growth had to be based on an enduring commitment to fiscal consolidation, the boost of private 
demand in countries with a current account surplus, structural reforms to raise job creation, strengthen 
reform of national financial systems, measures to promote free trade and development (G20 Cannes 
2011). This strategy was upgraded during the G20 summit in Las Cabos, Mexico, hosted for the first 
time by an emerging country.  The countries agreed on assessing progress made on the Action Plan on 
the basis of a framework consisting of three pillars: consistency and fairness of the review process; a 
peer review process; annual reports to the leaders summarizing the outcomes of the assessments (G20 
Los Cabos 2012a).  
A new set of priorities has been decided for the G20 in St. Petersburg, Russia. The summit took place 
in September 2013 and it was based on growth through quality jobs and investment, trust and 
transparency, effective regulation. The emphasis on growth seems to be the common thread of the last 
meetings, but another element that deserves to be mentioned is the stronger link to the G8. In fact, the 
2013 meeting that took place in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, focused on the importance of restoring 
growth through an environment based on transparency. A comparison and an analysis of the potential 
interactions between the two fora goes beyond the scope of this chapter, but bridging the gap between 
the G8 and the G20 might help increase further the coordination between advanced and developing 
economies (Zandonini 2013). However, at the G20 leaders meeting in St. Petersburg the economic 
issues were overshadowed by the debate between the US and Russia on the opportunity and legitimacy 
of a military action against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad: something that goes much beyond the 
scopes for which the G20 had been originally created. The final declaration, approved at the end of the 
summit, contains a joint commitment to foster economic growth through the channels of 
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macroeconomic and financial stability (the fight against financial fragmentation with the full 
enforcement of the Banking Union in the EU is the most important example with respect to this), fiscal 
transparency, and the promotion of a new round of multilateralism in international trade. In this sense, 
the forthcoming Ministerial Conference of the WTO, that will take place in December 2013 in Bali, is 
considered as a potential turning point to restore multilateral talks that take into account also the 
importance of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) (G20 St. Petersburg 2013).  
A successful history? 
Originally established as a forum for national Finance Ministers and Central Bank governors, the G20 
was elevated to a leaders-level organization in November 2008. After initial successes in addressing and 
coordinating a global response to the economic and financial crisis, its effectiveness seems to be waning 
for different reasons: a reduced sense of urgency, a ‘nationalization’ of the problems, which are not 
perceived as strictly global anymore, and flaws in the decision-making process, that often tend to result 
in ‘lowest common denominator’ agreements (Pickford 2013). 
In the current situation, characterized by rapid changes in the structure and the distribution of global 
economic power, an organization like the G20 is necessary to address these changes and foster the 
implementation of new global governance based on inclusiveness, ownership shared by members and 
coordinated actions. Nevertheless, improvements to its working methods are needed: the continued 
broadening of the agenda prevented the organization from achieving tangible and deep results in all of 
the issues covered during the meetings. Therefore, it would be better to limit the scope of the G20 to 
macroeconomic and financial coordination (Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry 2012).  
Also, the trade-off between legitimacy and effectiveness should be addressed as soon as possible. G20 
members, as systemically important countries, should be more proactive in pushing for further reforms 
to the governance of IFIs, which would help make the IMF and the WB more representative and act as 
a counterbalance to the G20’s limited membership (Subacchi and Pickford 2011).  
Last but not least, strategies to bridge the gap between the G8 and the G20 should be pursued. Areas 
of overlapping and complementarity exist between the two fora, so that a coordinated action between 
the two of them might increase the degree of effectiveness (Kirton 2013). 
The G20 represents a unique opportunity to address the changes in global economic relations through 
coordination and cooperation instead of conflict. But its structure and functioning have to be 
strengthened to deploy all its potential. Whether the G20 will lose efficiency is one of its main future 
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risks. An excessive enlargement of its agenda, as recently witnessed by the summit in Russia, might 
upgrade it further to the status of a new multilateral forum for the resolution of global disputes, but it 
might reduce its effectiveness in addressing economic issues.  
3.2.3 Argentina and the G20 
History of its membership 
Argentina forms part of the G20 for different reasons other than its mere economic size. In terms of 
GDP, it does not rank among the first 20 countries in the world,43 but it was included among the G20 
members for different reasons. Geopolitical considerations imposed that Latin America would be 
represented by the biggest Central American country, Mexico, and by the most representative of South 
America: Brazil and, of course, Argentina. Secondly, the latter was originally preferred to Chile because 
during the 1990s it had regained economic credibility thanks to the policies implemented by the 
Minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo (see previous chapter) (Cooper and Thakur 2013). 
Moreover, the unprecedented friendship established with the United States and the adoption of the 
neo-liberal policies contained in the so-called “Washington Consensus” (see previous chapter) played 
an important role in determining this decision (Abeles and Kiper 2010). Nevertheless, as we briefly 
explained in the previous section, Argentina was considered important also because of its latent 
financial and macroeconomic vulnerability and for the potential to spread its economic ‘diseases’ to 
other countries. Despite the fact that Argentina was a member of the G20 Finance since its inception in 
1999, this is exactly what happened in occasion of the 2001 crisis, after which the default on Buenos 
Aires’ external debt had to be borne by private savers all around the world.  
The last criterion was reiterated when the Bush administration took the decision of upgrading the 
summit to the leaders’ level: Argentina, together with Turkey, was confirmed among the participants 
around the table of the discussions since they might be part of future financial crises (Cooper and 
Thakur 2013).  
Argentina had the opportunity to play an active and important role within the G20. Although the size 
of its economy is not so big and its systemic relevance cannot be compared to that one of Brazil, its 
importance as a fast-growing emerging market and as a benchmark of past mismanagement of financial 
                                                          
43
 According to the latest IMF data, Argentina’s nominal GDP stood at 474,954 million US$ in 2012, ranking 27
th
 at the 
global level (IMF).   
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crises would have allowed the country to get more and more involved in the process towards the 
definition of a new global economic and financial governance. 
Firstly, it is useful to recall that in the G20, because of its improved inclusiveness and the formal 
equality of all its members, a plurality of policy models were suggested and followed. The collapse of 
the neo-liberal policies, represented by its misinterpreted exacerbation of the financial crisis, led to a 
reshuffle in the global order and to the elaboration of three different responses to the crisis. The 
‘anglosaxon’ model, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, advocated for countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies, both in fiscal and monetary terms, and it had a more reticent approach 
towards stricter financial regulation. The ‘European’ block, represented by the European Union and led 
by Germany, was more conservative and pushed for policies based on fiscal adjustment and 
consolidation and a more advanced financial regulation. The last approach, represented by the BRICS 
countries, was positioned in the middle view with favor to countercyclical, growth friendly policies, 
asking at the same time a deeper regulation in financial issues (Abeles and Kiper 2010). Argentina’s 
approach was closer to the last group of countries.  
The first two years, characterized by four rounds of meetings, saw a quite active participation of 
Argentina which generally tended to adopt positions closer to the BRICS countries. According to the 
Argentine government, global economy was facing a systemic crisis rooted in an excessive financial 
deregulation and a possible response from developing countries was to build up a series of ‘safety nets’ 
through the accumulation of foreign reserves and the pursuit of current account surpluses (Abeles and 
Kiper 2010). According to this main policy framework, Argentina’s action within the G20 revolved 
around the following issues: 
a) Counter-cyclical policies: Argentina agreed on the proposals for fiscal stimulus plans fostered 
by the US and kept on implementing expansionary measures (conditional cash transfers 
programs, public investment plans). It must be recalled that the country had been facing a 
period of sustained and unstopped growth since 2003 and that only in 2009 it slowed down 
because of the external consequences of the global crisis; 
b) Financial regulation: Argentina was particularly active in the issue related to the improvements 
of the risk assessment mechanisms implemented by rating agencies. Not only they were blamed 
for not being able to foresee the mortgage bubble expanding from the US, but they were also 
keeping on considering Argentina as a country not ready to be included again inside the global 
financial markets; 
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c) Reform of IFIs: Argentina supported all the proposals made with respect to an increased and 
more flexible liquidity provision to emerging markets, often characterized by domestic 
shortages of liquidity, and to a more inclusive reshape of their governance structures. The IMF 
quota reform, as well as the proposal to increase the capitalization of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), were supported by Buenos Aires; 
d) Labor standards and conditions: Argentina promoted, together with Brazil, the idea of getting 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) involved in the G20 discussions. The emphasis on 
decent jobs and on the rise in salaries did not match with the attitude of developed countries, 
which advocated for more flexible labor markets and wage moderations (Abeles and Kiper 
2010).  
At the same time, however, some objections were moved by the IMF to Argentina for manipulating its 
exchange rate, accumulating an excessive quantity of foreign reserves and over regulating controls on 
capital movements. Despite these diverging views, Argentina had the opportunity and the potential to 
vie for an important role within the G20, given the innovative ‘rules of the game’, its relevance as a 
systemic important country, and the human skills and expertise it is well endowed of. An issue-by-issue 
approach, based on technical arguments rather than ideological, should have been adopted in order not 
only to protect and safeguard its own interests but also to give an active contribution to the redefinition 
of global and regional governance coordinating its action with other developing countries (Gutierrez 
Girault, ed., 2010). Brazil, not only the biggest economic power in South America, but already a 
strategic partner within the MERCOSUR free trade area, would have been the natural partner 
Argentina had to pursue its strategy with, a strategy based on the rejection of protectionism (in order to 
second the country’s export-led growth) and the stabilization of monetary and exchange rate policies. 
The opportunity of a new multilateral forum, characterized by a higher degree of ownership and equal 
power between members, offered optimal conditions for a “medium-sized power” like Argentina to 
play a more active role from the periphery on the global scenario, developing for this purpose a deeper 
and more intense cooperation with the other developing countries sitting around the table (Deciancio 
2010). Then, why after a promising start, Argentina started to isolate itself from the rest of the G20 
member States? 
In order to assess current Argentina’s situation in the G20, it is very useful to look at what the country 
is really doing to comply with the decisions taken at the summits. The G8/G20 Research Group at the 
University of Toronto elaborated a ‘scorecard’ that keeps track of the measures implemented in each 
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member States after they have been agreed on at the meetings. First of all, let us have a look at the 
commitments undertaken by Argentina at the Los Cabos summit in 2012. They revolve around 
different areas that are: fiscal policy, financial sector policy, structural reforms, and they embrace a 
broad range of policy measures. Table 3.2.4 provides a detailed list of the commitments.  
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Table 3.2.4 – The commitments taken by Argentina at the Los Cabos G20 summit, 2012 
Fiscal Policy 
Commitment/Timeframe Objectives Update on Progress 
Primary fiscal result compatible with a decreasing debt-to-
GDP ratio  
Keep increasing public sector solvency  2011 finished with a primary surplus of 0.3% of GDP. 
National Public Debt reached 42.7% of GDP in 3rd 
quarter 2011, 1.4 p.p. below the previous quarter and 4.4 
p.p. below the same quarter of 2010.  
The Provincial Debt Relief Program (created in 2010) has 
been extended until 2013. This plan allows the most 
indebted provinces to refinance their debt with the 
National State in favourable conditions.  
Reduce subsidies on household energy consumption and 
public transportation by means of a focused approach with 
the aim of protecting lower-income families.  
To reduce the fiscal cost of subsidies and free resources 
for infrastructure investment, as well as to improve the 
distribution of income by channelling subsidies exclusively 
to lower-income households.  
This policy has begun to be implemented, starting with the 
elimination of subsidies for higher-income households.  
To apply countercyclical fiscal policies in case the 
international economic situation deteriorates further.  
To offset the negative impact of extremely adverse 
international conditions.  
The National Government has a solid fiscal position, as 
evidenced by its primary surplus and a declining 
debt/GDP ratio. This fiscal strength would allow it to use 
fiscal tools in order to preserve employment and 
production, if necessary.  
Financial Sector Policy 
Commitment/Timeframe Objectives Update on Progress 
Provide central bank funding to banks for long-term To increase the financing of both infrastructure and In 2011 ARS 4bn were disbursed (representing 5% of total 
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investment projects by attenuating maturity mismatch. Up 
to ARS8bn will be allocated (10% of total corporate loans 
of the banking system). /2011-2013  
private sector real investment in order to augment the rate 
of growth of potential output.  
corporate loans).  
Increase Financial depth and equality through the diffusion 
of free savings accounts for low-income households and 
instant electronic transfers./2012- 2015  
Increase the private credit to GDP ratio from 11,7% of 
GDP in 2011 to 16-18% in 2015 and promote a more 
widespread access to financial services.  
In December 2011, the Credit to GDP ratio reached 
14.4%, increasing 2.7 pp. on a year-over-year basis.  
The BCRA has been promoting the use of electronic 
means of payment through the implementation of a 
universal free bank account with an associated debit card, 
and the reduction of inter-bank transfer costs. There was 
an expansion of 35% of money transfers of small amounts 
in the last year. 101.400 Universal Free Accounts were 
created since the implementation of this program in the 
end of 2010.  
Under a new regulation that promotes a wider 
geographical coverage of the financial system, 84 branches 
were opened through 2011. Most of them (67 branches) 
were placed in areas where the financial infrastructure is 
less developed.  
As an alternative of using cash in transactions for large 
amounts the BCRA relaunched the so called “Cheque 
Cancelatorio”. In 2011 2.184 transactions were made 
totalizing ARS154 millions and 4.244 transactions 
totalizing USD 241 millions.  
Complete the adoption of (Basel II, Basell II.5 and Basel To increase banking sector soundness and resilience by The project for the adoption of Basel II is being 
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III) the three Pillars in Basel II and the new elements in 
Basel III.  
upgrading the regulatory framework to the best 
international risk management practices.  
implemented as from may 2011. The rules on capital 
requirements for operational risk have been put forward 
through Com.”A”5272 as from January 2012. As regards 
capital requirements for credit risk an advanced proposal 
including Basel 2.5 and Basel III modifications is being 
considered by BCRA Directors and impact studies are well 
ahead. As regards the provisions of Pillar 3 these will be 
implemented in 2012 and Pillar 2will be put into effect in 
the first half of 2013.  
As from January 2012 financial institutions must have in place a 
comprehensive risk management process based on the guidelines 
established by the Central Bank (Com."A"5203). This 
comprehensive risk management process must contemplate credit, 
liquidity, market, interest rate and operational risk.  
In line with Basel II and III, the Central Bank of Argentina 
implemented further steps to strengthen bank solvency 
standards. A new regulation set by the Central Bank 
(com."A"5273), established that banks posting profits (after 
applying the existing regulatory filters) may only pay dividends if their 
regulatory capital, following the corresponding allocation, is at least 
75% above the minimum regulatory requirement. The purpose of this 
measure is to reduce the financial system’s pro-cyclicality, by having a 
capital buffer to face potential financial and/or macroeconomic 
volatility episodes.  
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Expand the regulatory scope to include other institutions 
that directly or indirectly are involved in financial 
intermediation.  
Strengthen financial stability.  The Central Bank Charter was modified in March 2012 by 
Law 26.739 extending the regulatory scope to the 
payments system, including clearing houses, and other 
institutions that directly or indirectly are involved in 
financial intermediation.  
Design incentives in order to channel credit towards 
productive purposes and certain economic sectors, 
especially the SMEs, or less developed regions./ 2012-2016  
Bolster economic development.  
 
The Central Bank Charter was modified in March 2012 by 
Law 26.739.  
Give authority (power) to the Central Bank to ensure a fair 
relationship between the financial institutions and 
consumers.  
Protect consumers of financial services and foster 
competition in the banking system.  
The Central Bank Charter was modified in March 2012 by 
Law 26.739.  
Structural Reforms 
Commitment/Timeframe Objectives Update on Progress 
Increase food and agricultural output and diversify 
production and exports, as established in the Agricultural 
and Food Strategic Plan.  
To increase the world´s food 
supply, improve Argentina´s 
external sustainability and allow 
for higher imports of capital 
goods. 
Grain production did not grow in 2011 as a result of 
unfavourable climatic conditions. In spite of that, total 
land sown with cereals grew by 770.000 has (2.2%).  
There was an increase of 440.000 has. (10%) in the area 
planted with corn and an increase of 405.000 has (54%) in 
the area sown with barley. 
Add 3227 mw of new power by 2013, with emphasis on 
technologies such as hydroelectric, nuclear and gas power 
stations.  
To augment energy supply and increase the share of green 
technologies in electricity generation.  
In 2011 and the first quarter of 2012 ten energy projects 
have been completed, representing a total added capacity 
of 1223mw. Moreover, the Yaciretá dam height was raised, 
allowing for a gradual increase in capacity of up to 1000 
mw. The new additions include both hydroelectric and 
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eolic plants.  
In 2012 the energy supply is expected to augment by 1630 
mw, 700 of which correspond to the Nuclear Central 
Atucha II, and 30 mw to wind energy.  
Continue increasing the coverage and the per capita 
allocation of social programs.  
Reduce unemployment to 6% by 2015.  
Increase drinkable water and sewage coverage to 90% and 
75%, respectively, by 2015.  
To reduce absolute poverty and improve the distribution 
of income.  
The main income transfer program, the “Asignación 
Universal por hijo”, which is directed to children under the 
age of 18, has achieved an 85% coverage rate for children 
in a vulnerable situation. In May 2011 the program was 
extended to pregnant women.  
During 2011, pensioners of the Argentine Integrated 
Retirement System increased their income by 37% and the 
minimum pension was raised by the same percentage. 
Pensions were further raised by 17.6% in March.  
The unemployment rate fell from 7.8% in 2010 to 7,2% in 
2011. Besides, the rate of informal employment has been 
reduced in 1 p.p. between 2010 and 2011, to 34.2%.  
The water and sanitation company (AySA) launched the 
Strategic Plan 2011-2015. National transfers to this public 
enterprise reached USD 540 million in 2011, which 
represents an increase of 229% compared to 2010.  
Moreover, the “Water and Sanitation Program for Urban 
and Suburban Centers” is being implemented, with a total 
cost of USD 250 million.  
A long-term project to clean up the Matanza- Riachuelo 
172 
 
172 
 
river basin is being implemented.  
Source: G20 Los Cabos 
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As it can be seen by the table, the set of policies Argentina was asked to implement are quite broad and 
go from fiscal policy to food and energy security. Some of them, especially in fiscal policy, would have 
requested not too much of an effort to the Government, since sound public account deriving from a 
decade of current account surpluses and massive revenues from agricultural exports helped Argentina 
to be already on the ‘right track’. However, excess in public spending and slowness in adjusting to new 
regulations in the financial and the banking sector represented a serious risk that the country deviated 
from this ‘right track’. 
Which is what actually happened: if we look at the scores individually obtained by the G20 member 
countries as per the rate of full implementation of the decisions taken at the summits, we discover that 
Argentina is the country with the lowest score. Normalized on a scale that goes from +1 (full 
implementation) to -1 (no implementation at all), Argentina obtained an average score of -0.29, with the 
lowest score recorded in the “protectionism” area (-1) (G20 Research Group 2012). Even in the area of 
fiscal consolidation, despite not too bad statistics (a general government balance of -1.6% and a debt-
to-GDP ratio of 49.1% in 2010, IMF), the rate of improvement and compliance with the G20 decisions 
was absolutely insufficient (a miserable 0). In the field of International Financial Institutions, Argentina 
obtained a negative score for not ratifying the Board Reform amendment of the IMF, which would 
pave the way to the reform of the quota sharing and the system of vote. As already said before, 
adjustments to reform in the banking regulation were very poor, and no implementation at all of the 
Basel III agreement has been recorded so far (-1). Finally, Argentina is the country that has raised the 
highest number of new protectionist measures (10 for food and agricultural goods, 66 for 
manufactured goods, 6 for fuel and minerals, 4 for other categories of goods). Even with respect to 
developing countries Argentina (which can be hardly be considered a developing country tout-court 
itself) has adopted the highest number of trade-distorting measures. The country obtained positive 
scores only in relation to food security and internal social development. Table 3.2.5 shows the ranking 
of the G20 member States according to their implementation rate. 
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Table 3.2.5 – G20 decisions implementation: individual scores 
 Fiscal 
Consolidation 
Structural 
Reforms 
IFIs reforms Financial 
Regulation 
Protectionism Development Average 
Canada 1 0.17 0.5 0.42 1 1 0.68 
Korea 1 0.43 0.67 0.17 1 0.53 0.63 
Saudi Arabia - n/a 0.67 0.42 1 0.51 0.65 
Japan 0 0.17 1 1 1 0.43 0.6 
Australia 1 0.29 1 -0.08 0 0.89 0.52 
Mexico - 0.33 1 -0.25 1 0.5 0.52 
Germany 1 0.5 1 0.42 -1 1 0.49 
UK 1 0.5 1 0.42 -1 0.84 0.46 
France 1 0.4 1 0.42 -1 0.78 0.43 
EU 1 0.4 1 0.33 -1 0.85 0.43 
Italy 1 0.38 0.67 0.42 -1 0.49 0.33 
South Africa - 0.2 0.67 0.42 1 0.51 0.23 
Brazil - 0.2 1 0.17 -1 0.74 0.22 
China - 0 1 0.33 -1 0.57 0.18 
Russia - 0.6 0.83 -0.25 -1 0.62 0.16 
India - 0 0.17 1 -1 0.51 0.14 
Turkey - -0.2 0.83 -0.42 0 0.48 0.14 
US 0 0 0.17 0.5 -1 0.85 0.43 
Indonesia - -0.2 0.33 0.17 -1 -0.18 -0.18 
Argentina - n/a -0.17 -0.17 -1 0.17 -0.29 
G20 average 0.8 0.24 0.71 0.23 -0.35 0.62 0.34 
Source: G20 Research Centre 
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What are the reasons of such a disappointing performance? Simply bad will or bottlenecks in the 
domestic bureaucracy and administration that could have prevented Argentina from reaching a higher 
level of implementation? Although the latter is surely part of the explanation, the former is probably 
the most important and worrisome. The next section will explore this issue.  
Still a G20 member? 
Argentina had been criticized by different countries all over the world during the past few years for the 
economic policies implemented, not exactly friendly towards Foreign Direct Investment and the 
promotion of international free trade (see part I). In April 2012, the re-nationalization of the Spanish oil 
company Repsol triggered harsh controversies, not only by the Spanish government but also by other 
countries. The forthcoming G20 summit at Los Cabos provoked a debate around the issue whether 
Argentina were still deserving a chair at the organization. Official measures were proposed against the 
country’s participation in the forum, for instance the Resolution submitted to the Senate of the United 
States by Senator Richard Lugar, the most senior Republican member of the US Senate foreign 
relations committee, claiming that: “Whereas the Republic of Argentina has consistently violated the 
spirit and letter of these and other G20 declarations through its policy of expropriating the property of 
foreign investors, evading the judgments of United States courts, ignoring decisions of international 
arbitral forums, refusing to comply with International Monetary Fund requirements and failing to 
implement anti-money laundering and terrorist financing measures; Whereas the President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner has flouted international norms and agreements by proposing legislation to 
nationalize Argentina’s largest oil and gas producer, YPF SA, effectively expropriating the assets of 
foreign investors; Whereas Argentina has persistently ignored claims brought by United States and 
other countries before the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
administered by the World Bank, despite receiving billions of dollars in loans from the World Bank; 
Whereas Argentina remains one of only four countries, and the only G20 member, that refuse to 
submit to an International Monetary Fund review in violation of Article IV of the IMF Charter; (…) 
Resolved, that the Senate (1) finds that the Republic of Argentina has failed to meet the responsibilities 
inherent to membership in the G20, (2) calls upon the President and the Secretary of the Treasury to 
work with the governments of the G20 to suspend the participation of the Republic of Argentina in the 
G20 until the Government of Argentina has fully demonstrated its intent to adhere to international 
norms of economic relations an to commit to the rule of law (…)” (Lugar 2012). Although the Bill was 
not passed, possibly because of a sentiment of antipathy against Repsol for oil-drilling in Cuba spread 
among US Senators (Rachman 2012), it helped foster the debate around Argentina’s membership. If 
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the then President of Mexico Felipe Calderón, host of the G20 summit, described the nationalization of 
YPF as “very regrettable”, it can be said that both Argentina adopted a non-cooperative attitude within 
the G20 and that at the same time a strategy to marginalize Argentina at the Los Cabos meeting was 
being put in place (Cooper 2012). Moreover, tense relationships with the United Kingdom because of 
the revived controversy around the sovereignty issue on the Falkland/Malvinas islands induced Prime 
Minister David Cameron to publicly attack Cristina Kirchner for undertaking protectionist measures 
aimed at harming the global economy. Aside to the official proposals to kick the country out of the 
organization, other countries were invited as external observers: among them, Chile and Colombia, 
that, thanks to their successful economic policies, are the two best candidates to replace Argentina, 
were its expulsion ever decided. There is still an on-going debate about how the membership of the 
G20 should actually be, and Argentina is often excluded by the ‘ideal’ group of States. A research by 
Brill and Glassman (2012) showed that, according to criteria of economic size and global economic 
importance, country’s adherence to the rule of law and principles consistent with market-based 
economies, and the size of a country’s financial services sector, Argentina (together with Mexico, 
Indonesia and Russia) does not fully qualify to be a G20 member.44     
As shown, at the G20 Los Cabos summit the position of Argentina inside the G20 reached its lowest 
peak ever. Even at the last summit in St. Petersburg the attitude of the country doesn’t seem to have 
changed much. President Cristina Kirchner advocated for a new wave of multilateralism and rejected 
the accusations of protectionism, saying that developed countries are those which impose the highest 
trade barriers45 and are mostly responsible for the lack of dialogue and economic coordination. 
Argentina also proposed to establish a committee within the WTO to deal with international health and 
sanitary standards, so as to have a set of global common rules and to avoid non-tariff barriers of this 
kind (La Nación 2013).  
However, a combination of factors resulted into the progressive detachment of Buenos Aires from the 
rest of the members: a poor record in the implementation of the decisions taken, hostile actions 
towards foreign investors and international trade, tense relationships in foreign policy deriving from the 
long-lasting, unresolved issue of the Falkland-Malvinas islands. Together with the broadening fracture 
with the IMF, the international role of Argentina is being harmed and marginalized.  
                                                          
44
 The empirical test attributed a score to each different criterion. According to their results, the four countries should 
be replaced by Norway, Malaysia, Switzerland and Singapore.  
45
 However, Argentina is one of the most protectionist countries in the world (see chapters 3.3 and 3.4).  
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3.2.4 Conclusion: the risk of becoming an ‘outlier’ in the global economy 
The G20 is a relatively new organization in the framework of global multilateral institutions. Born in 
1999 as an annual meeting between Finance Ministers of the 19 (plus the European Union) most 
“systemically important countries”, in 2008 it was upgraded as a leaders’ summit and it was defined as 
“the world’s steering committee”. Very active especially in the areas of fiscal policy, financial and 
banking regulation, it was quite successful in addressing the worst consequences of the global financial 
crisis and in helping developed and developing economies find coordinate responses in order to retake 
the path of growth relatively soon. The novelty in its internal governance, based on informal 
procedures where each member has the same weight, helped increase the sense of ownership between 
the States and favored the active participation of developing countries. 
According to this framework, Argentina had the big opportunity to start playing again an important 
role on the global economic stage. Its membership in the G20 was chosen because its relevance in 
Latin America and its recent past characterized by a systemic debt crisis. As one of the fastest growing 
countries in the 2000s, Argentina could have seized the opportunity to undertake an active role within 
the forum aligning itself with the position of the BRICS countries and establishing networks with the 
other developing countries. This would have allowed it to have an increasingly reliable and respected 
weight and to be considered a full member of the international economic and financial community. 
Nevertheless, despite a promising start limited to progress in fiscal consolidation, Argentina became 
more and more isolated among the G20 countries. It ranks last according to the implementation of the 
measures agreed at the summits and this is due not only to inefficiencies and bottlenecks in its 
bureaucratic sector, but also to a hostile attitude developed over the course of the past few years. The 
nationalization of the oil company YPF, as well as the renewed hostility against the UK for the control 
on the islands Falkland/Malvinas and the increase in protectionism are the clearest examples of the 
process that is driving Argentina to be a “pariah” or an ‘outlier’ in the world economy, as shown in the 
previous chapter dedicated to the IMF. Isolation is likely to prevent Argentina from being inside 
networks of cooperation and from receiving foreign capital that should be necessary to sustain 
domestic investments and to allow the country to be part again of global financial markets. In a world 
that is rapidly changing its shape and moving towards a multipolar distribution of the economic power, 
it seems that Argentina is going to miss a unique opportunity.   
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3.3. Argentina and the MERCOSUR: a promise not fulfilled 
3.3.1 Structure of the chapter 
The history of economic integration in South America is characterized by several attempts that trace 
back in a not too recent past. The examples of the Latin American Association for Free Trade, set up 
by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay in 1960, the Association of Latin 
American Integration (ALADI), established in 1980 between 13 Latin American nations, and of the 
Andean Community of Nations (CAN), created in 1969 between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, 
represent the oldest organizations aimed at building up the integration process, in terms of trade and 
macroeconomic coordination, in the region.46  
The main focus of this chapter is the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), created in 1991 
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Started as a  free trade area, it then became a custom 
union in 1995 after the enforcement of the Ouro Preto protocol. As the most ambitious economic 
integration project ever launched in South America, in the intentions of its member States 
MERCOSUR should have followed the same pattern of the European Union, in order to progressively 
become a fully fledged, integrated common market. The project had been working well during its first 
six years of life and helped increase intra-regional trade by more than four times (BID – INTAL 2012) 
with a further boost during the last decade.  
Nevertheless, economic and political contrasts between its two main members, Argentina and Brazil, 
led the integration process to a standstill because of the lack of a sufficient degree of macroeconomic 
coordination and a progressive return to protectionist measures raised intra-bloc. MERCOSUR’s 
current situation is disappointing and its institutional paralysis ended up with the organization being 
overtaken by other trade and economic integration projects developed by other dynamic South 
American countries (for example Chile which is involved in the negotiations towards the Trans Pacific 
Partnership, TPP).  
What is the role of Argentina in this process? In this chapter I show that the country has adopted 
during the last two decade inappropriate economic policies which led to an insufficient degree of 
integration, especially with its most important neighbor, Brazil. The ‘irrational’ behavior adopted at the 
global level, shown in the two previous chapters dedicated to the analysis of the role of the country 
within the  IMF and the G20, has been reflected by a similar attitude at the regional level, because of a 
                                                          
46
 See Chapter 2.1 for further information.  
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never extinguished protectionist trend which is leading Argentina to a progressive isolation. Therefore, 
I argue that the economic policies implemented at its borders within the regional integration context 
have negative spillovers also at the global level, undermining Argentina’s international position and its 
economic relevance in South America and worldwide. 
3.3.2 MERCOSUR: history and achievements 
The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) represents the most ambitious project of economic 
integration in South America. Created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción among Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay (Bolivia and Chile became associate members, while the membership of 
Venezuela is still pending because of the negative pronunciation of Brazilian Parliament), MERCOSUR 
marked a further step on the integration process, since it created not only a free trade zone but also a 
custom union. The Protocol of Ouro Preto, signed in December 1994, determined the full enforcement 
of the organization through the establishment of the common external tariff and of its institutional 
structure. Four concrete goals were targeted: free circulation of goods, services and factors of 
production; coordinating macroeconomic and sectoral policies; harmonizing domestic legislation 
(Malamud 2005). Since 1995 most of items traded faced zero duties, but a certain level of protection 
remained for categories of goods like automobiles, which represent a strategic asset for the 
manufacturing sector of both Argentina and Brazil.  
In the intention of its founders, the organization was modeled upon the experience of the European 
Union, and the last step of this process should be the achievement of a “common market” through the 
coordination of the national macroeconomic policies.  
The effectiveness of MERCOSUR has been strictly dependent on the economic performance of its 
main members, Argentina and Brazil. Intra-regional trade increased during periods of boom, while it 
was negatively affected during periods of recessions. Malamud (2005) underlines how the success of the 
organization strictly depends on the economic performance and on the political views of its two biggest 
members, but also recognizes that in its first seven years of life regional trade increased four times, this 
effect explained by trade creation rather than trade diversion. On the other hand, it is also possible to 
argue that the increase in regional trade can be interpreted as the natural outcome of periods of 
economic ‘booms’. Figure 3.3.1 shows that intra-regional exchanges were on the rise in the periods 
1991-1996 and 2003-2008, when Argentina and Brazil had the highest and most stable rates of growth 
of GDP (respectively 5.9% and 2.85% during the first period, 8.5% and 4.2% during the second  - IMF 
2013).  
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Figure 3.3.1 – Trade and economic growth in MERCOSUR (billion US$, % values, 1991-2012) 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on UN Comtrade and IMF data 
Internal demand, as a reflection of economic growth in Argentina and Brazil (we do not consider in 
this analysis Uruguay and Paraguay because of their negligible economic size), has therefore been a 
main determinant in the increase of intra-trade zone. External demand (i.e. coming from the rest of the 
world) has also promoted the increase of exports extra-region for the four countries, since during the 
last decade the proportion of intra-regional has grown little from 11% in 2002 to 15.7% in 2010 (BID 
Intal 2012).  
Despite the constant increase of intra-regional trade flows, MERCOSUR has been affected during the 
last years by a return of protectionism. Following an opposite trend from the rest of the world, in 2010 
new 62 protectionist measures were raised by the four countries, while at the global level trade 
defensive measures decreased by almost half (Evenett  2012). The main recipients of the protectionist 
barriers were other Latin American countries, the European Union and Asia particularly in the sectors 
of textiles, raw metals, paper and cardboard (BID Intal 2012).   
Another important area to assess the degree of economic integration is that one related to the 
promotion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The “Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and the 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment”, signed in 1993, states that the four members guarantee the same 
treatment to external investors according to the Most Favored Nation principle. In particular, this 
refers to the limits imposed to expropriations and nationalizations, which can occur only in cases where 
the public interest clearly prevails over private ones (Lara 2011). Investment flows increased particularly 
during the 1990s thanks to the liberalization and privatization process implemented in Argentina under 
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the two terms of President Carlos Menem and also to an effective action of integration and 
harmonization of some important markets such as car manufacturing (Lara 2011). A second important 
wave of FDI coming into the region took place after the 2001-2002 crisis, but the total proportion of 
FDI on the overall GDP of the bloc is still quite low (2.3% in 2010, BID Intal 2012). Argentina used to 
be the first recipient of FDI until the middle of the 1990s, but it was overtaken by Brazil and its 
participation in the incoming flows into the region was only 12.1% in 2010 (BID Intal 2012).  
Finally, macroeconomic coordination is a third important area to assess the degree and the 
effectiveness of integration in MERCOSUR. In 1995 the MERCOSUR Action Plan had stressed the 
importance of having coordinated macroeconomic policies in order to strengthen the economic 
integration and to let the custom union work effectively. Therefore, the Plan suggested to establish a 
periodical exchange of information among the Member states and to set up common regional 
economic indicators so as to design and implement a coherent framework of macroeconomic policies. 
In 1999 a High Level Working Group was created and asked to provide MERCOSUR with the 
appropriate tools in order to comply with these needs, and in 2000 the group was upgraded to the 
status of Macroeconomic Monitoring Group (Grupo de Monitoreo Macroeconómico, GMM), dedicated to the 
elaboration of harmonized fiscal and public debt policies. After this intense preparatory work, the 
leaders of the four countries agreed with the Florianopolis Declaration in December 2000 to address 
the following targets: 
- Deficit-to-GDP ratio: up to 3% of GDP from 2002 
- Debt-to-GDP ratio: up to 40% of GDP from 2010, with a convergence process starting in 
2005 
- Inflation rate: up to 5% between 2002 and 2005, then 4% (BID Intal 2012). 
How have the four countries performed so far with respect to these targets? Table 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 
show the data recorded in the last decade and highlight whether the maximum level allowed has been 
respected (green color), or not (red color). In the case of public debt, a yellow color underlines whether 
a process of convergence was taking place. 
 
 
 
182 
 
182 
 
Table 3.3.1 – MERCOSUR countries, Deficit-to-GDP ratio (% values, 2002-2011) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Argentina 0.93% 3.38% 5.45% 4.65% 4.18% 2.47% 2.76% 0.21% 1.68% -0.11% 
Brazil 3.22% 3.27% 3.72% 3.79% 3.23% 3.36% 4.01% 2.12% 2.44% 3.09% 
Uruguay -1.38% 1.87% 2.99% 2.08% 1.96% 2.38% 3.57% 1.16% 1.36% 1.09% 
Paraguay 0.23% 3.03% 3.83% 4.03% 3.64% 3.52% 1.34% 1.08% 1.74% 1.99% 
 
Source: IMF 
Table 3.3.2 – MERCOSUR countries, Public debt-to-GDP ratio (% values, 2002-2011) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Argentina 164.97% 139.46% 127.03% 87.13% 76.46% 67.10% 58.52% 58.70% 49.10% 44.94% 
Brazil 79.80% 74.69% 70.63% 69.15% 66.66% 65.18% 63.55% 68.06% 66.84% 64.94% 
Paraguay 72.61% 53.10% 45.49% 38.00% 27.87% 21.92% 19.07% 18.04% 15.43% 12.04% 
Uruguay 94.71% 99.27% 90.14% 77.62% 70.35% 63.17% 61.65% 61.02% 57.06% 55.07% 
 
Source: IMF 
Table 3.3.3 – MERCOSUR countries, Annual Inflation rate (% values, 2002-2012) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Argentina 25.9% 13.4% 4.4% 9.6% 10.9% 8.8% 8.6% 6.3% 10.8% 9.5% 10.0% 
Brazil 8.5% 14.7% 6.6% 6.9% 4.2% 3.6% 5.7% 4.9% 5.0% 6.6% 5.4% 
Paraguay 10.5% 14.2% 4.3% 6.8% 9.6% 8.1% 10.2% 2.6% 4.7% 8.3% 3.7% 
Uruguay 14.0% 19.4% 9.2% 4.7% 6.4% 8.1% 7.9% 7.1% 6.7% 8.1% 8.1% 
 
Source: IMF 
It is possible to say that the performance with respect to the public account has been quite successful in 
all four countries. In particular, Argentina managed to obtain a substantial haircut on its external debt 
after the unilateral decision of restructuring it down to 30% of its original level. The real problem seems 
to be the inflation rate, that remains particularly high in Argentina (as I showed in chapters 1.2 and 3.1, 
official data on inflation are considered to be much lower than they actually are).  
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Another big problem of macroeconomic misalignment has been due in the past to too different 
bilateral exchange rates. It seems then that internal asymmetries between the four members have 
represented the biggest stumbling blocks to achieve further integration. As shown by Bittencourt, 
Larson and Thompson (2005), the stability of the organization was in doubt due to the Brazilian crisis 
in 1998, which led to the devaluation of the national currency and to severe commercial disputes with 
Argentina (that during those years was pegged to the US dollar through a currency board regime) , and 
to the fierce economic slowdown of the latter in 2002. The researchers attribute the troubles faced by 
MERCOSUR to a lack in policy coordination among the members, which could have helped to 
mitigate the issues arising among them. This lack of coordination has also been stressed by Baer, 
Cavalcanti and Peri (2002), who described how the divergence in monetary policy between Argentina 
and Brazil affected regional trade in a negative way. The deficits in the trade balance registered by 
Argentina in the first years of the MERCOSUR, and by Brazil afterwards, provoked a rise of the tariffs 
regarding sensitive goods as automobiles and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 1999, with the 
clear objective of gaining competitiveness in export. A high level of variability of the exchange rate was 
shown having a negative impact on bilateral trade between the two countries (Baer, Cavalcanti, Peri, 
2002): which is exactly the effect a regional trade agreement should avoid.  An analysis of the 
macroeconomic cycles in MERCOSUR showed that lack of synchronization has marked the last twenty 
years especially between Argentina and Brazil, the former being characterized by a much higher degree 
of volatility (Builes Vásquez 2010). 
In 2010 the last step ahead was characterized by a long-awaited agreement on a common customs code, 
but in the more recent years, the integration process has faced other problems originated by different 
factors, not only economic but also political. The most interesting example is provided by the 
admission of Venezuela into the membership of the organization. The country, which shares its 
borders only with Brazil among the other members of MERCOSUR, applied to be admitted in the 
organization after withdrawing from the CAN in 2006 in opposition to the forthcoming of Free Trade 
Agreements with the United States. The admission process took several years and it was prolonged by 
the refusal by the Parliament of Paraguay to ratify the act that would allow Venezuela in. Finally, at the 
MERCOSUR summit in Brasilia on 31 July 2012 Venezuela was admitted, simply because Paraguay’s 
membership had been previously suspended following a coup d’etat that had removed the former 
President Fernando Lugo. Serious juridical concerns were expressed about the fairness of this process 
(the simple ‘freezing’ of the membership status does not mean that other members can be admitted 
without the consent of the former) but also about the real implications of Venezuela’s admission, 
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determined not by a concrete willingness of economic liberalization and integration, but by the 
geopolitical ambitions of the former President of Venezuela Hugo Chávez to establish a new south 
American bloc of power (Stefanini 2012). However, the potential gains for Venezuela, as a country 
increasingly dependent on imports from other MERCOSUR countries after the conversion of the 
domestic production system to the exclusive exploitation of oil resources, should not be 
underestimated (Arellano 2013).  
To conclude, it seems today that MERCOSUR ran out of the integrating push that had animated the 
first years of its life. To use Malamud’s words (2008), the organization lacks the fundamental 
characteristics that are needed for a regional integration process to be successful. First of all, demand 
conditions that arise because of further needs of lowering transaction costs are low in MERCOSUR, 
since we showed that the proportion of intra-regional trade compared to total trade is not so high. 
Secondly, the organization has also a deficit of supply conditions, in the sense that there is not a clear 
leader willing to act as a ‘paymaster’, i.e. willing to pay most of the integration costs. The role of 
‘paymaster’ should be played by Brazil, for its relevant economic size, but its reluctance as a regional 
leader prevented MERCOSUR from achieving a deeper level of integration. Finally, inertial conditions, 
represented by the degree of institutionalization, are also too weak. MERCOSUR is endowed with an 
institutional framework, but the questionable status of MERCOSUR community law, given the absence 
of direct effect and mutual recognition, prevents regional regulation from having primacy over 
domestic law (Malamud 2008).    
3.3.3 Argentina: from integration to …isolation 
Argentina was originally a strong promoter of MERCOSUR as a project that, in the intentions of its 
founders, would have followed and replicated the integration process of the European Union in South 
America. As shown in the previous section, the first steps moved by the organization seemed to stay on 
the right track, but after some years the integration process was at a standstill. This happened mainly 
because of the responsibility of its two biggest members, Argentina and Brazil. There are at least three 
factors that prevented MERCOSUR from being successful. First of all, macroeconomic imbalances 
between Argentina and Brazil: in part II it was shown how the devaluation of the Real implemented by 
Brazil in 1999 led to a sudden loss of competitiveness from Argentina, from which it had never been 
able to completely recover, even after abandoning the currency board with the US dollar in 2002. This 
provoked a misalignment between the two countries and an enduring lack of coordination in terms of 
bilateral exchange rate. Secondly, the unwillingness of both countries to take on the role of a leader 
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deprived MERCOSUR from the “supply conditions” to properly nurture the integration process. Brazil 
always looked with reluctance at the role of regional leader, while Argentina’s return to political and 
economic nationalism after the 2001-02 crisis help explain why MERCOSUR remained without an 
integrating push.  
Third, and a consequence of both the previous two factors, is Argentina’s return to protectionism.  It is 
important to make a distinction between tariff and non tariff barriers (NTBs). If we look at the simple 
mean of tariffs applied for all products traded, Argentina and the other members of MERCOSUR have 
reduced them over the course of the last 15 years (Figure 3.3.2). However, they are still at an average 
level of 10.3%. A further focus on Argentina suggests that, with respect to its MERCOSUR partners, it 
has kept the level of tariffs low, as shown by the average levels computed for all products in 1995, 
2000, 2005 and 2010 (Figure 3.3.3). The econometric regressions performed in part II revealed that 
belonging to MERCOSUR had a negative impact overall on the exports of the four countries. I argue 
that this is not due to the level of tariffs, which are relatively low between the MERCOSUR countries, 
but a reason for this is a sharp rise of Non Tariff Barriers erected especially by Argentina in the last five 
years. Argentina ranks third in the world as per the number of new protectionist measures (in the sense 
that they are considered discriminatory against goods produced abroad) implemented since 2008 (185), 
behind only the European Union and the Russian Federation (Table 3.3.4). Argentina is also the third 
most protectionist country as per number of sectors affected by protectionist measures (73, behind the 
European Union and Italy). Such a dramatic increase of discriminatory measures can be partly 
explained as a consequence of the global financial crisis of 2007-08, which induced many countries to 
reduce its openness towards the rest of the world in the attempt to preserve their domestic economic 
system (Bianchi 2013).  
Figure 3.3.2 – MERCOSUR countries, Tariff rate applied, simple mean, all products (1995-
2011) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
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Figure 3.3.3 – Argentina, tariff rate applied to MERCOSUR partners, simple mean, all 
products (1995-2000-2005-2010) 
 
Source: United Nations Comtrade Statistics Division 
Table 3.3.4 – The world’s most protectionist countries (2008-2013) 
Number of protectionist measures imposed Number of sectors affected by protectionist 
measures 
EU 27 (372) EU 27 (78) 
Russian Federation (231) Italy (78) 
Argentina (185) Argentina (73) 
India (113) Germany (66) 
Belarus (101) Algeria (58) 
Germany (99) Russian Federation (54) 
United Kingdom (98) China (52) 
Italy (94) Kazakhstan (50) 
France (91) USA (47) 
Brazil (80) Nigeria (45) 
  
Source: Global Trade Alert 2012 
At present, Argentina is implementing a total number of 234 protectionist measures and is responsible 
for 48% of the 335 discriminatory measures adopted by Latin American countries since March 2008. 
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Most of them are directed against MERCOSUR partners (179, equal to the 76%), and in particular 103 
of them are aimed at affecting Brazilian exports (Table 3.3.5 and Figure 3.3.4).47  
Table 3.3.5 – Argentina’s protectionist measures against MERCOSUR partners (2013) 
Country Number of protectionist measures 
Brazil 103 
Paraguay 29 
Uruguay  47 
TOTAL against MERCOSUR 179 
 
Source: Global Trade Alert 
Figure 3.3.4 – Argentina’s protectionist measures (World and MERCOSUR partners, 2013) 
 
Source: Global Trade Alert 
A closer look at Argentina’s trade policy helps to understand what kind of instruments the country uses 
in order to protect its domestic products. Argentina’s NTBs mainly revolve around the following policy 
tools: 
                                                          
47
 It must be noted that some of these measures apply simultaneously to more countries at the same time, so it can be 
the case that some of the measures aimed at affecting Brazil are affecting at the same time Paraguay and/or Uruguay.  
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- Capital goods regime (national producers of capital goods competing with imported goods are 
compensated with a tax benefit of 14%. Moreover, in 2012 an import duty of 14% was 
established for capital goods that can be provided by domestic manufacturers); 
- Bicentenary Productive Financing Programme (a programme launched in 2010 aimed at 
providing cheap credit to domestic firms, mainly in sectors like autoparts, food and 
medicament.); 
- Programme for the Recovery of Production (subsidies preventing firms from firing their 
employees Subsidies increased by 450% between 2009 and 2010 up to amount of 130 million 
US$); 
- Reference prices (currently 86 tariff lines are covered by these measures, mainly textiles and 
plastic products, that impose higher prices than the actual market prices and generate extra 
protection for domestic producers); 
- Antidumping measures (mainly for textiles and machinery equipment, which are labor intensive 
and characterized by a high proportion of Small and Medium Enterprises, and especially 
directed against Brazil); 
- Non-automatic import licenses (see below for a more detailed explanation) (Szpak and Tussie 
2013) 
The main reasons why Argentina started imposing so many new barriers are essentially two: on one 
hand, the increasing trade deficit vis-à-vis Brazil (Figure 3.3.5), on the other hand the return to 
economic nationalism especially during the first and second Presidency term of Cristina Kirchner. Since 
2003 Argentina started running a trade deficit with Brazil, which rose up to the maximum level of 5.3 
billion US$ in 2011. This sharply fell down to only 1.5 billion US$ in 2012, with a 20% reduction of 
imports from Brazil over the previous year and also of a 4% drop of exports from Argentina to Brazil 
(UN Comtrade). This happened because between 2011 and 2012 Argentina started raising many new 
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), as shown in the above. Among the NTBs, the most implemented by 
Argentina were non-automatic import licenses,48 which were applied to additional 172 products 
imported from Brazil, adding up to a total of 584 products (Resolution 45/11).  
                                                          
48
 The WTO defines import licensing as administrative procedures requiring the submission of an application or other 
documentation (other than those required for customs purposes) to the relevant administrative body as a prior 
condition for importation of goods. Automatic import licensing (licensing maintained to collect statistical and other 
factual information on imports) is defined as import licensing where the approval of the application is granted in all 
cases. Therefore, non-automatic import licensing is defined as licensing not falling within the definition of automatic 
import licensing. Non-automatic licensing is used to administer trade restrictions such as quantitative restrictions 
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Figure 3.3.5 – The bilateral trade relationship between Argentina and Brazil (1999-2012, US$) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade Statistic Division 
Brazil is by far the country most affected by non-automatic import licensing: in 2011, 36.5% of these 
measures from Argentina were applied against MERCOSUR, 95.7% of which were aimed at affecting 
Brazilian exports (BID Intal 2012). Sectors most affected by these measures were car manufacturing, 
electric equipment, ICT devices, metals and chemical products, which corresponded to the sectors that 
suffered the most from the rising trade deficit vis-à-vis Brazil (BID Intal 2012).  
The new barriers erected by Argentina triggered a new ‘trade conflict’ with Brazil, that engaged in 
further restrictions against exports from its neighbor country imposing non-automatic import licenses 
on cars in May 2012. Buenos Aires’ first move triggered a conflictive ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy based on 
continuing retaliation between the two players,49 which ended up with damaging the domestic 
economy, since 70% of Argentine exports to Brazil come from the car manufacturing sector. A bilateral 
agreement signed in June 2012 tried to prevent the two countries from adding new import licenses, but 
the consequence so far has been a serious deterioration in the trade relationship between the two 
countries, as shown in Figure 3.3.5. Although the official reasons used to explain this return to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
which are justified within the WTO legal framework. But they should not have restrictive or distortive effects on 
imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the restriction, and  is to correspond in scope and duration to 
the measure it is used to implement (WTO 2013).  
49
 ‘Tit-for-tat’ means ‘equivalent retaliation’. The strategy was first introduced in game theory by Robert Axelrod. It 
can lead to cooperation if the move of the first agent is cooperative, so that the second player replicates the former’s 
action. Otherwise, if the first player is not cooperative, the second will not as well. This will lead to a sub-optimal 
equilibrium.   
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protectionism were that the Government needed to protect strategic sectors for the national industry 
and to safeguard jobs in the country (Webber 2011), these measures did not have any positive effect on 
the domestic economy, with consequences both in the short and the medium-long run. Short term 
consequences imply a further increase in internal prices, since imports from Brazil became more 
expensive, so that they affected consumers. On the other hand, in the long term protectionist measures 
do not provide any incentive to national producers to increase their productivity, damaging their 
competitiveness at the global level. Moreover, negative spillover effects propagated to the other 
MERCOSUR countries, affecting also 6.2% of Paraguay’s imports and 24.2% of Uruguay’s, countries 
that rely very much on intra-regional trade (BID Intal 2012). This further contributed to lead the 
integration process at a standstill.  
At the regional level, Argentina has not only implemented non-automatic import licenses, but also 
countervailing (or anti-subsidy) and anti-dumping duties and safeguards.50 Nevertheless, these measures 
represent a very small part of the trade barriers deployed by the country, since they affect only 20 
Brazilian products (0.3% of the total and a value of 28 US$ million) (BID Intal 2012).    
Sectors most affected by the measures described are those ones where Argentina’s economy is more 
sensitive. Non-tariff barriers mainly revolve around car manufacturing (the deficit with Brazil shrank, 
but mainly because of an overall reduction of bilateral trade rather than because of a strong increase of 
Argentine exports), textiles, shoes and dairies.  
                                                          
50
 Anti-dumping duties (ADD) are imposed in addition to any normal customs duty for which the goods being imported 
are liable. It enables the country to take action against goods sold at considerably less than their ‘normal value’. This is 
defined as a price that is lower than the price of similar goods in the country from which they originate. 
Countervailing, or anti-subsidy duties, Countervailing duties (CVDs), also known as anti-subsidy duties, are trade 
import duties imposed under World Trade Organization (WTO) Rules to neutralize the negative effects of subsidies. 
They are imposed after an investigation finds that a foreign country subsidizes its exports, injuring domestic producers 
in the importing country. According to World Trade Organization rules, a country can launch its own investigation and 
decide to charge extra duties, provided such additional duties are in accordance with the GATT Article VI and the GATT 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Finally, WTO member may restrict imports of a product 
temporarily (take “safeguard” actions) if its domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a surge in 
imports. Here, the injury has to be serious. Safeguard measures were always available under GATT (Article 19). 
However, they were infrequently used, some governments preferring to protect their domestic industries through 
“grey area” measures — using bilateral negotiations outside GATT’s auspices, they persuaded exporting countries to 
restrain exports “voluntarily” or to agree to other means of sharing markets. Agreements of this kind were reached for 
a wide range of products: automobiles, steel, and semiconductors, for example. 
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To conclude, it is possible to infer that the integration process in MERCOSUR has been armed both in 
terms of trade relationships by an increasingly damaging retaliation strategy implemented by Argentina 
and Brazil and in terms of macroeconomic integration by an insufficient coordination among the four 
member countries.   
3.3.4 Conclusion: regional integration at a standstill 
This chapter described the pattern followed by MERCOSUR since its foundation, in 1991, until the 
present day. At its inception the most ambitious attempt of regional integration in South America by 
replicating the process implemented by the European Union, it is now at a standstill and the current 
situation can be defined disappointing. 
As it was shown, MERCOSUR helped without any doubt to promote intra-regional trade, especially 
during the first years of its existence, but this remarkable increase was mainly explained by the 
economic growth of its members, and especially of the two biggest, Argentina and Brazil. In other 
words, the increase of intra-regional exchanges was also accompanied by an increase of extra-regional 
trade.  
Several problems have undermined the deepening of the integration process especially over the course 
of the last fourteen years. They are due both to political and economic reasons. Political reasons imply 
the lack of “supply”, as described by Malamud (2008), in terms of integration force by its two main 
members. Argentina, under the governments of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, turned to adopt a 
nationalist foreign policy which led the country to have diplomatic argues with its neighbors, while 
Brazil did not accept to undertake the role of regional leader preferring to look outside the continent. 
However, economic reasons are way more important. Lack of macroeconomic coordination between 
Argentina and Brazil, mainly represented by misalignments of the exchange rates, affected the trade 
relationships not only at a bilateral, but also at a regional level. The Macroeconomic Coordination 
Group, established within the MERCOSUR, has not been effective enough in promoting 
harmonization among the four States and in achieving the targets set in terms of debt and deficit 
reduction and inflation control.  
Moreover, Argentina’s recent return to protectionism and economic nationalism triggered a ‘tit-for-tat’ 
conflictive relationship with Brazil. The imposition of many NTBs, among which non-automatic 
import licenses to hundreds of products coming from Brazil played a major role, justified as a means to 
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protect domestic industries and workers, contributed to further increase prices in Argentina and 
undermine its global competitiveness in the medium term.  
In conclusion, it is possible to say that Argentina has adopted an ‘irrational’ behavior also at the 
regional level. Instead of promoting the full realization of an effective custom union and of an 
integrated, economic area, the country’s nationalist strategies are detrimental to its economic 
development and to the role of leadership it could play at a regional level. For its economic size, 
Argentina could be a big regional power in South America and a medium-sized power at the global 
level, but the economic policies implemented during the last years are leading the country to a 
progressive isolation. Next chapter will be dedicated to analyze the framework of the international 
relations where Argentina operates and what strategies the country could adopt to become a more 
active and integrated player . 
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3.4. Argentina in the neo-liberal order: is there any way to play a role? 
3.4.1 Structure of the chapter  
In the previous chapters of this part I analyzed Argentina’s behavior in the economic international 
context, through a series of case studies covering different dimensions of multilateral institutions (from 
the global to the regional level) and different time periods. I showed that Argentina has adopted for 
most of the time since the end of World War II economic policies and political attitudes not 
compatible with the rules at the basis of the liberal order established after the conference of Bretton 
Woods. Internal political instability was reflected into uncertain and wavering economic policies and 
relationships with the main global institutions, as described in the case of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). This dynamics has intensified during the last decade, dominated by the “Kirchnerismo”, a 
new political movement embodied by Néstor and his widow Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, whose 
populist and economic nationalist roots are based in the early Peronism. 
Nowadays, the economic global framework is quickly changing. From a unipolar scheme, dominated by 
the United States as the only superpower remained on Earth, we are moving towards a new situation 
where economic power is distributed more evenly across the world. How is Argentina positioned in 
this context? Can the country play a decisive role in multilateral economic affairs and influence other 
countries’ behavior? If things stay as they are, I argue that Argentina is doomed to become marginalized 
in the global arena and to have negligible relevance. A way out of this cul-de-sac would consist of 
accepting the rules of the current neo-liberal order, based on an increasing participation of developing 
countries in the process of economic global governance, and play an active role inside of it, instead of 
breaking off relationships with institutions and implementing protectionist policies that are detrimental 
for the development of Argentina itself.  
This chapter is structured as follows. After a theoretical digression aimed at defining what economic 
power is and how it can be interpreted in the current global context, an assessment of Argentina’s 
power will be provided. A negotiation behavior framework for rising powers will then be applied to the 
case of Argentina in order to stress the main drawbacks of its strategy. Finally, an analysis of the role 
the country can play and a series of policy recommendations to improve its relevance at the global and 
regional level will be provided. 
3.4.2 Economic power in a changing global environment 
Economic power and its global diffusion 
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The size and complexity of the world economy has expanded massively in the last two decades. The US 
and the EU remain economically dominant but, unlike twenty years ago, theirs is relative rather than 
absolute dominance (Tentori and Zandonini 2013). Figure 3.4.1 shows they still account for almost half 
of the world’s GDP, although their share has gone down by almost ten percentage points in the last 
fifteen years and China’s share has grown more than fivefold in the same period, which has made it the 
second largest world economy. This redistribution process has been accelerated by the economic crisis, 
which has affected developed economies the most.  
Figure 3.4.1 – Share of World GDP (%, 1995 and 2013 at market exchange rates) 
 
Source: IMF 
It is uncertain whether this process is leading to a tripolar framework, with China as the third pivotal 
actor on the global stage, or rather towards a multipolar distribution of economic power, where the 
BRICS (other than China) and other developing countries will be rapidly able to play a determinant role 
at a global level.  
It is useful to recall the notion of economic power. It derives from the broadly accepted definition of 
“power” given by Robert Dahl as “the ability to induce another party to do something it would not 
otherwise do” (Dahl 1957) and therefore implies the concept of “influence”. Therefore, in economic 
terms it can be defined as the ability to induce someone else’s actions by deploying economic 
instruments (Cooper 2004) and it is something different than economic ‘dominance’. For instance, let 
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us think of the United Kingdom: far from being a ‘dominant’ country anymore, it is by all means very 
powerful because of its strategic position as a global financial centre. The last wave of economic 
globalization process, started at the end of the 1980s, brought about increasing levels of integration and 
interdependence, in terms of trade and financial flows. This resulted into a process of diffusion of 
economic power,  which enabled to provide new players with economic power (Subacchi 2008). Such 
players involve not only States like the BRICS or other emerging markets, but also non-state actors like 
Multinational Corporations, financial institutions, Non-Governmental Organizations, leading to a 
complex network of relations which flow in both directions, differently from the unidirectional flows 
typical of earlier economic phases. 
Therefore, it is clear that GDP cannot be considered a sufficient indicator to assess a country’s 
economic power. Other factors and variables must be taken into account. For example, capital 
accumulation in developing countries can be considered as a good proxy for rising power in emerging 
markets (Subacchi 2008), for example in the Gulf states, where massive oil revenues were accumulated 
into the so-called Sovereign Wealth Funds which are an increasingly important leverage for these small 
countries to reach the rest of the world via FDI flows. 
It is not easy to provide a quantitative assessment of economic power, but some attempts were made in 
order to provide a parsimonious, and at the same time comprehensive, representation of the power a 
national government can deploy in the global arena. Basu et al. (2011) elaborated an “index of 
government economic power” based on a weighted average of four indicators: government revenues, 
foreign currency reserves, export of goods and services, and human capital, taken as the product of 
population and the average years of schooling. The analysis covered a period of 9 years, between 2000 
and 2009: the US ranks first in each year, while China took over Japan in the second place and Brazil, 
the Russian Federation and South Africa entered the top 10. Argentina’s performance dramatically fell 
at the beginning of the period covered, clearly because of the debt crisis of 2001-2002,  from the 21st 
position in 2000 to the 32nd in 2002, and then partially recovered occupying the 26th position in 2009 
(Table 3.4.1). 
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Table 3.4.1 – Index of government economic power (2000 and 2009) 
Ranking 2000 Country Ranking 2005 Country Ranking 
2009 
Country 
1 United States 1 United States 1 United 
States 
2 Japan 2 China 2 China 
3 China 3 Japan 3 Japan 
4 Germany 4 Germany 4 Germany 
5 France 5 France 5 India 
6 United 
Kingdom 
6 India 6 Russian 
Federation 
7 Italy 7 Russian 
Federation 
7 France 
8 India 8 United 
Kingdom 
8 Brazil 
9 Canada 9 Italy 9 South 
Africa 
10 Brazil 10 South Africa 10 Italy 
21 Argentina 29 Argentina 26 Argentina 
Source: Basu et al. 2011 
 
This is why new theoretical frameworks are probably needed to explain increasing global complexity. 
For example, the traditional distinction centre versus periphery does not seem to fit the current context 
anymore. The ‘centre’ issues the reserve currency, while countries in the periphery are willing to peg 
their currency to that one issued by the center in order to gain stability in terms of exchange rate and 
external trade (Subacchi 2008). The centre is embodied by a “hegemonic State” which imposes  a 
capital accumulation model and a global division of labor, managing world capital flows at its own 
convenience (Arceo 2011). The United Kingdom and pound sterling between the 19th and 20th century, 
the United States and the dollar since the end of World War II, are the two main examples of this 
theory, which was broken at the empirical level by the global financial crisis of 2008. The rebalancing of 
economic power and the increasing interdependence suggest that a multipolar framework would better 
explain today’s situation (Subacchi 2008).    
Can International Political Economy explain the ongoing changes? 
As we saw, the current global economic environment is characterized by a high level of transformation. 
From a unipolar distribution of power, the scheme is gradually changing towards a multipolar 
distribution where the US is losing their economic hegemony.  
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The question I formulate in this paragraph is whether the available theoretical frameworks of the 
International Political Economy (IPE) can properly address and explain today’s situation. IPE is about 
the interplay of economics and politics in global affairs and it became a discipline of social sciences only 
in the 1970s, since before then the role of economics in international affairs had been almost neglected. 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, symbolized by the end of the convertibility of the US dollar 
to gold, which put an end to an era of stable exchange rates, and the economic crisis determined by the 
oil shock triggered by the OPEC countries urged scholars to focus on the linkages between economic 
and international affairs. In particular, the increasing importance of interdependence between States 
was highlighted and analyzed under different perspectives.  
One of the main theoretical approaches is neo-liberal institutionalism, which assumptions are based on 
two works by Keohane and Nye (1977) and Keohane (1984). Interdependence between States in 
economic affairs is increasing but it is asymmetric: this is why States are more powerful and less 
vulnerable than others. The United States clearly represents the most powerful actor, but after the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods regime its hegemony is slowly decreasing. Therefore, it is necessary to 
rely on new patterns of cooperation where multilateral institutions can play a decisive role in addressing 
issues between States and leading to a positive sum game. Keohane’s theories are in favor of 
maintaining the existing order through the development of more cooperation and coordination among 
states. 
The other main schools of thought in IPE are the mercantilist and the Marxian view. The first one 
derives from the realist theory of international relations, which is based on the assumption that States 
are driven by self-interested actions; therefore, the aim of every state is maximizing its wealth and 
independence, even at the expenses of other States. This is why stability will be possible only with the 
presence of a hegemon. On the other hand, the Marxian tradition is based on the dichotomy between 
centre and periphery, represented by the relationship of exploitation of the centre (industrialized 
countries) on the periphery (developing ones) (Woods 2001). 
The theoretical frameworks aforementioned put the nation State at the centre of international relations 
as the main actor (although neo-liberal institutionalism highlights the importance of multilateral 
organizations and center-periphery theories stress the role of classes (workers vs. capitalists) and social 
groups. However, over the course of the last three decades an increasing number of new types of actors 
have played an increasingly important role in the global arena, given the most recent wave of the 
economic globalization process.  On one hand, interdependence between States has increased (see 
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previous paragraph) and this process led to growing asymmetries among them in terms of the ability to 
deploy their power, so that the effective incapability of some of them of exercising control over their 
destinies does not add up to a zero-sum game (Strange 1994a). On the other hand, authority of nation 
States has diminished and has been progressively accompanied by new economic players, such as firms, 
Multi National Corporations (MNCs) and multilateral organizations. In other words, the power of 
markets is now comparable to that one of States (if not even more important in some cases) (Strange 
1994a and Strange 1994b). Susan Strange (1994a) pointed out that in this changing global governance 
the absence of an opposition was one of the main problems to address.  This is why new theoretical 
frameworks and ways to address these shifts in the distribution of power should be found, in order to 
guarantee more stability to the global and economic financial system. According to these systemic 
factors of change, in particular the realist/mercantilist and the Marxist theories do not seem the most 
appropriate to explain the current situation. We are living in an evolving world where economic 
relations are characterized by increasing interdependence and interconnectedness. The recent global 
financial crisis, amplified in Europe by a double-dip recession in the Euro area, changed the situation so 
that today the world is well described by the image conveyed by Christine Lagarde, Managing Director 
of the IMF, of a “three-speed global economy” (IMF 2013a). Therefore, macroeconomic coordination 
and cooperation is needed in order to avoid the imbalances which led to the crisis and to restore a 
global environment able to enhance stability and growth. As explained in the previous chapters of this 
part, the G20 looks like a particularly suitable organization, because of its informal structure and ability 
to admit rising powers in the decision making process.  
Neo-liberal institutionalism is the most suitable approach to provide this context with an appropriate 
theoretical framework. It depicts the world economy as an arena of inter-state cooperation, where the 
core actors are the States (like in the realist approach), but they delegate power to international 
organizations. It does share some features with realism, since it recognizes that States are self-
interested. But they are also rational actors, and that is why they agree on delegating some of their 
powers to the supranational level. Therefore, cooperation is achieved thanks to the rational decision by 
States, which understand that multilateralism through international institutions is functional to the 
pursuit or their own interests (Woods 2001). The advantages from cooperating are clearly explained by 
two examples drawn from game theory: the prisoner’s dilemma and multiple games with the adoption 
of tit-for-tat strategies. Especially in the latter case, after the first round the players understand that it 
becomes rational to cooperate, otherwise both will stay in a sub-optimal situation. Hence, the rational 
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acknowledgement that it is good for States to institutionalize their cooperation in the long run, in order 
to gain mutual benefits (Keohane and Martin 1995).  
In the next paragraph I will focus on the case of Argentina, and show, through a neo-liberal 
institutionalism approach, how the country has refused to adopt rationality in its choices, at the 
expenses of its economic stability and its international role.  
3.4.3 Argentina and its role as an emerging actor 
A disappointing negotiating behavior 
As shown in the previous paragraph and chapters, Argentina is today one of the most important 
countries in Latin America from an economic point of view. Should we try to assess its economic 
power, we could define it as a ‘medium-sized’ country, not only in terms of GDP but  also of 
government revenues, foreign currency reserves, export of goods and services, and human capital, 
according to the empirical methodology followed by Basu et al. (2011). Therefore, Argentina’s 
economic size and potential of projecting its power abroad would provide a sufficient explanation to its 
inclusion into the G20 membership as a regional pivot and according to the country’s ranking among 
the top-30 classification of economic power.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to observe and analyze the country’s behavior, the story is quite different. 
In this paragraph I will analyze Argentina’s strategy in the international economic arena and provide 
policy indications drawing upon a theoretical framework based on the negotiation strategy of emerging 
powers and including it within the neo-liberal institutional approach described in the previous 
paragraph. 
The increasing interconnectedness and interdependence between States, and between them with non-
State actors, means that power relations have to be analyzed under the negotiating behavior deployed 
by such actors. Developing and rising powers are characterized for adopting particular strategies at this 
respect, since they are defined as States that have established themselves as “veto-players” in the 
international system, but have still not acquired agenda-setting power (Narlikar 2013a). It is important 
to note that the concept of “veto player”  has to be considered in a flexible way, meaning that veto-
players are actors whose agreement is required in order to change the status-quo (Narlikar 2003, 
Tsebelis 1995)Among them the BRICS (Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa) are the main 
examples, but there is an increasing number of “outbreak nations” (Sharma 2012) that can be 
compared to the former ones because of similar features and potential, although maybe at a more 
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reduced scale (regional rather than global). I include Argentina within this category and will use the 
following framework to explain its behavior. I argue that Argentina can be considered  a veto player, 
with respect to the following taxonomy, especially as member of the G20 and of the MERCOSUR. Of 
course, given its smaller size in comparison to Brazil, Argentina’s role as a veto player is more evident 
and effective at the regional level, and the MERCOSUR offers a useful example at this respect. Narlikar 
(2013a) elaborates a taxonomy that highlights three particular aspects of negotiating behavior: 
- Negotiation strategy: it comprehends a continuum from distributive strategies, which include 
tactics based on refusals to make any concessions, issuing threats and penalties and threatening 
other players, to integrative strategies that comprise attempts to explore common solutions, 
which means strategies aimed at “expanding the pie”. In other words, these strategies involve a 
spectrum between conflictive and cooperative solutions; 
- Coalitions:51 two sets of oppositions can be listed. The first one is between bloc-type versus 
issue-based coalitions: the first ones usually include like-minded states willing to share common 
values and beliefs in view of a broad range of targets to jointly achieve; issue-based coalitions 
are characterized by a higher degree of pragmatism and they are formed in order to address a 
specific problem. This is the main reason why the latter generally tend to last for shorter 
periods. The second set of coalitions is a polarization between balancing and bandwagoning. 
Balanced coalitions are generally formed by actors that share a similar amount of power, while 
bandwagoning strategies are generally applied by weaker states that align with stronger ones in 
order to enjoy some of the benefits the latter would gain anyway.  
- Framing: this category refers more to the area of ideas and how different actors view their 
objectives. This has to do with hierarchy and political cultures, but also with the international 
context and the particular institution where the negotiation is taking place. Framing tactics are 
likely to vary not only with the position of particular actors in the international hierarchy and 
their political cultures, but also with the international context and the particular institution 
where the negotiation is taking place.  
The negotiating behavior can be deployed with established powers (i.e. the US, the EU, Japan), or with 
other emerging powers, within the context of multilateral and international organizations, and also with 
private actors.  
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 By coalition we mean “a group of states that comes together in pursuit of a common end” (Narlikar 2003) 
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According to this taxonomy, that is quite parsimonious but helpful, it is possible to define the behavior 
of an emerging power in the global context. For example, the analysis of Brazil suggests that the 
country tends to establish bloc-based coalitions (the so-called “South-South” cooperation) with low 
ideological content but determined by real-politik motivations (Burgess 2013). The case study of India 
suggests also that this country shows a tendency to form balancing rather than bandwagoning coalitions 
and some degree of distributive bargaining (Narlikar 2013b). 
Therefore,it is possible to apply this methodology to analyze Argentina’s action in the three multilateral 
organizations used as a case study in the three previous chapters. 
 
Table 3.4.2 – Argentina’s behavior in the IMF 
Negotiating behavior   
Strategy Distributive Integrative 
 X  
Coalitions Bloc-Type Issue-based 
  X 
 Balanced Bandwagoning 
  X 
Framing Ideological Non-ideological 
 X  
Source: elaboration of the author
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Table 3.4.3 – Argentina’s behavior in the G20 
Negotiating behavior   
Strategy Distributive Integrative 
 X  
Coalitions Bloc-Type Issue-based 
  X 
 Balanced Bandwagoning 
  X 
Framing Ideological Non-ideological 
 X  
Source: elaboration of the author 
Table 3.4.4 – Argentina’s behavior in the MERCOSUR 
Negotiating behavior   
Strategy Distributive Integrative 
 X  
Coalitions Bloc-Type Issue-based 
 X  
 Balanced Bandwagoning 
 X  
Framing Ideological Non-ideological 
 X  
Source: elaboration of the author 
Chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 were dedicated to the analysis of Argentina’s behavior within some of the 
most important economic multilateral organizations, two at the global level (the IMF and the G20), one 
at the regional level. The discontinuity between global and local organizations was adopted in order to 
identify similarities or differences in the type of action deployed by Argentina. 
Tables 3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 briefly show my findings, summarized through the negotiating framework 
explained in the above. It seems that Argentina has adopted a similar strategy in all the three 
organizations object of the analysis, with some remarkable differences between the global and the 
regional level. Argentina’s strategy has been relatively more distributive both in the IMF and the G20, 
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as well as in MERCOSUR., and the type of coalitions where the country took part have been relatively 
more issue-based and characterized by bandwagoning in the IMF and G20, while the coalition scheme 
adopted in MERCOSUR is relatively more bloc-type and balanced. These results are particularly 
evident in the case of the troubled and long-lasting relationship with the IMF: the asymmetric 
bargaining power of Argentina with the Fund, and in particular with the United States, resulted into a 
distributive strategy implemented mainly towards unilateral actions like the repayment of the debt 
towards the Fund in a single instalment or in the refusal to comply with the Article IV Consultations. 
The implementation of these choices progressively put Argentina in a position of isolation, from where 
it is difficult even to implement bandwagoning in coalitions. A similar attitude has been observed in the 
G20, where Argentina has the lowest compliance rate to the decisions taken at a collective level during 
the summits. A partial different behavior was observed with respect to MERCOSUR, where the 
attempts to establish a stronger and more stable cooperation were made, at least during the first decade 
of the organization. In this case, the strategy has been more integrative and the coalition more of a 
‘bloc-type’ and balanced, although especially in the last years the rise of tit-for-tat retaliations with 
Brazil changed the direction of Argentina’s behavior in a more distributive way. 
Therefore, the country’s behavior can be defined ‘irrational’ especially because it lacks of coordination 
between the other developing countries members of the forum, so that it is not able to take part in 
stable and comprehensive coalitions. In this respect, Argentina is much less involved in the so-called 
“South-South” cooperation, differently from Brazil, where since Lula’s presidency economic foreign 
policy was based on the promotion of strong relationships with other developing countries (especially 
in Africa), so that today Brazil is seen by many States as a potential source of political support, 
developmental assistance and commercial opportunity (Burgess 2013). In other words, for its growing 
economic importance as a major commodity exporter, Argentina could have nurtured the ambition, as 
its bigger neighbor, to become a ‘bridge’ between the North and the South of the world, so as to gain in 
‘immaterial’ terms (international reputation and consideration) but also in terms of external trade and 
attraction of new investments into the country.  
The Kirchner governments were not able to do so because of the wrong ‘framing’ adopted in their 
negotiating behavior. In all my case studies, it appears that Argentina’s framing, i.e. its view of the 
world, has been characterized by ideological assumptions and considerations, which led to an 
exaggeration of populism and economic protectionism. This ended up with narrowing the space for 
capital inflows, while the country would need much more foreign investment, and undermining the 
global competitiveness of its firms. Argentina’s closure towards the rest of the world also negatively 
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affected the regional integration process, since the trade disputes with Brazil (but also with Uruguay, 
although at a lesser extent) led MERCOSUR to a standstill (see chapter 3.3).  
As already shown, the final outcome of this underperforming negotiating behavior is leading Argentina 
to be a ‘pariah’ in international relations. How this can be avoided, it will be the object of the next 
paragraph where a neo-liberal institutional approach will be adopted. 
The thin line between relevance and irrelevance on the global stage 
In the previous chapters it was shown how Argentina managed to recover successfully from the severe 
economic crisis of 2001/2002. Growth has been impressive during the last decade, as well as the 
improvements of living conditions of Argentine people. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the 
country’s economic power, intended in the terms explained in the above, has increased. As a rising 
nation, Argentina cannot use properly its veto power because the policies implemented so far, as well as 
its reduced economic size, are confining it to a position of irrelevance in the global system. This is why 
I argue that Argentina’s behavior in the international arena is ‘irrational’ in the sense that distributive 
negotiating strategies, based on retaliation, and bandwagoning coalitions, are detrimental to its 
economic welfare.  
The global and the regional level have to be considered in parallel. At the global level, Argentina is 
progressively isolating itself from the rest of the international economic community, while at the 
regional level the country is unable to push forward the integration process through an effective 
development of the MERCOSUR.  
What can Argentina do in order to gain a more important role and to increase its economic power? 
First of all, the assessment of the country’s power showed that its capacity of projection is and will be 
limited, given its reduced population, productive capacity and also considering its peripheral 
geographical position in relation to the rest of the world. This condition should be the preliminary 
assessment by Argentine authorities in order to develop a pragmatic foreign economic policy that takes 
into account strengths but also structural weaknesses that limit the country’s international role. 
This means that Argentina can aspire to a role as a medium power, able to exert power and influence 
only at the regional level. In order to gain importance at an upper stage, it should not act alone, but in 
coalition with other emerging economies. According to the negotiation scheme proposed in the 
previous paragraph, Argentina should reverse its strategies from distributive to integrative and form 
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balanced coalitions with developing countries from other regions. This would be the only way for the 
country to play an international role, given its negligible veto power for the reasons already explained.  
This can be achieved inside the existing multilateral institutions. The G20 provides a unique platform 
where it is possible, at least in principles, to develop a new global economic governance that fosters 
macroeconomic coordination and international trade, and where all players have the same weight. The 
IMF, on the other hand, is also going through a reform process in the sense of an extended 
participation for developing countries. These organizations are clear examples of an evolving situation, 
which should be seen as an opportunity for Argentina to be part of this process where new rules are 
defined and more space for new actors is allowed. The neo-liberal institutional perspective is the most 
suitable to describe the current situation and also to interpret the window of opportunity that Argentina 
is facing, but that is narrowing day after day. The country should still pursue its national economic 
interest, but in a different way, playing an active role inside the global institutions. In pragmatic terms, 
Argentina should make a ‘u-turn’ in its economic policies giving up to its economic nationalism and 
opening its economy to imports (as a way to stimulate domestic productivity and competitiveness) and 
to foreign capitals, in order to foster investments which are extremely needed to propel its economic 
growth.  
However, Argentina has to be relevant in its region before being relevant at the world level. This can be 
achieved only by adopting a different attitude within MERCOSUR and in particular with its main 
economic partner and neighbor, Brazil. Born in the neo-liberal context of the Washington Consensus), 
MERCOSUR was designed as a strategic response to the imperatives generated by the globalization 
processes aimed at enhancing markets, trade and investment (Riggirozzi 2011). In order to work 
properly as a custom union and a future common market, it should have followed the following stages: 
trade creation; an increasing competition intra-bloc; the exploitation of economies of scale; intra-bloc 
cooperation in projects related to technological innovation; a more rational production obtained 
through a regional ‘division of labor’; economic complementarity (Balassa 1961). Especially the latter 
stages were not properly implemented, so that MERCOSUR is currently at a standstill and it is also 
taking some steps backwards in terms of trade liberalization (see chapter 3.3).  
This happened for two main reasons. The first one is a change in the ideological ‘framing’ of 
MERCOSUR, which in the 2000s was seen more as in opposition to the neo-liberal project of the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), that led to a more ‘political’ rather than economic conception of 
the regional organization (Bernal-Meza 2008). Argentina and Brazil shared this common view, but soon 
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after that divergences between the two States became evident. While Brazil shaped its foreign policy on 
the basis of a realist perspective, but also of the recognition that a favorable international institutional 
framework was necessary to support its ambitions to play a global role, Argentina behaved in the 
opposite way (as already shown) and did not support Brazil’s ambitions, as made clear, for instance, by 
its opposition to Brazil’s claim to gain a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. These 
contrasting views in terms of foreign policy were amplified by the trade disputes that led to a new rise 
in protectionism (see chapter 3.3). 
Therefore, it seems that Argentina is following an inappropriate path also at the regional level. Given its 
limited size, it should exert effort in two directions in order to strengthen its role as a regional power. 
First of all, it should foster a real economic integration, enhancing specialization among the different 
MERCOSUR members and integration in the regional value chains (see part I). On the other hand, it 
should establish a balanced coalition with Brazil, in order to contribute and take advantage of its 
strategic position at the global level. For example, Brazil has been listed among the strategic partners of 
the European Union since 2007 and  a joint action plan has been established for the years 2012-2014, 
which includes a deepening of economic relations, especially in terms of FDI (the EU is the main 
foreign investor in Brazil) (European Commission 2013). Negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement 
with the MERCOSUR were stalling but a new round of talks was held in October 2012; however, a 
positive final outcome still seems far to be achieved. There are indeed some trade disputes and there 
are even proposals for economic sanctions and retaliations by the EU in response to Argentina’s 
protectionist measures (Brandt and Erixon 2013a).  
In conclusion, if Argentina changed its negotiation strategy, aiming at establishing balanced and deeper 
coalitions with Brazil and other developing countries, and at opening up its economic policies, it might 
take advantage of the favorable global framework. This would help Argentina come out of the current 
international isolation and also contribute to its economic growth and development. 
3.4.4 Conclusion: Argentina’s wasted potential to become a regional power 
 In this chapter it was shown how the world economic environment is rapidly changing; from a 
unipolar structure, dominated by the United States, the distribution of economic power (which 
definition takes into account several dimensions and not only a nation’s GDP) is becoming more and 
more equal among emerging powers. The BRICS are the most important emerging nations from a 
geopolitical and geoeconomic point of view and Argentina cannot aspire to play a decisive role at the 
global level. Nevertheless, given its growing and developing economy and its resources, it is a medium 
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power and it could be a leader at least in the South American region, at least in the MERCOSUR 
integration organization.  
However, given the ‘irrational’ policies adopted particularly during the last decade, Argentina is not 
exploiting its advantages and assets that would allow it to be more important on the global stage. The 
analysis of the three case studies (Argentina and the IMF, the G20 and MERCOSUR) was made 
applying a theoretical framework from the International Political Economy. The neo-liberal 
institutionalism, compared to realist and marxist theories, was considered as the most appropriate to 
explain today’s context, where a new wave of multilateralism in the management of global economy is 
being fostered through the G20, an organization characterized by a low level of formalization where 
developing countries have the same weight as developed ones. Moreover, a negotiating behavior 
scheme was adopted in order to describe Argentina’s action within these three organizations. 
My findings show that the country is not negotiating its position in the global economy properly, since 
it is implementing strategies based on retaliation and bandwagoning without having tools powerful 
enough in order to deploy its veto power in an effective way. The outcomes, a progressive isolation at 
the global level, and a standstill in the regional integration process, are detrimental to Argentina’s 
economic development. 
Therefore, a change in Argentina’s ‘framing’ of its economic foreign policy. The example of Brazil, less 
inspired by ideological principles, suggests what the country should do in order to increase its power 
and become a pivotal actor at least in South America. Wider and broader coalitions with other 
emerging markets should be pursued, as well as more open economic policies should be adopted in 
order to increase international trade, attract foreign capitals and raise internal competitiveness. 
There is a clear way ahead for Argentina, and this should be included within the current evolving 
international economic system. Otherwise, the country is probably doomed to stay in the ‘limbo’ of 
“frontier nations” for the years coming.52 
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 The Wall Street Stock Exchange Market removed Argentina from the list of “emerging markets” downgrading it to 
the lower class of “frontier markets”, where the rule of law is thin and enforcement of the existing rules even thinner 
(Sharma 2012).  
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APPENDIX – INTERVIEWS TO ARGENTINE EXPERTS 
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Interview to Martin Schorr, Researcher, FLACSO Argentina (Latin American Faculty of Social 
Sciences) 
Ten years after the Kirchner – Néstor and Cristina – took power, what is your evaluation of the 
economic policy framework implemented by their governments? 
The roots of the ‘Kirchnerist’ policies trace back to the context of deep recession in 2002, after the 
default determined by the failure of the neo-liberal model implemented during the 1990s. The first 
important step was the devaluation of the Peso, which had very negative effects in the short run 
reducing salaries by 30% and making the recession even worse. In this context the new Government of 
Néstor Kirchner, elected in 2003, put an end to the model of financial speculation as the core element 
of the process of capital accumulation, introducing a “neo-developmentalist” model based on a growth 
pattern relying on productive sectors. 
In this framework, the industrial growth of the last decade can be divided in two stages. The first one, 
from 2002 to 2007/2008, was entirely focused on keeping a weak exchange rate as basically the only 
instrument of industrial policy. The second stage is parallel to the end of the period of the strong US 
dollar and the break out of the global financial crisis: since then the Government has implemented new 
measures such as import restrictions, more tariffs, interventions to direct investments to specific 
productive sectors). However, both stages were characterized by a general absence of a precise strategy 
and a plan of industrial development.  
Is it true that Argentina is running the risk of coming back to a ‘re-primarization’ of its 
economy?  
I would not agree with statement. It is true that a big part of Argentina’s recent growth can be 
explained by the remarkable performance of its agricultural exports and by the Government revenues 
collected by the taxes imposed on these exports, but the real data about the composition of the Gross 
Domestic Product actually show that there was not a return to the primary sector in terms of 
production and a dismantling of the industrial sector. On the contrary, the intention was to support 
industrial growth and this has been partly achieved thanks to the policy instruments that I mentioned 
before. Some sectors, like agricultural machinery and the automotive, received quite a lot of attention 
and managed to grow. However, the Government was unable to use those instruments in the most 
efficient way, failing to support the smaller and more vulnerable firms, as well as the peripheral regions 
that would need to grow the most. 
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So, why do you say that the industrial policy implemented by the Kirchner did not help 
Argentina’s economy to exploit all its potential? 
There have been a lot of new measures aimed at supporting industrial firms. This at least was a positive 
attempt to rebuild the industrial fabric of the country, after the neo-liberal wave of the 1990s. The main 
problem is that those Government programs were unable to target and prioritize companies, sectors 
and geographical areas that needed this support more. For example, there are different schemes which 
offer financial support repaying up to 40% of the investment undertaken by a firm; but very few firms 
manage to get access to this support, since they are not able to meet the conditions set by the banks in 
order to obtain credit. The underdevelopment of the domestic banking sector is a structural problem of 
Argentina, which affects the most vulnerable firms: smaller, operating in more isolated geographical 
areas (for example in the North-West) and in sectors which are not ‘strategic’, not linked with 
agriculture or the automotive industry. Therefore, it is not true that there is no support for the 
industrial sector: the problem is that policies wrongly designed prevent Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs), which constitute the backbone of Argentina’s industrial system, from developing further. Also, 
in my view it is not true that Argentina is affected by a lack of capital, especially from abroad, for 
investments. We do not need more FDIs, there is a good availability of domestic capital: the problems 
is that the transmission channels do not work properly and money is not allocated where it should be 
more necessary. For instance, much more investments in R&D would be needed in order to exploit 
better the high quality of Argentina’s human capital. Let us look at the episode of the nationalization of 
YPF. Foreign extracting companies used to exploit our natural resources for short-term gains. On the 
contrary, before YPF was sold to Repsol, it acted as a territorial mechanism of economic and social 
development, with its demand to local suppliers and the schools located in rural areas. When the 
company was privatized, all this disappeared. This is why I say that a company like YPF does not need 
more foreign capital, it just needs to be managed well in order to be a useful tool for local economic 
development rather than a speculative opportunity for foreign capital.  
Let us look outside of the country: can Argentina be globally competitive with this economic 
system and policies? What about the challenges posed by China and Brazil? 
First of all, I would like to highlight once again that international competitiveness cannot be pursued 
only by manipulating the exchange rate, something which can be effective in the short-term but that is 
not able to enhance a country’s competitiveness in the long-term because it creates high inflation. 
Moreover, this kind of policies are becoming more and more ineffective because global competitors 
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like China are not competing any longer only on prices and cheap labor costs, but they are upgrading 
more and more the quality of their exports: 17% of the capital goods imported by Argentina come 
from China, they are products with a higher technological content and value added.  
Regarding Brazil, I would say that opening Argentina’s trade to it can be both an opportunity and a 
threat. It is an opportunity for companies operating in sectors like the agro-food and the automotive 
industry, because of the huge Brazilian domestic market. On the contrary, it is a threat for other sectors 
that are more vulnerable to Brazilian imports and because there is little scope in my opinion for 
production integration between the two countries. In the current situation, I think that MERCOSUR is 
only a platform for companies operating in tradable sectors, but the disadvantages for the non tradable 
ones are quite high. This is why I think that more longer-term policies, such as projects to support 
R&D at the firm level, should be prioritized in order to strengthen Argentina’s industrial sector as a 
whole and to guarantee an evenly spread development to all the sectors and regions.  
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Interview to José Maria Fanelli, Senior Researcher at Study Centre of State and Society 
(CEDES), Buenos Aires, and Professor of Economics at the University of San Andrés, Buenos 
Aires  
 
What is your general evaluation after ten years of Kirchnerism? Do you think the economic 
model implemented over the course of the last decade is about to run out of effectiveness?  
To be more precise, there has not been only one model during this decade. There is a big difference 
between the policies implemented between 2003 and 2007 and from 2008 onwards. Policies in the first 
period were consistent and the country grew showing twin surpluses, both in fiscal and current account 
terms. Moreover, the economy was competitive and the government was paying its debt back. The 
turning point is represented by the intervention of the National Institute of Statistics (INDEC): price 
statistics started to be manipulated in January 2007. That was followed by a wave of violation of 
property rights (see chapter 1..2) and of bad public policies, consisting of a rise of public expenditure, 
utilization of the currency reserves held by the Central Bank (with inflationary consequences), 
undervaluation of the exchange rate and increase of the cost of US dollars. Actually, it is even possible 
to identify a third stage, started at the end of 2011 with the imposition of rigid currency exchange 
controls and the exacerbation of the Government’s interventionism. The economy stalled and 
investments started to flow out of the country. This kind of regime is exhausted because the restriction 
of currency flows is more and more harsh given the disequilibrium of the energy balance and the fiscal 
deficit becomes larger because of the burden of energy subsidies and the lack of bureaucratic control. 
There is no future to this kind of situation. The question is not whether this economic system will last, 
but how this is going to change and what the political consequences of this change will be. Therefore, it 
is not very useful to talk about a ‘K-model’.  
The domestic industrial policies are based on the establishment of an undervalued exchange 
rate. Is this still an instrument sufficient to sustain the international competitiveness of 
Argentine products?  
 
The exchange rate is not so undervalued anymore. Of course, it was necessary to impose a strong 
control on the exchange rates and of the imports because of the rise in the cost of US dollars. The 
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Government did not adopt a consistent industrial policy, using at most some instruments from the 
1950s (like the import substitution strategy) that nobody still implements today. Industrial policies, as 
they are today conceived in a modern fashion by authors such as Rodrik, were never taken in 
consideration.  
What evolution do you foresee for national energy policies? The potential of the so-called 
‘shale gas’ seems to be very high, but massive investments are necessary to exploit it. Can the 
recent partnership between YPF and Chevron be considered within a new context of openness 
to foreign capital? 
Argentina has a high potential for the exploitation of shale-gas resources but needs very big 
investments, especially in terms of technology that it does not currently have. Such investments could 
be partly financed by repatriating capitals that flew out of the country (Argentina is today a net creditor 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world) and by attracting FDIs. In order to do so, the pre-condition is to 
generate credibility and predictability in the public policies and to reach a better enforcement of the rule 
of law. This is why the partnership with Chevron does not mean much: the amount of money is limited 
and the juridical framework is very uncertain. For instance, at present multinational corporations 
operating in Argentina cannot distribute dividends. So, who would invest at such conditions?  
 
The World Economic Forum ranked Argentina in 96th position out of 144 countries in its latest 
“Global Competitiveness Report”. What does Argentina need to improve its ‘software’ 
conditions? 
I am not surprised by the fact we are so badly positioned in the competitiveness ranking. Argentina’s 
limitations are not in the lack of viable investment projects, but in its software endowment, i.e. the rules 
of the game, institutions and policies. I think that this aspect can only improve, starting with a 
government change in 2015. It would be very hard for the current Government to obtain credibility 
back. 
Nowadays, what is Argentina’s potential in the international economic environment? Is there a 
risk of isolation and, if this is the case, what could the consequences be? 
I don’t think Argentina will isolate itself from the rest of the world. It is not in the DNA of the 
country, that was built on the exploitation of international trade and immigration during the first wave 
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of globalization. It was the current government that isolated itself from the rest of the world, and the 
consequences are really negative. For example, given the fact that Argentina is a net creditor and has a 
low public debt, how to explain that the country does not have access to the international capital 
markets and that the country risk is much higher than Brazil’s, which has a much higher public debt 
and a current account deficit? The only possible explanation is that the policies implemented by this 
administration since 2007 are unreasonable: Argentina has political and economic disputes with its 
neighbors (Chile, Brazil), with the international investors, with the Paris Club, with Spain, and so on 
and so forth. However, in order not to be wrong about the country’s future, it would be better to talk 
of ‘Argentina’ instead of the ‘current Government’. The next one will surely have a lot of work to do in 
order to recompose the relationship with the rest of the world, but it will be also able to gain a lot of 
benefit from the exploitation of all the promising projects that the Government is not taking advantage 
of because of its irrationality. Vaca Muerta is only an example.  
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Interview to Verónica Moreno, Former advisor at the Foreign Relations of the Presidency of 
Argentina 
 
Despite the economic and social progress obtained by Argentina over the course of the last 
decade, what are the biggest challenges the country will have to face in the next few years? Can 
the progressive isolation of Argentina with respect to the global economy decrease its external 
vulnerability or, on the contrary, be detrimental? 
 
It’s true that Argentina remained for a period relatively isolated from the international financial 
instability, mostly thanks to the nationalization of the private pension funds in 2008, which represented 
a high proportion of the public debt. The nationalization of those funds and their conversion into 
public assets made possible to re-finance the debt at inferior interest rates to the market, thus reducing 
the financial cost of the consequences of the crisis. At the same time, the utilization of the foreign 
currency reserves of the Central Bank in order to service the debt with private holders and multilateral 
organizations allowed Argentina to remain partially immune to the global financial turbulences. 
In this context, there have not been significant private capital inflows to the domestic financial sector 
(the total of credits circulating is just equal to 15% of GDP), in a moment when FDIs to Argentina 
were quite scarce. Therefore domestic financial stability was not significantly harmed by sudden 
movements in the capital flows.  
The crisis produced a more visible shock on the side of international trade shown in 2009, when there 
was a 12% decrease of the price of Argentine exports, made even worse by the drought that led to a 
35% contraction of the volume of agricultural exports. Despite this slow down, since 2010 there was a 
strong upward rebound of prices, with a moderation in the second half of 2011. Therefore, the 
economy started again to grow strongly, with a 8% GDP growth in 2010 and 2011, thanks to the anti-
cyclical macroeconomic policies implemented in 2009 as well as to the recover from the drought in 
2010 and the rise of commodity prices in 2010-2011. This process was accompanied by an expansion of 
imports in response to the expansion of aggregate demand and the undervalued exchange rate. The 
pressure on external liquidity that came from the acceleration of imports was amplified in 2011 by the 
rapid outflows of private capital, that put an obstacle to the strategy of the Government aimed at 
reducing Argentina’s exposure to the international financial risk. These developments led the 
Government to impose restrictions on trade and international capital movements at the end of 2011, 
which was successful in the short run by putting a brake on the fall of the trade surplus and by avoiding 
excessive capital outflows.  
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A key point is that Argentina’s GDP growth during the last years was mainly driven by internal 
investments and by an intensive use of production factors, and not by an increase of total factor 
productivity. This process is not sustainable in the context of a global crisis, because an intensive use of 
these factors leads to their scarcity, affecting internal competitiveness in the long run. At the same time, 
an increase of productivity is necessary to maintain growth in the long run and keeping the debt 
sustainable, reducing pressure on the external liquidity, which will allow to reduce the need to impose 
trade barriers and capital movements. 
In accordance to what happened at the global level, Argentina increased its degree of protectionism, 
but at a much stronger rate than other countries. Argentina is among the top-ten countries which 
impose the highest number of trade restrictions.  
In this framework, Argentina’s economic outlook starts to deteriorate affecting negatively the 
population: distrust is further deepened by the fact that 2013 is an electoral year. The slowdown in 
growth, as well as the steady increase of public expenditure, might lead the country to the necessity of a 
fiscal adjustment. Although the Government ensures that the economy grew at a 2.8% in the first two 
months of the year, some private consultancies have lower estimates. For instance, Elypsis, whose 
leader is the former Chief Economist of the Central Bank, Eduardo Levy Yeyati, foresees a 2% growth 
in 2013, lower than the rest of Latin America. 
The annual inflation rate should be between around 22% and 25%, according to the provincial 
statistical agencies that realize the measurements, since the National Institute of Statistics (INDEC) is 
accused, even by the IMF (see chapter 3.1) of data manipulating. Not even the price control policy, 
based on an agreement between the Government and the supermarkets, is able to put an end to the 
price rise since the wholesalers keep the branded products included in the price-freezing off sale.  
Social unrest increased in the last months forcing the Government to move salaries up of a 24.4% in 
the first quarter of 2013, according to the inflation, and to increase the minimum free-tax amount 
applied to salaries, after the Government lost the primary elections.  
Tax collection increased in the first four months by a 28.5%, more than the inflation rate. Tax 
imposition is also rising and Argentina is the Latin American country with the highest tax rate, equal to 
40% of GDP.  
According to the external trade, exports decreased by a 3% in the first quarter, especially for the 
reduction of wheat, oil, soy oil and bio-fuel exports. On the contrary, imports increased by a 5% in the 
same period, given that Argentina had to increase by 57% its energy purchase. The energy deficit 
provided a sort of justification for the nationalization of YPF in 2012: despite the intention to reduce 
external dependency, it is difficult for the Government to attract the necessary investments to exploit 
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the basin of non conventional gas that has been recently discovered at Vaca Muerta, Patagonia, and that 
has only attracted a limited interest of Chevron so far.  
In the currency black market, the US dollar is 70% more expensive than in the legal market. The 
Government is considering what measures to undertake at this respect. At the moment is discarding the 
hypothesis of a devaluation or a liberalization of currency flows because it fears that this might end up 
with a higher inflation and because this is an electoral year.  
At the same time, the systematic depreciation of the Argentine peso negatively affects the real estate 
sector and is starting to hit the firms, some of which engage in financial speculation by illegally buying 
US dollars instead of investing or satisfying debts taken abroad. Multinational corporations, having to 
bear the effects of internal devaluation, also increase prices of their goods and services in order to 
better compensate their shareholders. 
On the other hand, the support given to energy consumption through subsidies over the course of the 
last decade has been one of the main reasons why Argentina lost its twin surpluses (fiscal and current 
account). In fiscal issues, increasing subsidies, as a result of the insufficient update of energy tariffs, 
strongly contributed to the public deficit. The ‘autarchy’ principle undertaken by the Government, 
together with the difficulty to get access to the foreign credit market after the 2001 default, resulted into 
an increasing dependency on resources drained from the Central Bank to fill the deficit, both by 
printing money (thus causing inflation) and by using foreign currency reserves. By the same token, the 
need to import hydrocarbons has been rising, up to the point that since 2011 Argentina has been a net 
energy importer, for the first time after twenty years.  
To sum up, the economic statistics do not look very promising at the moment. The deterioration of the 
public account has been financed by printing money, which boosts inflation. The latter weakens savings 
in domestic currency and pushes the demand for US dollars and the rising gap between the value of the 
currency on the legal market and on the black market. Lack of trust turned also into a massive run on 
foreign currency denominated deposits, which harms the reserves of the Central Bank. All of this has 
to be included in a context of low growth, if compared to the regional average.  
However, Argentina’s points of strength lie in its comparative advantages in sectors like the food and 
the mining industry, its low public indebtedness and the low vulnerability of the external sector, and the 
low levels of leverage, both public and private. 
The items that weigh the most in Argentine exports (which include agricultural  and mineral 
commodities as well as cars) have been very dynamic during the last five years. The potential price 
volatility of commodity prices exported by Argentina and the slowing down of emerging economies 
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might weaken this strength: for that reason I would suggest a wider diversification of products and 
destinations of exports. 
Argentina starts from a quite good position in terms of public debt. The debt-to-GDP ratio was 44.9% 
at the end of 2012. This condition reduces the country’s vulnerability to global financial shocks. The 
low interest rate on the debt stock associated to the restructuring of the debt realized in 2005, together 
with rates inferior to the market, allow to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio at the current level even with a 
relatively low long-run GDP growth, without having to generate big primary fiscal surpluses. In the 
same way, the Government chose not to enter the market to satisfy its financing needs, using the 
reserves of the Central Bank to service its debt with private creditors and multilateral organizations. In 
this way it is possible to keep an interest rate inferior to the market, strengthening debt sustainability. 
At present, the Government is waiting for the decision in the Supreme Court of the United States with 
respect to the holders of Argentine debt, which might force to change its strategy. 
It is worth to highlight that, although this strategy can bring about macroeconomic strength in the short 
run, propensity to financial autarky does not offer any positive contribution to the long-run growth, as 
clearly seen in the Argentine experience during the post-war era.  
In a framework where global liquidity is going to be abundant for a long period, choosing financial 
autarky can lead to miss opportunities to sustain long-run growth without jeopardizing the 
sustainability of public debt. If Argentina came at a negotiation table with the Club of Paris, it would be 
good that future debt emissions, both public and private, have a long maturity and rates consistent to 
the growth rates of Argentina, and that be preferably aimed at financing high productivity investments. 
But, if the country insists on the autarky option, it might worsen its fiscal deficit.  
Every crisis offers challenges and opportunities, and in this case there is no exception to this rule. On 
the side of challenges, it is worth mentioning the need to avert the fiscal deficit (in 2012 the first deficit 
since 1996 was recorded) and also the current account deficit in order to avoid distortions that reduce 
productivity and competitiveness.  
Many rich countries with problems of indebtedness and in their external sector choose to introduce 
competitive devaluations. In this framework, policies promoting competitiveness are necessary. The 
move to exports of goods and services characterized by higher sophistication is key to accelerate the 
growth rate through a deeper action of learning by doing. But at this respect Argentina has problems to 
face the challenge to generate an accelerated productivity growth, which is the most important element 
to converge to the levels of income of developed countries.  
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 2010 assessed that the factors that mostly push 
growth down in different Latin American countries, including Argentina, are: 
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a) A disproportionate market share captured by low-productivity firms, especially in the services 
sector but also in the manufacturing, because of market failures and policies that introduce 
distortions in favor of firms characterized by a lower productivity; 
b) The low intensity of technological innovation, especially in the private sector; 
c) The high transportation costs, intern and international, that reduce international 
competitiveness and investments in new export activities; 
d) The low financial development, that prevents most productive firms from expanding further 
and less productive firms from technological upgrade. 
It should be added to those factors the lack of the rule of law, which is unfortunately commonly spread 
in the country. Argentina is one of the country with the highest number of pending trials at the 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) of the World Bank, and at other 
international courts. Other fast-growing Latin American countries, such as Peru, Chile, Colombia, 
despite they changed political majorities several times, have clear that part of their economic systems 
cannot be modified if they want to keep attracting investments. One of the most important flaws of 
Argentina is the permanent modification of the ‘rules of the game’, which might seriously affect the 
generation of trust in a context where FDIs are absolutely necessary.  
 
Argentina is member of the G20, an important organization for the definition of the 
multilateral economic governance, but its contribution has been quite scarce and is the country 
with the lowest rate of implementation of the decisions taken at the G20 summits. What are the 
reasons of this behavior and what should Argentina do to play a more relevant role? 
 
According to the political actors taking part in its formation, Argentina was included in the G20 in 1999 
because of its alignment to the US and for the adoption of neo-liberal policies become popular during 
the 1990s under the name of “Washington Consensus”; in such a context Argentina was considered as 
the example to follow, since it strictly followed the doctrine spread through the recommendations of 
the IMF and the WB.  
With the change of political orientation and the economic policies that became common in Latin 
America since the beginning of the 2000s, Argentina broke its automatic alignment and turned its 
international inclusion towards a deepening of its relationships with the other countries of the region, 
and with other ‘emerging’ countries like China, India and Russia. 
Therefore, within the G20 we saw the formation of ‘blocs’ , among which there is the ‘Anglosaxon’, 
which holds the biggest capacity of action and proposition, followed by the ‘European’ and then by the 
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‘BRICS’. In this framework, Argentina remained closer to the BRICS, but it kept a degree of freedom 
in function of its national interests and priorities. 
The opportunities to intervene, propose or veto the countries that do not belong to any of these groups 
like Argentina, are quite scarce. This is why the strategy of those countries, characterized by a small 
political and economic weight consisted in joining ‘critical mass’ from the periphery and take 
advantages of the spaces when opinions between principal actors are contradictory, sustain converging 
positions, discarding the inappropriate or not favorable ones and at the time to make proposals, explore 
alliances with the most relevant partners. 
Nevertheless, the Argentine experience regarding economic and financial crisis might offer a relevant 
contribution to the group. It is worth to mention that in the framework of the current Argentine 
government the main topics presented at the summits were: countercyclical policies, financial 
regulation, international financial institutions, labor conditions and more recently money laundering and 
debt conversion.  
 
Let us talk about regional integration: the trade disputes with Brazil harmed the integration 
process in MERCOSUR. This could have negative consequences not only at the regional level, 
but also at the global level, since the project of a free-trade area with the EU is at a standstill 
and Brazil would like to start negotiations with Bruxelles alone. What are the perspectives for 
Argentina in this context? 
 
Since the second half of the 1980s the bilateral relations moved from the traditional competitiveness in 
political and strategic issues to focus on promoting a common economic agenda on the basis of 
cooperation and complementarity. The creation of MERCOSUR in the 1990s was the corollary of this 
convergence pushing on the intensification of the economic bindings.  
Despite these good intentions, the bilateral agenda was always focused on the management of bilateral 
economic disputes leaving the strategic orientation aside. In this context the Brazilian financial sector 
grew a lot while the same did not happen in Argentina, so that the relations between the two 
Governments became stagnating.  
The growth of private business in Brazil was accompanied by a fragmented vision on the desirable kind 
of relationships with Argentina: while the Government and some business sectors having interests in 
Argentina or showing political sensitivity to the importance of the bilateral relationship adopted a sort 
of ‘strategic patience’, other influent sectors asked for bigger autonomy for Brazilian initiatives in the 
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international field and for a firmer answer against the protectionist measures adopted by Argentina. As 
a consequence, the stimulus to expand the bilateral relationship became less intense.    
These changes in the dominant perceptions were influenced by different factors. Among those which 
had a positive impact it is possible to mention three: the expectation that the political bilateral 
relationship might contribute to increase the ‘capital’ of Brazil vis-à-vis the rest of the world, the vision 
that Argentina could contribute to Brazil’s target to become included in the global economy, and the 
increase of the interdependence due to the rise of trading flows and investments. However, in parallel 
to these positive factors it is necessary to mention some negative ones: the asymmetries in terms of 
economic size and the opposition to accept restrictions to the internal policies of industrial 
development and investments attraction or to the Brazilian strategies in different international fora. 
While the origin and the dynamics of the positive factors is relatively autonomous (especially the 
political incentives), the negative ones were highly articulated: in particular, there was a direct 
relationship between the perception of growing asymmetry and the lower availability from Brazil to 
accept restrictions in the management of internal and external policies. The result was a relationship 
concentrated in the administration of ordinary disputes within a complete lack of a strategic agenda.   
On its side, in Argentina the perception is expanding that Brazil is more and more increasing its 
strategic importance as economic partner. During the last few years, Brazil became a more relevant 
economic partner and is gaining importance not only in the region, but globally.  
There is no consensus on the specific content the relationship with Brazil should have and, even if in 
the debate the references to a strategic partnership are quite common, the bilateral economic 
relationships are managed with a short-term view in the framework of a mutually defensive interaction. 
This situation is mainly the consequence of bilateral asymmetries with respect to: the size, the 
participation in the respective markets, the standards of specialization and the regulatory disputes. 
These divergences come from conceptual and ideological differences, asymmetries in the institutional 
framework and in resource endowments in the public organization and policies. 
The development of Brazil in the last decades, the diversification of its production structure and the 
weight gained on the global stage are sufficient reasons why Argentina might reconsider the costs and 
benefits of the economic relationship with Brazil and, in this framework of growing asymmetries, find 
ways to stimulate the strategic interest of its neighbor. 
Against this objective there is a strong internal unrest originated by the adoption of inconsistent and 
short-sighted policies. Among those, the most criticized by Brazil were the import restrictions and the 
currency controls on the US dollar. Another issue that deeply worries Brazil is the reduction of 
opportunities to get access to credit by the Argentine government, which directly affects Brazilian firms 
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and, more broadly, the MERCOSUR as a whole. All this situation goes against the deepening of the 
capital market, and reduced the possibility for the local economic agents to plan, favoring activities able 
to provide immediate returns.  
The sectors dominated by the presence of MNCs show heterogeneous perspectives. Their future 
obviously depends on the public policies and the coordinated actions both Governments will eventually 
undertake. Despite the principal global MNCs act simultaneously in both countries, evidence about 
complementarity and specialization in global value chains (GVCs) is scarce. After the experience of the 
late 1990s, the risk of a competition policy for the attraction of investments through incentives is still 
there and its effects potentially negative for Argentina deepened as the bilateral asymmetries broadened. 
Therefore, in this area it is difficult to develop cooperative strategies without a leadership of public 
policies which include an effective commitment from Brazil. 
Moreover, there is a complex of activities with a potential of complementarity that could push for a 
bigger cooperation and integration, like agro-industrial chains (both countries are facing similar 
challenges in moving up the value chains), firms specialized in providing mechanical components (oil 
industry, automotive industry), tourism and other services. In this context, the free trade negotiations 
between the MERCOSUR and the European Union, that have been ongoing since 1999, reflected once 
again, in August 2013, the persistence of intra-bloc divergences.  
In practice, the deputy Minister of Development and Industry of Brazil, Ricardo Schaefer, said that 
technical alternatives are being considered, in case a common agreement on the future of MERCOSUR 
is reached. These options would consist in the negotiation of ‘different-speed’ agreements for every 
country, although the Brazilian Foreign Ministry ensured that any decision will be agreed upon by all 
the partners. 
According to the Itamaraty (the name used for Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Brazil will not 
negotiate a separate agreement with the EU, as long as the opening to third markets that involve most 
of the goods and services is defined as a single bloc. Moreover, it was said that any position taken by 
the Brazilian Government has to be previously debated and supported by the Chamber of External 
Trade, an inter-ministerial body. 
The only exception will be Venezuela which, in order to fully join MERCOSUR, is still going through a 
joining process to the Common External Tariff that defines the openness of MERCOSUR as a whole 
with respect to the external countries or blocs. 
Nevertheless, as the Argentine economic context keeps on deteriorating it should not be discarded that 
Brazil decides to open direct negotiations with the EU, as already done by Colombia and Chile, as long 
as it relaxes its trade restrictions, according to the critics contained in the last report of the European 
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Commission (September 2013) in which both Argentina and Brazil are listed among the countries that 
most restrictive regulations to trade applied, together with Russia, India, Indonesia, Ukraine and South 
Africa.  
 
Fredrik Erixon of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) defined 
Argentina as “a pariah in global economy”, should it continue with this attitude, especially in 
trade and FDIs issues. Do you think this risk is real? What could the consequences be? 
I have to make a strong effort to answer this question without feeling personally involved. I have been 
told for all my life that, in occasion of each crisis, that is going to be the last one in Argentina. And 
every time the country is able to rise back again from its ashes. Argentina is a country that has been 
deeply analyzed because it went through all the possible economic circumstances. Argentina 
experienced almost everything over the course of the last 30 years. In 1989 and 1990, years with an 
annual inflation rate of 4000% and 1300%; afterwards, between 1999 and 2001, a 25% fall of GDP. 
This is why is almost compulsory for an economist to pay a visit to Argentina.  
Today, the main problem of the country is the lack of trust not only in the foreigners but in the 
Argentine people themselves: social unrest is rising. The most dynamic countries of Latin America have 
been devoted in the last decade to put a brake to the inflow of US dollars, so that their national 
currencies do not appreciate too much and lose competitiveness. In Argentina, the opposite happened: 
controls on currency movements were applied, as well as restrictions to imports and measures to stop 
the outflow of dollars. We had a default in 2001 and we then experienced a decade of growth, due to 
the rising prices of commodities that resulted in a 30% annual inflation, but now the tailwind is off and 
we are going to face a stagflation. Not even the global economic situation is good. Uncertainty is not 
only centered in Argentina, since the emerging countries are growing slowly while the developed ones 
are going through a crisis.  
The years 2014 and 2015 will be crucial to our future, considering that we are in an international 
context of transition where Argentina has two directions to choose: to keep on isolating from the 
international context, committing a political and economic suicide, or taking advantage of this context 
and looking for opportunities outside.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis offered a comprehensive analysis of Argentina’s position and role within the global 
economy, adopting different methodologies of the economic analysis.  
The focus of the research started from the analysis of the domestic economic dimension of the 
country. It was then broadened to the study of the determinants of Argentina’s trading flows with its 
regional partners, and finally to the analysis of Argentina’s global inclusion in the management of the 
global economy. 
The first part was a study of Argentina’s economic structure and of the development models adopted 
over the course of the last decade and tried to suggest some policy options for the future in order to 
guarantee more economic stability and less volatility in the long run. This would help Argentina 
become more competitive vis-à-vis the rest of the world (and especially with its neighboring country in 
South America). During the period covered by my analysis, industrial policies were mainly based on the 
manipulation of the exchange rate, a strategy which can be helpful in the short run but not very 
effective in the long-term also because its main drawback is rising inflation. A better institutional 
framework and business environment, as well as more investments in technological upgrade and R&D, 
would be necessary for Argentina’s sectors with the highest potential (especially those linked to 
agricultural and food processing and those ones that require a higher intensity of human capital) to 
move further on global value chains. The protectionist barriers erected during the last few years were 
not helpful, differently from the experience of South-East Asian countries, to enhance Argentina’s 
competitiveness because these measures were not accompanied by policies targeted at improving the 
strength of domestic firms, especially Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which represent the 
biggest part of Argentina’s industrial sector but suffer from structural problems like a chronically 
underdeveloped banking system which seriously affects their performance. 
The second part was an empirical analysis of the variables determining Argentina’s trading flows. The 
econometric application of the Gravity model of international trade, and of the Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood estimator (which was shown to be the most efficient estimator after a 
comparison with other regression techniques), gave some important results. The first one is that 
MERCOSUR’s effectiveness in promoting regional trade is questionable: the coefficient obtained from 
the regression says the impact was negative if we consider all the goods involved in the bilateral 
transactions, while sign changes according to the category of goods (it turns positive only for 
commodities and crude materials). The second one is that macroeconomic instability, mainly 
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represented by a particular measure of exchange rate variability I computed, do not seem to have 
affected in a significant way Argentina’s trade pattern with its main partners. Both of these main results 
could be explained by factors that mainly revolve around the troubled economic relations between 
Argentina and Brazil, and I suggest that future research on this topic should follow this direction.  
In the third part of my research I adopted a methodology taken from International Political Economy. 
The case study of Argentina’s behavior in three international organizations (IMF, G20 and 
MERCOSUR) reveals how this has been characterized by progressive hostility towards the current 
global economic system and failure in the implementation of the decisions taken at a collegial level (the 
example of the G20 is striking at this respect, showing that Argentina is the country with the lowest 
implementation rate of the decisions taken during the G20 summits that took place since the global 
financial crisis broke out in 2008). The taxonomy of  negotiating behavior of rising powers suggested 
by Narlikar (2013) helped order the findings obtained in the analysis, showing that Argentina mainly 
implements distributive strategies, promoting issue-based coalitions with a high degree of ideological 
content. The neo-liberal institutional framework, which suggests that States are rational actors and 
therefore they accept to delegate a portion of their sovereignty, looks like the most suitable to describe 
the current global environment, which is shifting from a unipolar framework to a multipolar 
distribution of the economic power. In such a context, it seems rational to use multilateral 
organizations like the IMF and the G20 to address these changes and to create a new global governance 
through the coordination of macroeconomic, monetary and financial policies. My conclusion, 
therefore, is that Argentina’s behavior seems irrational: the current situation could be quite favorable 
for rising economic powers to play a more active role in redefining global economic governance. 
The aforementioned findings represent the most important results obtained in each of the three parts 
of the thesis. After this long research, it is possible now to analyze them in light of the research 
questions formulated at the beginning of this work. In the introduction I had explained that the main 
goal of this thesis was to explore the relations between the internal and the external dimension of 
Argentina’s economic and political development, in order to assess the country’s potential in terms of 
regional (MERCOSUR – South America) and global competitiveness. In fact, the structure of the thesis 
explicitly wanted to expand the focus of the analysis from the domestic level (part I) to the regional 
(part II) to the global one (part III). From the research, it emerged how economic policies implemented 
by Argentina were incoherent. The lack of coherence is evident both at the domestic and the global 
level. In the first sense, this has been a common feature over the last decades: economic policies and 
strategies were periodically replaced by opposite ones (for instance the recurrent shifts from public 
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interventionism to liberal policies), with the result of creating uncertainty and instability and slowing 
growth down. From the external point of view, Argentina moved from periods of openness towards 
the rest of the global economies to others, as the current one, characterized by higher degree of 
isolation. From another point of view, Argentina’s policies proved also to be inappropriate at all levels. 
They harmed the country’s potential to play an influential role in the global arena. If we consider the 
domestic dimension, for instance, the recent policies based on high public intervention, protectionism 
and capital controls, not only reduced the country’s growth potential, but also had a negative impact on 
the external attractiveness of the country for new investments. In a similar way, lack of collaboration 
and engagement of Argentina in the main international economic organizations damaged its external 
reputation and credibility, leading to the same consequence. The overall result is a country which 
economic policies can be effectively described by a ‘tango’ between economic integration and isolation, 
as suggested by the title of this thesis. The current framework (monetary, fiscal, industrial and trade 
policies) is not consistent and compatible with the international ‘rules of the game’ which, as I argued in 
part III, would be actually appropriate to nurture Argentina’s economic growth.  
What is the innovative contribution given by the results of this research? The methodological approach, 
based on three different analytical frameworks, offered a comprehensive analysis of Argentina’s recent 
economic history starting from different angles and perspectives. This helped build a multi-dimensional 
image of the country’s economic role within the global economy, something which would have not 
been possible with the adoption of a single methodology. For instance, a pure econometric analysis of 
Argentina’s performance would not have allowed a more analytical study of the reasons and 
implications underlying the results obtained with the regressions. By the same token, an investigation 
based only on IPE analytical frameworks would not have made possible to analyze economic 
phenomena in detail.  
Moreover, another innovative contribution comes from the fact that the different parts apply analytical 
frameworks and tools that had not been tested to the Argentine case before. The first part compares 
three different economic development theories to show strengths and weaknesses, and combines these 
elements to provide policy recommendations. The second part adopts the recently defined PPML 
estimation technique to analyze the variables of Argentina’s trading flows, showing interesting results 
especially in terms of the disappointing effects of regional integration (the case of MERCOSUR). 
Finally, the third part focuses on a case study of three different examples which are then classified 
according to a new taxonomy of negotiating behavior.    
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Therefore, the overall result of this innovative methodological approach can be compared to the pieces 
of a ‘jigsaw’ that contribute to form a clear and detailed picture of the subject. Such a ‘jigsaw’ could be 
expanded by further research that could follow these directions:  
- a more detailed analysis of monetary policy and of the potential scenarios arising from a future 
shift (for instance towards a full openness of capital flows and the dismissal of strategies 
pursuing competitiveness through currency devaluations); 
- an investigation on Argentina’s potential reinsertion into global financial markets, starting from 
the strategies it should adopt to strengthen its domestic banking sector; 
- further specifications of the econometric analysis of Argentina’s trading flows, aiming at 
defining better the implications of monetary policy and protectionist measures on the country’s 
trading patterns and on regional integration.  
In conclusion, how is it possible to summarize the findings of this research? Argentina’s recent – and 
less recent – history is the case of a country endowed of a huge potential, both in terms of natural and 
human capital resources, which has been partly wasted mainly because of macroeconomic instability 
and lack of coherence in the models of development adopted over the course of the last decades. The 
thesis showed there is a link to the external dimension, since these domestic economic policies resulted 
also into a lack of global competitiveness which affected in the long run the economic performance of 
Argentina, preventing it from achieving the status of a completely developed country. This situation has 
partially changed during the last ten years: the Kirchner governments managed to promote stable  and 
sustained growth, but their industrial policies were not effective in fostering competitiveness in terms 
of creating a favorable business environment able to attract capitals from within the country and from 
abroad. Moreover, populism and economic nationalism are isolating Argentina from the rest of the 
region and the world, driving the country to the status of ‘pariah’ in international relations. 
Therefore, this research would like to suggest some policy recommendations. Argentina would need to 
implement different policies at all levels. At the domestic one, economic policies should be aimed at 
fostering innovation in sectors provided with comparative advantage and at promoting more private 
investment. At the regional level, the integration process of MERCOSUR could be revived through a 
solution of the commercial disputes with Brazil and with a commitment to harmonize the 
macroeconomic imbalances with the other members. Finally, at the international level Argentina should 
play a more collaborative role in order to gain reputation and credibility from other key global partners.  
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The recent mid-term parliamentary elections, held in Argentina at the end of October 2013, saw the 
most negative performance for the Kirchner’s Frente para la Victoria, which still remains the strongest 
party in the country but which has significantly reduced its share of votes, losing in the biggest cities 
(Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Rosario). This will prevent President Cristina Kirchner from managing to 
obtain a constitutional modification (requiring more than the absolute majority of votes in Parliament) 
which would allow her to run for a third term.. Cristina Kirchner reshuffled her cabinet by replacing 
the key economic figures (Minister of Economy, Secretary of Trade relations, President of the Central 
Bank) with other experts. Hernán Lorenzino was replaced by Alex Kicillof as Minister of the Economy, 
while Guillermo Moreno was removed from his appointment as Trade Secretary (he was considered the 
main responsible for manipulating the data on inflation) and Juan Carlos Fábrega replaced Mercedes 
Marcó del Pont at the head of the Central Bank. However, despite this effort to provide more reliable 
and credible figures, it seems unlikely to expect a substantial shift of economic policies in the short-
medium run. Therefore, the presidential elections in 2015 might be a real turning point for Argentina’s 
political and economic future although, as the country’s history shows, a new change at the government 
will not necessarily mean a better future for the country. It is crucial that Argentina’s emotional and 
unpredictable tango is finally driven in the right direction.  
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